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The author examines the Khomeini Regime's process of power
consolidation before, during, and after the Iranian Revolution
of 1979. Using this event as a case study in coercive power
consolidation, the author determines the Khomeini Regime's co-
optation and incorporation (through coercion and persuasion)
of the Iranian military was the first and crucial step in this
process. He further examines the Islamic Republic of Iran's
use of the military to then consolidate its power by
suppressing ethnic minorities, political opposition groups,
and religious minorities. Throughout the thesis, the Khomeini
Regime's practice of demonizing its enemies will be examined
as a principle component of the power consolidation process.
The major conclusion of this study is that the essence of
regime legitimization was grounded in the incorporation of the
army as a necessary element of power. The regime then used
the army to suppress those elements of society that it deemed
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The author examines the Khomeini Regime's process of power
consolidation before, during, and after the Iranian Revolution
of 1979. Using this event as a case study in coercive power
consolidation, the author determines the Khomeini Regime's co-
optation and incorporation (through coercion and persuasion)
of the Iranian military was the first and crucial step in this
process. This co-optation and incorporation was made possible
through inherent structural defects within the military
command and control hierarchy. The Shah's compartmentation of
the military leadership to avoid a coup (such as the one that
brought him to power) served to isolate the military branches
from each other and Iranian society. The author further
examines the Islamic Republic of Iran's use of the military to
then consolidate its power by suppressing ethnic minorities
(Kurds, Azerbaijanis, Turkomans, Baluchis and Arabs),
political opposition groups (Tudeh, Mujaheddin-e-Khalq and
Fedayeen-e-Khalq), and religious minorities (Baha'is and Jews)
after they had been deemed "un-Islamic" and "corrupt".
Throughout the thesis, the Khomeini Regime's practice of
demonizing its enemies is examined as a principal component of
the power consolidation process. This phenomenon is examined
as the process by which the above-mentioned groups evolved
from being "brothers in Islam" to "enemies of the revolution"
to "enemies of the messenger of God" to "enemies of God" and
"corruption on earth" and how they were neutralized. By
vii
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neutralizing these various elements, the Islamic Republic
purged all ideologically or theologically "impure" groups that
could pose a challenge to its legitimacy. The major
conclusion of this study is that the essence of regime
legitimization was grounded in the incorporation of the army
as a necessary element of power. Having secured the state's
most potent coercive arm unto itself, the regime then used the
army to suppress those elements of society that it deemed
threatening or unnecessary in its efforts to remake and recast
Iranian society into a more "Islamic" mold.
viii
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 produced far-reaching changes
throughout Persian society whose impact will be felt for many
years. Concerning those who participated in the early phases
of the revolution, there was "hardly a religious, tribal, or
ethnic minority that was not represented."' As directed by
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian Revolution became
associated in the minds of many with Shi'i Islam. However,
there were other factors that had a hand in the revolution's
development.
Shi'i Muslims were not the only persons participating in
the revolution, nor was Shi'i ideology the only ideology
prompting revolutionary action. Leftists, liberals, and
nationalists of a whole range of political persuasions
were active, on the basis of secular ideologies alone or
in conjunction with religious ideas. Even within the
Shi'i Muslim community, the approach to Islam and politics
was hardly monolithic.2
This paper proposes to examine the coercive aspects of how
the Islamic Republic of Iran consolidated its power following
the revolution that ousted the Shah. This study will posit
that the new regime, after first co-opting the military unto
itself, then used the military to pursue a campaign to
eradicate all potential competition. This was accomplished by
waging a multi-pillared policy aimed at ethnic minorities,
political opposition groups and religious minorities.
1Hegland, Mary, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and
Revolution in an Iranian Village," Keddie, Nikki R., ed., ReliQion
and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution (New
Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 218.
2Ibid., p. 219.
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1 
These purges were undertaken because "the revolutionary
government considered the unity of Iran vital to its national
security,"3 and even went as far as to claim that "abuses of
human rights -are all defended as necessary to safeguard the
Revolution."'
Not only did the Islamic Republic of Iran wage a vigorous
campaign against perceived and real threats, it labeled any
disagreement with its policies as "un-Islamic" or
"counterrevolutionary," which "narrowed the range of
permissible discourse"s to the extent that
The loss of individual rights has been accompanied by a
suspension of all objective moral judgements on the part
of the regime, which has enabled it to conduct a reign of
terror against non-Shiite Muslim minorities, against non-
Muslim minorities, and against anyone accused of fasad
fil-ard ("causing corruption in the land"); in short,
against anyone whose views deviate from "the Imam's
line.'
'Kechichian, Joseph A. and Sadri, Houman, "National Security,"
Metz, Helen Chapin, ed., Iran: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.:
Department of the Army, 1989), p. 296.
"Ibid., p. 297.
sKeddie, Roots of Revolution: An Intervretive History of
Modern Iran (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 230.
6Savory, Roger, "Ex Oriente Nebula: An Inquiry into the
Nature of Khomeini's Ideology," Chelkowski, Peter J. and Pranger,
Robert J., eds., Ideoloav and Power in the Middle East: Studies in
Honor of George Lenczowski (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1988), p. 349.
2
       
      i nal 
rity,"l     f 
 lI~re  r  r   
 .• t 
   i  i     s 
 t i   , t   
t    r 
• tionary, "    f 
i le 5 t t 
l  ied  
   i e ts  rt 
 ,   t   f 
 t t   i s, t -
i  ,       
 ing ti n     , 
t      am's 
. 6 
l ichian,  .  i, , ity," 
t ,  i , .,     , . .: 
t t , 9), . . 
tl   . 
5 ie,   : p tive  f 
  ,   , ), . . 
a , ,  t  :     
  l y," ski,  . r, 
t , ., gy       
   ski ,  it  , 
8), . . 
 
II. THE ARMED FORCES
In a discussion of her book States and Social Revolutions:
A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China, Theda
Skocpol states
the repressive state organizations of the prerevolutionary
regime have to be weakened before mass revolutionary
action can succeed, or even emerge. Indeed, historically,
mass rebellious action has not been able, in itself, to
overcome state repression. Instead, military pressures
from abroad... have been necessary to undermine
repression.
In another article, she further clarifies this by stating that
the "centralized, semi-bureaucratic administrative and
military organizations of the old regimes disintegrated due to
combinations of international pressures and disputes between
the monarchs and landed commercial upper classes."'
Placed in the context of the Iranian Revolution, Skocpol's
theory that in order for the revolution to succeed, the
military had to have disintegrated due to outside pressures,
did not apply. As a result, the following question arises:
Given that the Pahlavi Regime had the most powerful, well-
7Skocpol, Theda, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian
Revolution," Theory and Society, 2, No.3 (May 1982), p. 266 and
States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France,
Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
'Skocpol, "Social Revolutions and Mass Military
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equipped, and well trained military machine in the Persian
Gulf,' how did the Khomeini Regime neutralize (politically,
socially, and militarily) the armed forces of the Pahlavi
Regime?' 0 This must be considered in light of the fact that
"the least likely of all scenarios generally was thought to be
one in which the trained and elaborately equipped military
forces of the Shah would fail at the eleventh hour to save the
monarchy or at least to be in the vanguard of its
replacement.""
This section of the paper will argue that the Iranian
Revolution succeeded not only in spite of the armed forces,
but because of them. It will do so by first outlining the
inherent structural defects of the Shah's military hierarchy
that led to the political emasculation of the armed forces.
This was due to the Shah's personal control of and invcLvement
in the command and control structure. Additionally, the
Shah's insistence that all armed forces heads deal with him
'Kechichian and Sadri, "National Security," from Metz, ed.,
Iran, p. 237 and Wright, Robin, In the Name of God: The Khomeini
Decade (New York: Touchstone, 1989), p. 84.
"
0The question may also be asked inversely: Why did the
Pahlavi Regime (with its powerful, well-equipped, well-trained
armed forces, which were the most important pillar upon which its
power rested), allow the Khomeini regime to politically and
socially emasculate its military forces?
"Noyes, James H., The Clouded ens: Persian Gulf Security and
U.S. Policy, Second Edition (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution
Press, 1982), p. 112.
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directly on all matters and his prohibition on direct contact
between service chiefs will be examined as a factor that
prevented effective coordination to counter the revolution,
even during a time of military rule. 12
This section of the paper will further argue that the
Khomeini Regime, having identified the incorporation of the
armed forces into its power structure as the key to successful
power consolidation, took active measures before and during
the Revolution to do so. It did so by appealing to the armed
forces, who were the backbone of the Shah's regime, 13 to
desert the monarch during the last days of the Pahlavi Regime
and join with the Imam's forces.14
This section of the paper will then show that, in
contradiction to Skocpol's theory, the Khomeini Regime came to
"I2 t could be argued that a well coordinated military response
was not necessary to quell the unarmed, civilian population because
a section of any one of the armed services could have done so.
While this is true, the answer that will be explored will be the
lack of decisive leadership on one hand and psychological
dependence upon the Shah on the other. Both of these factors
synergistically combined to make the armed forces incapable of
independently responding to the uprisings.
"13Amuzegar, Jahangir, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution:
The Pahlavis' Triumph and TraQedy (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1991), 157.
"
14Due to the Shah's compartmentation of the armed forces and
his repressive policies towards the Iranian populace, these
broadcasts found a receptive audience among the younger, less
traditional members of the military. Since they were not among the
established hierarchy of the upper levels of the Pahlavi Regime,
these messages found a fertile, moldable audience.
5
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power in spite of the Shah's armed forces. Once in power, it
incorporated the armed forces unto itself. It then left the
basic infrastructure of the armed forces intact while purging
the monarchists from the upper ranks. Replacing the
monarchists with "ideologically pure" officers, it then used
the armed forces as its primary tool to consolidate the power
of the Khomeini Regime over other elements of society.
Through a later "ideological purge," it further ensured
military loyalty to the government. In this manner, the
Iranian Revolution succeeded not only in spite of the armed
forces, but because of them.
In the wake of the purges, the Khomeini Regime and the armed
forces were drawn even closer together through the Iran-Iraq
War as the new regime found itself relying on the military
expertise of the ancien regime to defend Iran in a fight for
national survival. This wartime experience resulted in the
armed forces further solidifying as an arm of the nascent
Islamic Republic.
A. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY SCENARIO
Since both the Shah and his father came into power due to
military coups, the Shah's main pillar of support was based in
the armed forces," whom he directly supervised.1 6  The
"*SRichards, Alan and Waterbury, John, A Political Economy of
the Middle East: State, Class. and Economic Development, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 354.
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Shah's hold on the armed forces was grounded in his intense
personal supervision of military affairs to the extent that he
"insisted that the commanders of the army, navy, and air force
report to him separately rather than act jointly."" His
compartmentation of the military was based (ironically) on
fears of a military coup and led him to distrust his own hand-
picked generals'8 to the extent that "the shah trusted almost
no one and assumed disloyalty even among his closest
officers.""9  Despite the Shah's paranoia, the military
assumed even more importance with the passage of time and
became his most important pillar, upon which his "survival
critically depended.`20
The Shah ensured loyalty to himself by applying the divide
and rule principle among his generals. He accomplished this
by exacerbating personal rivalries among his generals and
placed "personal enemies alternately in the chain of command"
"I6 brahim, Youssef M., "Ex-Premier Hoveida Is Executed in Iran
After Closed Trial," New York Times, April 8, 1979, p. 14.
"Lenczowski, George, American Presidents and the Middle East,
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 190.
8lIbid.
"19Cottam, Richard W., Iran and the United States: A Cold War
Case Study (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988),
p. 128.
"
20Arjomand, Said Amir, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic
Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc, 1988),
p. 119.
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to preclude the possibility of a coup. 21  Although he was
never ousted by a coup, his preventive measures prevented
communications within the branches of the armed forces,
leading tc their utter psychological dependence upon him for
any type of decision.
The upper echelon of the officer corps was loyal to the
monarch, who personally approved the promotion of all officers
above the rank of major. 22  Towards the latter part of the
seventies, many junior officers were judged to be less
politically reliable due to their university backgrounds. 23
In terms of military capability, the Iranian armed forces
had been seasoned with recent combat experience in Oman, where
over 35,000 troops had assisted in the suppression of a
Communist-supported rebellion in the southern region of
Dhofar. 2 ' The advanced level of military technology was also
evident in the Iranian Air Force, who possessed a formidable
arsenal of state of the art weaponry. 25 This advanced
21Ibid., p. 124.
22Gage, Nicholas, "U.S.-Iran Links Still Strong," New York
Times, July 9, 1979, p. 10.
23Ibid. At the universities, these junior officers had been
exposed to the various anti-Shah factions (leftist and Islamic)
that were prevalent in the late seventies.
24 Ibid.
21•Ibid. The article states the Iranian Air Force had 141 F-4's
and 60 F-14's with 20 more F-14's and 160 F-16's to be delivered.
At the time of the article, these airframes were among the most
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weaponry was a result of many years of expenditures which
consumed a great part of Iran's national income to fuel the
Shah's regional ambitions.26 Through his efforts, the Shah
*sought to make the Iranian military the dominant force in the
Gulf and.... the purchase of arms and military technology ran
at more than $4 billion per annum." 27  In spite of its
advanced state of readiness in terms of weapons, size and
training, the military had no well developed sense of
institutional identity due to the Shah's paranoid
compartmentation and divide and rule policies. 28  For this
reason, the armed forces, although militarily proficient, were
lacking in any independent decision making capability, a
advanced (and therefore coveted) in the non-Soviet world's air
forces. Another New York Times article by noted military affairs
correspondent Drew Middleton (November 6, 1978, p. 18) stated the
Iranian Army had "the most advanced arms of any Asian country east
of Israel," stating it had 1,620 tanks (compared to 2,500 NATO
tanks in Central Europe) and 459 combat airplanes (Israel had only
84 more). The Middleton article, "Both East and West Regard Iran As
Pivotal in the Power Balance," also estimated the Iranian
military's size at 413,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen. The Army
included three armored divisions, three infantry divisions, and
four independent brigades, making it "the most powerful for its
size in Asia," according to Middleton's citation of American and
British advisors.
"
24Fuller, Graham E., The Center of the Universe: The
Geopolitics of Iran, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 49.
"27Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle
East, p. 364.
28Owen, Roger, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the
Modern Middle East (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.,
1992), p. 217.
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factor which would weigh heavily against them during the fall
of the monarchy.
Cracks in the seemingly unassailable structure appeared in
May of 1978, when two former Iranian Army officers, Lieutenant
Mehrdad Pakzad and Captain Hamzeh Farahati, disclosed at a
press conference in London that many in the Iranian armed
forces did "not believe in the regime at all," 29 and that the
Iranian armed forces were rife with widespread discontent.
They also alleged that they had not been allowed to resign
their commissions and had eventually been imprisoned and
tortured for "reading Marxist books," a charge they denied.
In September of 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini gave a speech
coinciding with the end of Ramadan in which he proactively
exhorted the Iranian armed forces to throw off the Shah's
"yoke of slavery and humiliation" to join with their
brothers.3  In October of 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini again
denounced elements of the Iranian Army, stating that they were
in reality under American command - it is even led at the
upper echelons by American advisers and technicians
.... But there have already been, among officers and
"
2 9Mortimer, Edward, "Unrest in Iranian Army described," Times,
May 18, 1978, p. 6.
"30Ibid.
3 1Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: WritinQs and
Declarations, translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 236.
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soldiers, evident signs of trouble as the popular revolt
mounts. 32
B. MILITARY RULE
On November 6, 1978, the Shah placed Iran under military
rule due to the growing discontent and violent nature of the
opposition's anti-government activities. Upon the declaration
of military rule, opposition leaders urged their followers to
avoid confrontations with troops. 3 3  At that point, the
Shah's hold on power was primarily attributed to the
allegiance of the military.3 4
During the rash of anti-Pahlavi demonstrations that occurred
throughout the Fall of 1978, the Shah demonstrated his
indecisiveness as he used the military inconsistently against
his own people, giving United States intelligence false
signals regarding the threat to the monarchy
Circularity was the most common feature of the analysis;
it started with the fact that the Shah had the security
and military forces, and went on to assume that he would
use them as necessary. Because the Shah was not using
force, the analysis continued, the opposition then was
obviously no threat. This was a circle that couldn't be
broken into. The Shah's failure to act was taken as proof
"
32Kandell, Jonathan, New York Times, October 19, 1978, p. 14.
Although it was true that American advisors and technicians were to
be found at the upper echelons of the Iranian military, they by no
means led it or were in any situation to exercise command.
33Gage, "Shah Puts Military in Control in Iran; U.S. Endorses
Move,' New York Times, November 7, 1978, p. 14.
34Gage, mHopes Fading for a Negotiated Settlement in Iran as
Shah Turns to Army,N New York Times, November 6, 1978, p. 18.
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that things were okay. The unasked question was, What
inhibitions on the Shah kept him from using force to stay
in power?"5
This refusal to use the military to suppress the opposition
was later assessed to be one of the Shah's critical mistakes
in light of the fact that the military remained loyal to him
until he departed. His reticence to use the military for
suppression of civil unrest also enraged his hard-line
generals, who favored harsh measures to retain the monarch's
power. 3'
As tensions mounted in Iran between the Shah and the
factions within society who opposed him, Khomeini (from Paris)
called on the Shah's soldiers to desert their barracks, stop
helping the "traitor shah" and to "unite with the people" in
order to undermine the monarch's power." In doing so,
Khomeini correctly identified the Army as the "key to the
success of the revolution" 3' and the element that would
ensure the consolidation of power. He then "acted swiftly to
3
'Woodward, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987,
(New York: Pocket Books, 1987), p. 108.
36Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, p. 120. In a discussion
of this topic, Arjomand posits that the Shah simply lacked the
nerve to employ his military against the populace.
"31"Khomeyni Calls on Shah's Soldiers to Desert," Paris AFP in
English, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 1436 GMT, 03
Dec 78 (TA031441Y), December 4, 1978, pp. R3-4.
38Sick, Gary, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter With
Iran, with a New Introduction by the Author (Harrisonburg, VA:
Penguin Books, 1985), p. 98.
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neutralize the military"' in order incorporate it into the
new power structure. Part of Khomeini's strategy for
accomplishing this incorporation was based on the fact that
Khomeini was also cognizant that without the armed
forces' assistance, the leftists and autonomy-seeking
ethnic minorities could undermine the Islamic Revolution.
Thus, he pursued a.. .policy... to maintain the
institutional integrity of the armed forces while purging
them of monarchists.. .Despite the purges, the structural
cohesion of the armed forces remained intact. 40
Due to constant appeals from anti-Shah factions to the armed
forces to desert, the Information Ministry issued a series of
desperate communiques in mid-December denying reports that the
Iranian Army was on the verge of mutiny.41
Responding in kind, the anti-government forces waged their
own propaganda campaign to foment dissent within the ranks of
the Iranian Army. The opposition accused the Pahlavi regime
of pitting the Army against the people in order to bring about
a schism to separate the junior members of the armed forces
"19Ibid. p. 97.
"
0Milani, Mohsen M., The MakinQ of Iran's Islamic Revolution:
From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1988), p. 258.
41"Tehran Commentary: Nations's Soldiers Will Not Relax
Vigilance," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1430 GMT, 08
Dec 78 (LD081602Y), December 13, 1978, p. R8 and "AFP: Government
Denies Report of Mutiny in Army," Paris AFP in English, FBIS, 1348
GMT, 16 Dec 78 (TA161404Y), December 18, 1978, p. R2. Both of
these refute anti-government claims concerning armed forces
desertion. The first one addresses at length the loyal and noble
character of the Iranian soldier, calling him a "high-flying
phoenix across whose path no desperate cunning and treachery by the
servants of the foreigner could ever set a snare."
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against their own families. The opposition appealed to the
"patriotic soldiers and noncommissioned officers of our
homeland" to leave the forces of "a despotic, bloodthirsty
regime" and join them to place themselves "on the side of the
nation..42
As the levels of intensity against anti-government
demonstrations increased, reticence on the part of soldiers to
fire upon their countrymen became a topic of anti-government
broadcasts. These broadcasts exacerbated uncertainty within
the armed forces, who lacked clear leadership and decisiveness
on the part of the upper echelons directing them. These
broadcasts also emphasized the refusal of many soldiers to
obey direct orders from their commanding officers, especially
if the order concerned firing upon unarmed demonstrators.
The religious leaders and national forces have called on
the armymen to carry out their national and religious duty
to Iran and the Iranian people by disobeying the orders of
the black generals of the shah's court and by joining the
people. The soldiers, offices and armymen are the children
of the Iranian nation and cannot remain indifferent to the
bloody events in the realm and the call--the invitation--
of the national and religious leaders. The day is not far
away when the armymen, by fully joining the ranks of the
people, will cast the heads of this bloodshedding regime
and its criminal generals into the trash can of
history. 43
42 "National Voice of Iran Urges Soldiers to Abandon Regime,"
National Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran, FBIS, 1730
GMT, 05 Dec 78 (LD190052Y), December 19, 1978, pp. R11-12.
13"National Voice of Iran on Mutiny in Armed Forces," National
Voice of Iran (Clandestine) in Persian to Iran, FBIS, 1730 GMT, 15
Dec 78 (LD221830Y), December 27, 1978, pp. R8-10.
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In the face of continuing unrest, elements of the armed
forces continued to rebel, in many cases refusing to fire on
anti-government demonstrators and also deserting. In some
instances, the government kept the soldiers in their barracks
rather than send them into the streets to combat the
demonstrators. The fear that the soldiers would heed the
calls of the demonstrators to hold their fire and desert was
stronger than the need to quell the unrest.44 Additionally,
the military forces were trained in conventional warfare, not
non-lethal riot control techniques. For this reason, military
responses to anti-Pahlavi demonstrations tended to be harsh
and repressive, which evoked strong responses from the Iranian
populace and the world community.4 5  This also served to
further confuse and alienate many of the younger soldiers.
The blame for this can not be attributed to a lack of effort
on the part of many senior military leaders. They repeatedly
asked for riot control equipment and training but their
requests were denied time and again.46  In fact, the very
orientation of the armed forces was not geared towards an
"Apple, R.W. Jr., *Shah's Army Is Showing Stress," New York
Times, December 19, 1978, p. 1.
4sLenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 189,
Cottam, Iran and the United States, p. 134, and Arjomand The Turban
for the Crown, p. 120.
"Rubin, Barry, Paved With Good Intentions: The American
Experience and Iran (Dallas, PA: Penguin Books, 1980), p. 227.
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internal threat, but rather an external one. The result of
this policy was that *weapons and training for domestic
disturbances were not emphasized."' 7 The outward orientation
meant that the military was "organized for the wrong war" in
which its response to internal dissent was much less effective
than a foreign invasion scenario. 48  Additionally, the
internal strife tended to confuse the priorities of many
soldiers, rendering them ineffective.
The differences between regular officers and the
(conscripted) soldiers were exacerbated as well during the
period of unrest preceding the departure of the Shah. The
cracks and fissures in the military were partially due to the
fact that the regular officers were part of an elite class
that lived a separate existence from the men they commanded.
They enjoyed access to free medical care, generous pay, and
special commodities. On the other hand, the conscripts were
paid very little and were drawn from the same elements of
society as the demonstrators, with whom they were able to
identify more easily.'" As the demonstrations continued, the
"Hickman, William F., Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army,
1982 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 3.
"4Ibid., p. 7.
"Ibid. There were many examples during the anti-government
demonstrations of conscripts being in a position where they had to
choose between disobeying an order or suppressing (in some manner)
a relative or friend.
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army came to be regarded as the force that prevented the
country from sinking into utter chaos. 50
As the crisis wore on, reports of soldiers defecting began
to circulate. Additionally, soldiers began to shoot other
soldiers to prevent them from firing on the anti-government
protestors and army units began to disobey orders to quell the
protests. This had the effect of undermining esprit de corps
and military discipline, as well as making the soldiers more
susceptible to dissident propaganda broadcasts. From exile in
Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the soldiers to desert
and join the opposition"1 . Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri
stated that Khomeini's appeals to the army were having an
impact:
There is a spirit of rebellion inside the army... and if an
Islamic government is installed in Iran, these soldiers
and young officers will obey and follow the leaders who
follow Khomeini's instructions. 5 2
Amidst speculation concerning the imminent departure of the
Shah in early 1979, senior offices in the armed forces
expressed their dismay at the possibility of a new civilian
government. Their fears were based in apprehension concerning
their collective and individual fates. With the Shah gone,
50Ibid.
SiGage, "Iranians Observe Day of Mourning for Dead in Revolt,"
New York Times, December 19, 1978, p. 3.
""
2 Religious Leader from Iran Says Torture Made Him Nearly
Deafm New York Times, December 20, 1978, p. 5.
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the military would have to negotiate with the new government
for control of the military budget. Additionally, the
military had borne the brunt of anti-Pahlavi sentiment and had
maintained internal discipline principally because of a sense
of loyalty to the Shah. With his departure, the military
feared being dismembered at the hands of a new regime as well
as at the hands of the populace." 3 The military, due to its
compartmentalized nature, also feared corporate inertia and an
institutionalized inability to act, as well as internal
rivalries that would render them useless. 5'
On January 4, 1979, General Gholam Ali Oveissi, the Iranian
Army Commander and martial-law administrator of Tehran
resigned. The General cited health reasons as the cause of
his resignation. He was disliked by the populace for his
hard-line views and he was vehemently opposed to any
abdication of power by the Shah. 5 5 His resignation, in the
53In terms of weaponry, the military did not fear the populace.
Their concern was that with the Shah removed from their future,
discipline would erode and they would be unable to withstand
popular demands for justice due to the armed forces' role in
suppressing anti-Pahlavi sentiment.
"
54Gage, "Trip for Shah: Some Say 'No,'" New York Times,
January 5, 1979, p. 6.
55Pace, Eric, "Shah Is Reported on Brief Vacation at Iranian
Resort," New York Times, January 5, 1979, p. 6. In and of itself,
the General's resignation would have been a negligible footnote.
However, in the context of political and societal turmoil, his
resignation took on another significance in terms of lowering the
morale of the soldiers he commanded.
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opinion of Carter Administration officials, reduced the
possibilities of strong military opposition to a post-Pahiavi
regime. 1
On January 6, Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar named General
Feridum Djam as War Minister. General Djam a former Chief of
Staff who had been dismissed in 1971 by the Shah for being
otoo good, too competent, too popular, too much his own
man.* 05 Bakhtiar also named Lieutenant General Mehdi Rahemi
Larijani as General Oveissi's successor to the post of
military governor of Tehran. Larijani had been Oveissi's
deputy and was considered more moderate than his former
commander., 8
The situation became so serious in the eyes of the Carter
Administration that Air Force General Robert E. Huyser, Deputy
Commander of the United States European Command, was
dispatched to Tehran to urge the armed forces to unite behind
the new government. General Huyser reportedly spoke with new
Chief of Staff General Abbas Gharabaghi, exhorting him to
56Gwertzman, Bernard, NU.S. Will Cooperate With A New Regime
If Shah Stays Or Not," New York Times, January 5, 1979. p. 6.
"Apple, "IJew Iran Cabinet Unable to Bring in Main Opposition,"
New York Times, January 7, 1979, p. 3.
"
5 Gage, =Bakhtiar Installed And Shah Declares He'll Take A
Rest," New York Times, January 7, 1979, p. 4.
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avoid precipitous military actions, especially a coup, which
would lead to a curtailment of American military aid."9
On January 10, former Imperial Guard Command General Abdolah
Badrai was named as Commander of the Iranian Army (Ground
Forces Commander), replacing General Oveissi in that
position.6 0 General Badrai assumed command as Prime Minister
Bakhtiar's power waned. Bakhtiar was viewed as impotent in
the wake of a remark by a general who publicly stated that the
army would refuse to follow Bakhtiar. Instead of a harsh
reprimand, the Shah promoted the general who made the remark,
further undermining Bakhtiar's position. 61
As the controversy over a possible military coup was
debated, reports began to filter in from Kuwait that over 50
Iranian Army officers had deserted in recent weeks. The
Iranian authorities had been reticent to take any steps
"
59Apple, "Fresh Street Violence Greets New Iranian Regime," New
York Times, January 8, 1979, p. 4. Although publicly General
Huyser decried the possibility of a coup, numerous sources have
pointed out that Huyser was acting as the representative of the
United States to formulate options which included "[A] encourage
the Iranian military to support Bakhtiar's civilian government; [B]
plan for possible direct military action if required to bolster the
civilian regime [C] support a military takeover by Iranian forces
if public order collapsed." Citation from Sick, All Fall Down, p.
163.
60whereas General Oveissi had been both the Military Governor
of Tehran and the Commander of the Iranian Army, the positions were
separated to attempt to prevent the concentration of too much power
in the hands of one individual.
"61"Bakhtiar Says His Regime Faces Danger of a Coup," New York
Times, January 11, 1979, p. 3.
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against the deserters due to "fear of popular reaction and
possible armed confrontation" among competing factions of the
Iranian military."2
During this time, General Huyser was still conducting
meetings with senior Iranian officials concerning the
ramifications of a military coup. Huyser reported back to
United States Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that working
with the Iranian military was difficult due to the
compartmentation of the services. The Shah's prohibition on
coordination among the services for fear of a coup had left
the military arms of the state incapable of joint action,63
or any type of independent action. In this vein, U.S.
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance issued the following
statement:
Iran's armed forces remain essential to the security and
independence of Iran, and as a necessary complement to a
legitimate civilian government. We have urged that
everything be done to ensure their integrity and their
support by the people of Iran. 64
Bakhtiar was forced to appoint a new Minister of War,
General Jaafar Shafaqat to replace General Diam. General
Shafaqat was regarded as a moderate who favored civilian rule.
62 "Kuwaiti Daily Reports Iranian Officers Deserting, Paris AFP
in English, FBIS, 1000 GMT, 11 Jan 79 (TA111016Y), January 11,
1979, p. R12.
"63Sick, All Fall Down, p. 165.
"64"Text of Vance's Statement on the Situation in Iran,a New
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He replaced General Djam because the Shah would not allow
General Djam to appoint the heads of the armed forces.
Fearing a coup, the Shah also refused to allow the heads of
the armed forces to report to General Djam. In light of thee
new developments, new speculation emerged concerning the
possibilities of a military coup if the Shah did not give the
military a freer hand in security affairs."5
From Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini stated that the Shah would
stage a military coup rather than abdicate his power. The
exiled opposition leader issued a call to the army to prevent
any such attempts.66
There is a possibility that the treacherous Shah, now
about to depart, will commit a further crime-a military
coup d'etat; I have frequently warned that this is
probable. It would be his last blow. The courageous
people of Iran know that there are only a few slavish and
bloodthirsty individuals in the army, who apparently
occupy important positions and whose identities are known
to me, and that the honorable elements in the army will
never permit these slaves of the Shah to commit such a
crime against their nation and religion. In accordance
with my God-given and national duty, I alert the Iranian
army to this danger and I demand that all commanders and
officers resolutely prevent the enactment of any such
conspiracy and not permit a few bloodthirsty individuals
to plunge the noble people of Iran into a bloodbath.
Iranian army, this is your God-given duty. If you obey
these congenital traitors, you will be accountable to God,
Exalted and Almighty, condemned by all humanitarians, and
cursed by future generations.. .The Iranian people must
treat the honorable officers and commanders of the army
6s'Iran's New Chief Calls for Backing of Arabs, 'Especially
Palestinians,'" New York Times, January 12, 1979, p. 3.
66"Iran's Exiled Moslem Leader Picks Council to Form a
Religious State," New York Times, January 14, 1979, p. 1.
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with respect. They must recognize that a few treacherous
members of the army cannot sully the army as a whole. The
record and responsibility of a few bloodthirsty
individuals is something separate from the army as a
whole. The army belongs to the people, and the people
belong to the army. The army will not suffer any harm as
a result of the departure of the Shah. 67
The Shah attempted to ensure the loyalty of the military
forces to Bakhtiar to prevent anarchy upon his departure but
There was, however, a flaw in his thinking: Iran's armed
forces were basically the shah's creation and loyal to
him, not to an abstract concept of "constitutional
authority." Should the shah choose to remain in the
country and fight for his survival, there was a good
chance that the army, even though suffering from
occasional desertions and the mullahs' antimonarchist
brainwashing, would side with the ruler and defend him.
But it was somewhat naive to expect that the army would
defend an empty palace and meekly transfer its allegiance
to a little known former opposition leader in the name of
constitutional principle.68
For this reason, the armed forces lost all vestiges of
discipline when the Shah left on February 11, 1979.69 When
he left Iran, the Shah refused to appoint a strong military
leader such as General Djam to hold the armed forces together,
fearing that such a situation would work against him if he
returned to Iran.° He was incapable of transferring power
"67Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, pp. 247-8.
"6OLenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, p. 197.
"ORichards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle
East, p. 427.
"This is indicative of how out of touch with the reality of
the situation the Shah really was.
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from himself to the government."' In contradiction to
Skocpol Is theory, it "was only after the Shah's departure that
the process of disintegration of the army under political
pressure set in.`12
Upon the Shah's departure, anti-Pahlavi demonstrators sought
to win the favor of soldiers patrolling the streets of Tehran.
The demonstrators kissed the soldiers and gave them flowers,
in an attempt to emphasize their solidarity with them. In a
return gesture, many of the soldiers placed the flowers in the
barrels of their machine guns."
Amidst the uncertainty, rumors circulated as to whether the
military would attempt a coup or at least a crackdown.
Iranian papers were especially critical of the armed forces;
they criticized the military's role in keeping the Shah in
power and killing hundreds of Iranians."
Waiting to see how events were going to develop with the
incoming regime, Iranian Armed Forces Chief of General
Gharabaghi issued a warning to any potential officers who
might be contemplating a coup, stating they would be
"Ariomand, The Turban for the Crown, pp, 123-4.
"Ibid., P. 190.
73 wDeparture of Shah Won, t Bring Peace, Opponent Predicts," New
York Times, January 15, 1979, p. 1.
7"Pace, "New Freedom Excites Iran Journalist," New York Times,
January 15, 1979, p. 3.
24
rom sel h r ent.'l t i  
pol'   t  ah' rt t 
 i l 
t  "n 
up ,   t 
  . 
onstrat r hem lo  
tem t phasi i it he   
,       
rr l i achi s. 73 
idst cert  or het r  
ili oul tem t  ackdo  
r er eciall  l  
 i     i     
er i in r s a '4 
wai         
nco i , r e r  hi f eneral 
i    i l rs  
i ht t plat   oul  
71Arj and, r r , . - . 
7:lIbid., p. . 
73 • Departure of Shah on't r ing eace, t t , ..  
or  i es, , 9, .  
"pace, "New Freedom Excites Ira  r alist,·  s, 
r  , , .  
 
"crushed." The General emphasized the need to avoid conflict
between the armed forces and the anti-Shah factions in Iran.
He stated that if any conflict occurred between them, "neither
the army nor the nation will survive."" The General further
stated that the Army would support "any legal government" but
that the Army had been subject to "provocations" by
demonstrators in various Iranian cities and issued a stern
warning to anti-government forces not to "provoke" the army,
whose duty was to maintain order.
7 6
In a similar vein, Khomeini urged the nation to "preserve
public order and win the support of the armed forces.""
Paris' diplomatic community was surprised by the Ayatollah's
moderate tone and his desire to include the armed forces in
any discussions of a post-Pahlavi Iran." What these
diplomats ignored was the fact that Khomeini in fact desired
to gain political control of the army to use it as a tool to
assist in the transition from monarchy to Islamic Republic."
"Gage, "Shah Said To Plan To Leave Iran Today For Egypt And
U.S.," New York Times, January 16, 1979, pp. 1 - 8.
76
"AFP: Army Chief Says No Military Coup," Paris AFP in
English, FBIS, 1520 GMT, 15 Jan 79 (TA151530Y), January 16, 1979,
p. R6.
"7Lewis, Paul, "Ayatollah Urges Backers to Press Fight on
Regime," New York Times, January 18, 1979, p. 1.
"7BIbid. p. 14.
"79Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern
Middle East, p. 217.
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Ayatollah Shariatmadari also issued an appeal for calm,
urging Iranians to "respect the Iranian Army and treat it with
kindness and fraternity," distinguishing the majority of the
soldiers from "those who have opened fire on the people," who
"should be treated separately.0"8
In the oil producing city of Ahvaz, renegade soldiers opened
fire on anti-Shah demonstrators, dashing any hopes of a
completely peaceful transition to Bakhtiar's rule. Estimates
of fatalities ranged from ten to over one hundred. The
violence began when a military officer told his subordinates
that the Shah had left Iran and that they must obey Prime
Minister Bakhtiar. Three officers and an undetermined number
of soldiers then took to the streets rolling their tanks over
cars and shooting at peaceful demonstrators. They were
contained within a few hours, but not before giving rise to
speculation concerning a possible coup."
In an attempt at damage control, the Governor General of
Khuzestan, Lieutenant General Jafarian decried the
"opportunists who want to plunge our dear country into
anarchy." He also criticized the renegade military members
whom he described as "adventurists" that would be punished "in
"
80
"Ayatollah Shari'at-Madari Warns Against Incitement," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 17 Jan 79 (LD171358),
January 18, 1979, p. Ri.
'
1Apple, "Soldiers Run Wild In Iranian Oil City," New York
Times, January 18, 1979, p. 1.
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accordance with the law and regulations." He urged the army
to obey Bakhtiar "so that a chasm--God forbid--may not be
brought about between the army and the zealous, patriotic
Iranian people." 82
In a another bid to defuse the tension and keep the armed
forces out of any controversial situations, Iranian Armed
Forces Chief of Staff General Gharabaghi stated there would be
no army coup, because the army was "the guardian of the
constitution and the government," whose duty was to maintain
public order. He also claimed that all military perpetrators
of insubordination would be "severely punished." 83  The
General then urged all soldiers to carry out their duties
"with a firm resolve, with moral discipline and a spirit
replete with patriotism and by overcoming emotionalism and
refraining from any act that might be contrary to military
commands and duties." 84
Despite being reigned in, the army became the focus of
public attention and a great deal of speculation concerning
82
"Khuzestan Governor General On Incidents in Ahvaz," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 17 Jan 79 (LD171848),
January 18, 1979, p. R2.
83"General Qarabaghi: There Will Be No Army Coup," Paris AFP
in English, FBIS, 1144 GMT, 22 Jan 79 (0W221145), January 22, 1979,
p. R6.
14"Qarabaghi Calls For Armed Forces Unity Behind Government,"
Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 2030 GMT, 22 Jan 79
(LD222240), January 23, 1979, R1.
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the possibilities of a coup. As the army generals expressed
their support for Bakhtiar, supporters of Khomeini skeptically
voiced their doubts about the army's intentions, especially in
light of the Ayatollah's imminent return from exile in Paris.
Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani warned that the people of Iran
would wage a "holy war" against the army if it attempted a
coup. 85 He stated that if the army tried to take over Iran,
"the people would deal with" the military and would be
"victorious."86 These fears proved to be unfounded since the
Army as a unified entity was incapable of acting without the
Shah. 87
The military's public image became more tenuous however when
renegade soldiers opened fire on pro-Khomeini anti-government
demonstrators in Tehran on January 26. Although Bakhtiar gave
the orders to quell the unrest, which included over 100,000
demonstrators, the army, as the enforcement arm, took the
brunt of public outcry against its actions, which resulted in
at least 15 deaths and dozens wounded. 88 This served to
further degrade the army's already tarnished public image.
"Pace, "Iran Islamic Leader Warns Of Holy War If Army Tries
Coup," New York Times, January 23, 1979, p. 1.
"Ibid, p. 4.
8 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, p. 124.
"Pace, "Troops Kill at Least 15 in Tehran As 100,000 Protest
for Khomeini," New York Times, January 27, 1979, p. 1.
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Further violence occurred on January 29, when demonstrators
protested the army's closing of all airports, which prevented
the return of Khomeini. After being pelted with rocks,
soldiers fired on crowds in Tehran, killing 35 and wounding an
unknown number of civilians. Soldiers also fired on anti-
government demonstrators in Resht, a town on the Caspian sea,
killing five and wounding 40.89
Upon announcing that Iran's airports would reopen to allow
Khomeini's return, army officers conferred with the
Ayatollah's aides. Among other topics discussed were security
plans to safeguard Khomeini. 9" A more telling sign of the
military's political emasculation was the fact that
revolutionaries, not the army, provided security for Khomeini
when he returned to Iran. 9'
After Khomeini's return to Iran, he appealed to the Iranian
military to become "free and independent" so that they could
join with him as "brothers." 92  He then criticized the
presence of American advisors in the armed forces as an impure
element and entreated the army to follow the correct path
89
"Bakhtiar Peace Bid To Khomeini Fails; Violence Renewed," New
York Times, January 29, 1979, p. 4.
"
9 0Apple, "Iran, Easing Return Of Khomeini, Is Set To Reopen
Airports," New York Times, January 30, 1979, p. 1.
"
91Arjomand, The Turban and the Crown, p. 135.
92Markham, James M., "Ayatollah Steps Up Pressure On Regime To
Bow Out In Iran," New York Times, February 4, 1979, p. 1.
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I invite them for their own good and the nation's good to
be with us. I hope they can be guided. The people are
their brothers. We want what is good for them; we want
them to be free and independent."3
Faced with the reality of the new regime, the military
stated that its loyalties were to the Iranian Constitution,
not the Shah. The Khomeini regime, in return, stated that
their goal was a transfer of power within the framework of
that same constitution." By cooperating with the incoming
regime, General Gharabaghi hoped to preserve the unity and
structure of the armed forces, thereby maintaining cohesion to
prevent disintegration and internal friction within the
military. Gharabaghi also omitted the pledge of loyalty to
the Shah which was administered on February 6 to cadets of the
Tehran Military Academy upon graduation.9'
The show of unity suffered a blow when a number of Iranian
Air Force civilian technicians staging a pro-Khomeini
demonstration at Farahabad Air Force base in Tehran were fired
upon by soldiers. Conflicting reports of the February 10
confrontation put the death toll between 20 and 70.96
"9'Ibid, p. 16.
"94Markham, "2 Sides In Iran Take Conciliatory Steps; Contacts
Reported," New York Times, February 5, 1979, p. 1.
9sArjomand, The Turban for the Crown, p. 123.
"I6 brahim, "Troops Said To Kill Khomeini's Backers At Iranian
Air Base," New York Times, February 10, 1979, p. 1.
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As a result of the Farahabad Air Force Base incident,
violence spread throughout Tehran among factions within the
military and armed civilians, causing many more casualties.
The Imperial Guard, equipped with helicopters and tanks, found
itself arrayed against the technicians, who were augmented by
an increasing force of military officers, Air Force cadets,
and civilians. A poorly planned offensive against the
technicians failed to dislodge them and further weakened the
military.97 In retrospective, the Homafaran "were singly the
most important unit in the armed forces won over by the
revolutionaries and were decisive in precipitating the final
split in the army that sealed its fate on February 9 to
1.98
The Homafaran were a particularly dissatisfied element
within the armed forces. Although they were civilians, they
wore military uniforms and possessed a military rank between
the officers and NCO's.99 They were hired on a contractual
basis to perform maintenance and technical functions within
the military. Although they were well paid, they were
accorded very little respect within the military and were also
"97Ibrahim, "Scores Dead In Iran As Military Groups Clash Over
Regime," New York Times, February 11, 1979, pp 1 & 3.
"9Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, p. 123.
"99NCO is an acronym that stands for Non-Commissioned Officers;
a type of enlisted personnel.
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forced to stay in the military after their contracts had
expired. This led to a great deal of discontent, owing to the
fact that they could have made much more money working in the
civilian sector.°00
In an effort to contain the violence, the Iranian Army
called its troops back into the barracks "to prevent further
bloodshed and anarchy." as Prime Minister Bakhtiar
resigned."0 ' Additionally, General Gharabaghi declared that
the armed forces were "neutral" in the political conflict in
an attempt to keep them intact and prevent popular rage from
being directed at them. 102
After the Farahabad incident, speculation concerning the
defeat of the Imperial Guard at the hands of "a mob of poorly
armed civilians" began to circulate. Questions as to why a
force in excess of 400,000 that was well-armed and well-
trained abounded in Tehran during the early phases of the
Revolution.10 3  One Western military attache offered an
analysis that seemed to state the obvious
... Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, p. 227.
101 Gage, "Army Withdraws Its Support For Bakhtiar; Iranian
Prime Minister Reported To Resign," New York Times, February 12,
1979, p. 1.
1 02Lewis, "Iran's Elite Army Guard Was Routed by Civilians,"
New York Times, February 13, 1979, p. 8.
103Ibid.
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As a fighting force the army has been humiliated. As a
political influence, its weight is greatly reduced.
It is a tragedy to see this happen to a force with such
fine tradition, but I am not surprised. I think the
Imperial Guard was wrongly trained and badly commanded.
But in the end you cannot ask a modern army to fight its
own people.10 4
Further comments by other military personnel also criticized
the Shah for not training his military in riot control
procedures or to learn to combat the psychological effects of
repressing their own countrymen.1 0 5  A more accurate
criticism would have targeted the monarch's paranoid
compartmentation of his military and the institutionalized
inability to make independent decisions.
The Farahabad incident was the vital catalyst that allowed
anti-Pahlavi factions to overcome the might of the armed
forces. This was not due so much to any ability of the
revolutionaries to resist the armed forces, but rather to (1)
the synergistic effects of popular, broad-based opposition to
the Shah, (2) reluctance of the soldiers to repress their
fellow countrymen and military personnel, (3) institutional
inertia, (4) the Shah's excessively paranoid compartmentation
of his security forces in order to prevent their conspiring
against him, and (5) the military's inability to act
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When the Army's decision to withdraw its support and retreat
into the barracks was made public, the citizens of Tehran
celebrated in the streets. They hailed the soldiers as they
withdrew from the Iranian radio and television complex and
threw flowers to them.' 0 6
Ayatollah Khomeini issued a statement praising the
military's decision to withdraw from the fray and encouraged
the populace to accord the military the proper courtesy and
respect in keeping with their status as part of the revolution
Now that victory is near and that the armed forces have
retreated and announced their lack of intervention in
political affairs and also announced their support of the
nation, you should not burn their institutions....
Again I say to you that if the army stops and joins the
people and the legal Islamic government, then we will
recognize them as being of the people."°"
In a show of support for Khomeini and the Islamic
Revolution, hundreds of Air Force warrant officer technicians
and other personnel from Hatami Air Force Base in Esfahan
marched in solidarity to proclaim their support for the
Bazargan government. 108
10 6Ibrahim, "Jubilation, Anarchy and Sadness Mix as Tehran
Erupts in Frenzy," New York Times, February 12, 1979, p. 1.
107"Text of Ayatollah's Statement," New York Times, February
12, 1979, p. 8.
l 0 8"Hatami Airbase Supports Bazargan," Tehran Domestic Service
in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 12 Feb 79 (LD121731), February 13,
1979, p. R7.
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C. THE PURGE OF THE MONARCHISTS
Almost immediately, leading military figures were publicly
displayed by the new regime in what was to become a string of
summary executions that took place in "an atmosphere of
arbitrariness and lack of control."10 9 This psychological
"reign of terror" was intended to send a clear message to the
military to submit to the new regime.110 In Tehran, three
generals were paraded in front of foreign journalists as "some
of the honorable thieves who have ruled this country for the
last 10 years.""' The new leadership had in fact decided
that a "purge of the armed forces would be undertaken, but on
a limited scale, concentrating on 'corrupt elements.'" 1
1 2
Provisional Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan quickly appointed
Major General Muhammad Vali Gharavi as the Chief of the
Supreme Commander's Staff, in the first of what were to be
many military personnel replacements carried out by the new
109Cottam, Iran and the United States, p. 192.
"n0Schahgaldian, Nikola B., The Iranian Military Under the
Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1987),
p. 27.
"'Ibrahim, "Some Leaders of Shah's Regime Are Put on Display
as Prisoners," New York Times, February 13, 1979, p. 1.
"12Kechichian and Sadri, 'National Security," Metz, ed., Iran,
p. 247.
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regime.-" Bazargan also appointed Lieutenant General Sa'id
Mehdiyun as Commander of the Iranian Air Force. When
announcing General Mehdiyun's appointment, all Air Force
personnel, to include "officers, warrant officer technicians,
NCOIs, administrative staff and enlisted men," were ordered to
report for duty on the following day to their units."' By
doing so, the new regime ensured that the military were not
only present and accounted for,15 they could also be
employed against any potential dissident elements. Air Force
Brigadier General Ayatollah Mahaqqeqi, the Commander of
the Air Force Fighters was arrested. There was no reason
immediately given." 6
On February 13, Major General Gharavi, Chief of the General
Staff, issued an order to all the senior officers of the staff
command to report immediately to Staff Command Headquarters
for a conference. The urgency of the order was emphasized by
the proviso that the officers were allowed to come in civilian
"13 "New Chief of Supreme Staff," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1245 GMT, 12 Feb 79 (LD121258), February 13, 1979,
p. R3.
"14"New Air Force Commander," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1705 GMT, 12 Feb 79 (LD121736), February 13, 1979,
p. R7.
"'Those who did not report for duty could also be identified
as possible subversives.
"1 6"Air Force General Arrested," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 0630 GMT, 13 Feb 79 (LD130658), February 13, 1979,
p. RI0.
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clothes if necessary."' Additionally, all officers, staff,
and soldier of the Army's Staff Command were ordered to report
for duty to their respective sections to "discharge their
duties" for the following day.' 18
On the same day, an order was issued from Prime Minister
Bazargan for all "officers, servicemen and employees of the
War Ministry and its related organizations" to report for duty
and "resume work immediately after receiving this
message.""1 9  Simultaneously, Colonel Tavakkoli, Head of
the Provisional Islamic Revolution Staff Command, issued the
following directive to all members of the armed forces
Since all the units of the armed forces have accepted
the leadership of His Eminence Imam Khomeyni, the leader
of the revolution, all the units that have started moving
toward Tehran in order to assist the units in the capital
are hereby informed to immediately return to their
barracks and report the whereabouts of all units in the
relevant garrisons to the provisional revolution staff
command. People who are on the route of these units are
asked not to obstruct their movement.' 20
'..This may have been a safety precaution as well in light of
the anti-military sentiment prevalent among certain elements of the
population.
"'"Senior Army Officers To Headquarters," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 0830 GMT, 13 Feb 79 (LD130858), February
13, 1979, p. R11.
'9"Military Personnel To Resume Duties," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 0840 GMT, 13 Feb 79 (LD130938), February
13, 1979, p. R1l.
120"Units Ordered To Barracks," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 0930 GMT, 13 Feb 79 (LD131028), February 13, 1979,
p. R11.
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On the same day, Khomeini addressed the Iranian populace,
stressing that the army, as well as the police and gendarmerie
should not be attacked because they *have returned to us, and
are one of us." The Ayatollah also stated that the "army is
ours, appealing not only to those elements of society who
harbored anti-military sentiment, but also to the military
itself.1 2 1
Deputy Prime Minister Amir Entezam issued a statement that
the 487,000 man Iranian Army was "dissolved, unfortunately."
He then went on to proclaim that he entertained hopes of
improving the state of affairs for the military to "put it
back together again.""' This sentiment was echoed by Prime
Minister Medhi Bazargan, who stated the desire to rapidly
rebuild the fragmented military with the same organizational
hierarchy and a distinct command hierarchy of new, appointed
officers,1 2 3 cast in the mold of the nascent Islamic
Republic.
1 2 1 "Khomeyni Addresses Nation," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1701 GMT, 13 Feb 79 (LD132038), February 14, 1979,
p. R8.
1 2 2Markham, "Iran Regime Is Expected To Insist in Total Power,"
New York Times, February 14, 1979, p. 8.
1 23Markham, "Marxist-Leninist Guerilla Group Is a Potent Force
in New Iran," New York Times, February 15, 1979, p. 18. Although
these statements seemed to indicate that the military had
dissolved, its basic structure remained intact, as evidenced by the
return of the soldiers to their barracks and duty stations when
ordered. The real crisis was one of leadership and knowing who was
in charge.
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In an attempt to keep the armed forces under government
control, Major General Qarani, Chief of Staff of the National
Army issued a directive for all members of the Army, Police,
and Gendarmerie to return to their duty stations as quickly as
possible. Appealing to those service members who had deserted
to fight against the Shah, he stated that the "dereliction of
duty has been forgiven" since they "deserted their barracks
at the command of the imam."124 Simultaneously, all Air
Force personnel were recalled to their duty stations to
"maintain order in Tehran." All returning members were also
instructed to bring in any weapons they might possess in order
to prevent "unidentified individuals" from obtaining them."2 '
General Manucher Khasrodad, the Army Airborne Division
Commander, was arrested on February 13 attempting to flee
Iran. As a loyal supporter of the Shah, he was placed in
detention for future deliberations.' 26  On February 15, four
generals, among them the former head of the Savak and General
Khasrodad, were executed by a firing squad in "accordance with
125"Air Force Personnel Recalled," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1835 GMT, 15 Feb 79 (LD151900), February 16, 1979,
p. R5.
126Ibrahim, "Iran's New Premier Names 7 To Cabinet; Khomeini
Asks Calm," New York Times, February 14, 1979, p. 10.
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Islamic standards and prescriptions"1 27 in Tehran. 1 2 ' The
state radio proclaimed to *have executed the executioners of
the previous regime" in order to "purify the blood of the
revolution and to put new blood of the revolution into
circulation." 129  The radio broadcast also stated that 20
other high-ranking officers of the Pahlavi Regime would face
a trial by revolutionary tribunal, followed by death
sentences.
130
A new arm of the military consisting of Islamic law
enforcement officials was announced as an integral part of the
military. Their presence was explained as necessary to "give
the utmost assistance" as "spiritual representatives" to the
armed forces.131  This was necessary due to the fact that
"there simply was not a core of pro-Khomeini military
personnel who could displace the discredited and mistrusted
Imperial officer corps" and as a result, "the full fury of the
12 7 Four Generals Executed," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 0619 GMT, 16 Feb 79 (LD160932), February 16, 1979,
p. R10.
1 2 8
"Secret Police Head And 3 Others In Iran Said To Be
Executed," New York Times, February 16, 1979, p. 1.
"129Markham, "20 More Shah Aides Said To Face Death In Start Of
A Purge," New York Times, February 17, 1979, p. 1.
"130Ibid.
"131"Islamic Law Enforcement Officials," Tehran Domestic Service
in Persian, FBIS, 0830 GMT, 16 Feb 79 (LD161008), February 16,
1979, p. Rll.
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revolutionary leaders were turned on the top commanders of the
Imperial armed forces promptly after the triumph of the
revolution. w13
In a message to the populace, Ayatollah Khomeini's
"Propaganda Committeem issued a statement explaining the
ongoing purge of the armed forces
The purging of the armed organizations affiliated with
the former diabolical regime is among the top priorities
of the new government. It has top priority in the
Revolution Committee appointed by Imam Khomeyni .... all the
unreliable and mercenary cadres whose loyalty to the
antipopular front has been proved shall be replaced by
revolutionary and popular Muslim cadres."'3
On February 17, General Qarani, Chief of Staf f of the
National Army of Iran, dissolved the Imperial Guard and the
Immortal Guards. He directed that all former members of the
defunct organizations place themselves at the disposal of the
Army. 13 On the same day, 26 Air Force generals and four Air
Force colonels were retired 131 and two military officers were
131 Zabih, Sepehr, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War
(New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 116.
133"nPropaganda Committee Issues Statement," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 16 Feb 79 (LD161905), February
21, 1979, p. R2.
1134 "Imperial, Javidan Guard Dissolved," Tehran Domestic
Service, in Persian, FBIS, 1022 GMT, 17 Feb 79 (LD171203), February
21, 1979, p. R5.
135 *Air Force Officers Retired," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1230 GMT, 17 Feb 79 (LD171348), February 21, 1979,
p. R6.
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132Zabih, Sepehr, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War 
(New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 116. 
133npropaganda Committee Issues Statement, n Tehran Domestic 
Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 16 Feb 79 (LD16190S), February 
21, 1979, p. R2. 
13hlmperial, Javidan Guard Dissolved," Tehran Domestic 
Service, in Persian, FBIS, 1022 GMT, 17 Feb 79 (LD171203), February 
21, 1979, p. RS. 
135. Air Force Officers Retired, n Tehran Domestic Service in 
Persian, FBlS, 1230 GMT, 17 Feb 79 (LD171348), February 21, 1979, 
p. R6. 
41 
arrested and handed over to the revolutionary committee.136
In the wake of the Air Force retirements, a new Air Force
Commander, Brigadier General Kiumars Saqafi, was appointed by
General Qarani.'" On February 18, 41 generals and admirals
were retired, including former Prime Minister (General)
Gholamreza Azhari.' 39
The arrests continued on February 18, with the government
announcing the seizure of an undisclosed number of military
officers in Tehran and other parts of the country.139 On
February 19, the government announced that four more generals
had been executed by firing squad in Tehran. 140
136"Two Mashhad Officers Arrested," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1530 GMT, 17 Feb 79 (LD171749), February 21, 1979 p.
R7.
137"New Air Force Commander," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1930 GMT, 17 Feb 79 (LD172101), February 21, 1979,
p. R8.
13 8"Azhari, Other Officers Retired," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 18 Feb 79 (LD181131), February 21, 1979,
p. RI0 and "Seven More Generals Retired," Tehran Domestic Service
in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 18 Feb 79 (LD181830), February 21,
1979, p. R11.
139"More Top Officials Arrested in Iran," New York Times,
February 19, 1979, p. 6.
14 0"Iran Reports 4 More Officers Dead, Executed by Order of
Islamic Court," New York Times, February 20, 1979, p. 1.
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On February 19, 25 more officers, including a number of
generals and admirals, were retired from service.141 At the
same time, seven officers in Orumiyeh were arrested and given
over to the Islamic Revolutionary Council.""
In the midst of the confusion generated by the rapid changes
in the social fabric of Iran and in the wake of a rash of
military executions, the Iranian military began to show signs
of stress and disorientation. Dissent and crumbling
discipline became apparent as soldiers began to veto the
appointments of senior commanders, disobey orders, and demand
the replacement of certain officers suspected of being Savak
collaborators. 143 Although the military's basic structure
remained intact, the crisis within the ranks was due to a
leadership vacuum. An observer noted the "disintegration of
authority in the armyu` that was indicative of the
ambitions of junior officers who coveted positions held by
senior officers perceived to be vulnerable to the ongoing
purges.
141 "Additional Officers Retired," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 19 Feb 79 (LD191122), February 21, 1979,
p. R18.
1411,Arrests of Orumiyeh Military," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 19 Feb 79 (LD191940), February 21, 1979,
p. R18.
143 Ibrahim, "Army Is Paralyzed by Dissent, 0 New York Times,
February 20, 1979, p. 1.
144 Ibid.
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On February 20, 20 more generals were retired. 145  At the
same time, four more generals were executed by Ayatollah
Khomeini's Revolutionary Committee firing squad in Tehran.
Prime Minister Bazargan expressed his surprise at not being
informed beforehand of the execution. 146
On the same day, Iranian Army Chief of Staff General Qarani
announced that more troops were returning to their barracks
and duty stations. He also stated that the purges of the
military would continue to remove all senior officers accused
of collaboration with the Pahlavi regime. He claimed that the
presence of these generals weakened the discipline of the army
since the soldiers refused to obey their orders and that Iran
"cannot afford to have a weak army.',,14
General Qarani also spoke of the challenges facing the armed
forces and correctly explained some of the factors that had
contributed to the army's poor performance during the Islamic
Revolution
Our problem concerns the fear, insecurity and humiliation
felt by the army cadre. The necessary reconciliation
between the army and the people has not been achieved yet,
and this very element has been the cause of our lesser
success with the capital's cadre. Basically, the army is
14 5
"Officers Pensioned Off," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 0815 GMT, 20 Feb 79 (LD201052), February 21, 1979,
p. R6.
14 6Ibrahim, NIranian Premier's Office Expresses Surprise Over
4 Latest Executions," New York Times, February 21, 1979, p. 1.
147Ibid, p. 3.
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not intended for maintaining domestic order: It is
equipped to safeguard and protect the country's borders
against foreign enemies. Our main program concerns
organizing a national Islamic army that can pursue the
ideology of a noble government with the progressive
Shi'ite principles, and for this reason we want to build
an army with a national character and Islamic principles.
Therefore, we need the kind of personnel who are able to
fulfill this critical task and who have no bad records of
past misdeeds. In pursuit of this program all the
generals and lieutenant generals and a number of major
generals and brigadier generals have been retired and half
the Imperial Guard NCO's have asked to be retired.
At any rate, with the extensive purge in the army.. .many
of the problems will be resolved."4 8
On February 21, 16 more generals were retired"' while four
military officers were arrested and incarcerated in
Shiraz.150 At the same time, six officers were appointed to
new positions of military command within the regime,"' which
helped to reconstruct the command hierarchy with officers
possessing minimal ties to the monarchy.
148"Qarani on Army's Disintegration," Tehran Domestic Service
in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 20 Feb 79 (LD201220), February 21,
1979, p. R22.
149"16 Generals, Brigadiers Retired," Tehran Domestic Service
in Persian, FBIS, 0701 GMT, 21 Feb 79 (LD211123), February 21,
1979, p. R31.
1 51"More Officers Arrested," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1830 GMT, 21 Feb 79 (LD211952), February 22, 1979,
p. R3.
"151"Army Appointments," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,
FBIS, 1630 GMT, 21 Feb 79 (LD212110), February 22, 1979, p. R3 and
"Armor Center Commander Appointed," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 21 Feb 79 (LD212111), February 22, 1979,
p. R4.
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The retirementb continued on February 24 when 32 major
generals were removed from active service.15 2  The
retirements were followed on February 25 by the appointment of
ten officers to new command positions and eleven military
lawyers to new posts."5 3  Ten colonels were also retired on
February 26.154
The Iranian Islamic Army announced on March 1 that 71
officers had been retired and that 71 more would be retired in
two days. The rationale for retiring the 142 officers was to
"organize the National Islamic Army's dimensions and make more
use of young people. '15
Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi spoke to the press
about the armed forces on March 3. He dismissed notions that
the army would be disbanded although he did say that there
would be some organizational and hierarchical changes
We must preserve the army in its present form, and at the
same time launch a series of programs aimed at staging a
cultural revolution within the army. Furthermore, we must
1 52 "More Army Generals Retired," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 2030 GMT, 24 Feb 79 ((LD242150), February 26, 1979,
p. R13.
151"Army Appointments," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,
FBIS, 0830 GMT, 25 Feb 79 (LD251002), February 26, 1979, pp. R14-15
and "Judicial Army Officers," Tehran Domestic Service, in Persian,
FBIS, 0830 GMT, 25 Feb 79 (LD251006), February 26, 1979, p. R15.
'54"Retired Colonels," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,
FBIS, 1230 GMT, 26 Feb 79 (LD261311), February 27, 1979, p. R2.
155 "Army Officers Retired," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,
FBIS, 2030 GMT, 01 Mar 79 (LD012232), March 2, 1979, p. R13.
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purge the army of the value held under the monarch, so
that we might be able to create an ideal army for the
Islamic government.
Of course, there are those in the army who will resist
such changes.
These individuals will be removed .... They shall be
removed and, if necessary, put on trial. 1 5 6
On March 4, 13 generals and colonels were retired from
active service,15 7 followed by 33 Brigadier Generals the next
day.' 5 8 On March 5, seven generals were executed at Tehran's
Qasr prison after being charged with torture and killing under
the Pahlavi Regime. 1 5
9
In Abadan on March 6, two soldiers from the military
garrison at Abadan were publicly displayed and confronted by
a crowd, who accused them of having shot at and arrested
demonstrators during a protest that took place the previous
December. The two soldiers were also accused of torturing
some of the persons whom they had arrested, to include pouring
156 Yazdi Interview," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS,
1710 GMT, 03 Mar 79 (LD032040), March 5, 1979, pp. R14-15.
5 7*"Officers' Retirement,n Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,
FBIS, 1030 GMT, 06 Mar 79 (LD061402), March 7, 1979, p. R1.
'85 "Retired Gendarmerie Commanders," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 05 Mar 79 (LD051230), March 6, 1979, p.
R1.
159Kifner, John, "Islam's Law in Iran, With Death to the
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acid over the genitals of male prisoners. The soldiers were
then sentenced to death.1 60
On March 9, three persons, one of them a lieutenant general,
were executed for (among other things) "Corruption on earth,"
and "Combatting God, the apostle of God, 16" and the imam of
the era.0".2  This incident was followed on March 12 by the
execution of 11 more military personnel, to include at least
one general. 163
"'Ibrahim, "Iranian Komiteh Has Final Say Over Oranges,
Brothels and Life," New York Times, March 8, 1979, pp. 1 & 10.
"26'Actually, many of the military personnel executed were
charged with being "corrupt on the earth" and "warring against
God." These two phrases became standard justifications for
carrying out executions. Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, the Deputy Prime
Minister for Revolutionary Affairs, explained that the two charges
had to "be understood in the Islamic cultural context," which was
"a union of church and state in which law is essentially religious
law," (the Sharia), which was derived from the Quran, the teachings
of Muhammad, and the work of religious legal scholars. Yazdi
commented that although the charge of "corruption on earth" was a
serious one, it was difficult to explain, although it did mean
"endangering the life of the nation." Joseph Schachf, a scholar on
Islamic law, stated that every political theory in Islam began
"with the assumption that Islamic government existed by virtue of
a divine contract based on the Sharia." Under those circumstances,
political science was not an independent discipline (as in the
West), but rather a part of theology to the extent that there was
"no distinction between state and society or between church and
state." All data in this footnote from Kifner, "Iranian Official
Explains Trials and Their Suspension," New York Times, March 18,
1979, p. 3.
"I2"Execution Of Three Officers," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 0430 GMT, 09 Mar 79 (LD091115), March 9, 1979, p.
R5.
"163 "More Executions," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS,
0530 GMT, 13 Mar 79 (LD131024), March 13, 1979, p. R8.
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On March 16 Ayatollah Khomeini ordered a cessation of the
closed trials and summary executions. He stated that from
that moment on, all trials would have to take place under the
direct supervision of the Islamic Revolutionary Council acting
under the authority of the Islamic Government." 6 '
On March 17, Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi cited the fears of a military
coup as "the most important reason for the first round of
executions." He went on to further justify the violence
This is a war, this is a revolution .... We had to show
that we mean business.
Now we are in control .... Now we can afford to wait. Now
we can have trials.1 65
Yazdi also stated that the Shah had fallen so quickly that the
incoming regime had not had a great deal of time to prepare to
govern Iran or construct a legal system,1 66 much less
construct a new organizational hierarchy for the armed forces.
At a press conference on April 3, Entezam commented that the
Islamic Republic would not inhibit the retirement of senior
officers from the military and would even encourage it in some
instances
army officers from the rank of brigadier general on up
will retire. If there should be a need for the expertise
164Jaynes, Gregory, "Ayatollah Orders Halt To Executions And
Closed Trials," New York Times, March 17, 1979, pp. 1 & 3.
165Kifner, "Iranian Official Explains Trials and Their
Suspension," New York Times, March 18, 1979, p. 3.
"166'.bid
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of some for them in restructuring the army, they might
possibly be invited to serve again. 167
On April 6, three soldiers were executed in Isfahan in the
first executions after a three week hiatus. On April 7, six
soldiers were executed in Tehran following a 15 hour trial.
They were condemned for their roles in the unrest of the
preceding December in which the armed forces shot into
demonstrating crowds from helicopter gunships. Prime Minister
Bazargan protested the executions to Ayatollah Khomeini, to no
avail. In the end, Bazargan had to resign himself to the
resumption of the summary trials and executions of soldiers
tainted by association with the monarchy. 168
Two generals were sentenced to death by secret trial and
e:cecuted by the revolutionary authorities on April 9. One of
them, General Amir Hussein Rabii, was the former Iranian Air
Force Commander. To no avail, Rabii criticized the Shah
during his trial, stating "I realized what a hollow man I was
working for whe' Americans such as Huyser could lead him out
of the country by the nose." 169
167
"Spokesman Comments On Retirement Of Generals, Khuzestan,N
Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 03 Apr 79
(LD031312), April 4, 1979, p. R7.
""
68Ibrahim, nHoveida Believed Doomed in Iran; 6 More Die in
Renewed Executions," New York Times, April 7, 1979, p. 1.
"
1 6
"Ibrahim, "Tehran Announces 4 More Executions," New York
Times, April 9, 1979, p. 1.
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On April 11, five more generals were executed after being
condemned in a secret trial. They were charged with being
*corrupt on earth" and "warring against God."" 0  The
generals were believed to be among the most senior officials
of the Pahlavi regime and included the former Chief of the
Immortals (the Shah's elite guards) and a former head of the
Second Department, a military intelligence organization."'
More executions followed on April 14 as three soldiers faced
a firing squad for their roles in supporting the ancien
regime. In the wake of these executions, the New York-based
International League for Human Rights requested that the
Islamic Republic review its trial procedures and stop the
executions. The League's president wryly commented that it
was "no advance for human rights to have the abuses of the
Shah replaced by abuses of revolutionary tribunals."al 2
Ayatollah Khomeini, addressing soldiers in their barracks in
Qom on April 15, spoke of the transformation of the Army since
the Islamic Revolution
Our army today is not the satanic army but a Mohammedan
army, you soldiers should protect the army. You should
listen to your superiors. Expel those who cause sedition
"
0Kifner, "Iranian Official Explains Trials and Their
Suspension," New York Times, March 18, 1979, p. 3.
"'1Kifner, "Tehran Executes 11 Top Officials," New York Times,
April 11, 1979, p. 9.
172 Iran Executes More Former Officials," New York Times, April
14, 1979, p. 6.
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among you from your midst: The protection of the country
depends on the existence of order in the army. We are
your supporters and you are our supporters and the nation
is the supporter of all.""
The Army's name was changed on April 16 to the Army of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The name change was attributed to
Ayatollah Khomeini by government sources to remind the nation
that the army was "an inseparable part of this revolutionn who
would fulfill "its great mission of safeguarding the gains of
the Islamic Revolution within the context of its duties.- 17 4
On the following day, Major General Naser Farbod, the Chief
of the General Staff of the Army of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, spoke of the changes taking place in the Army as an
example of the societal innovations occurring within Iran
the army, like other sectors of the community, is also
being reestablished on the basis of the life-giving school
of Islam.
The transformation in the status of the army, which
began with the end of the fallen imperial order in the
form of joining the ranks of the people's struggle and
resisting bloodthirsty rulers, was pursued by purging
itself of antipeople elements. The greatest effort in the
appointment of new commanders and senior officers was made
so that the assignment of posts and positions is based
only on competence and piety. For in our view, attaining
rank and office is not a privilege but a heavy
".73"Khomeyni Addresses Soldiers At Farahabad, Lashkarak
Barracks," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 15
Apr 79 (LD151940), April 16, 1979, p. R11.
"174"General Staff Command Announces New Army Name," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 16 Apr 79 (LD161454),
April 17, 1979, p. R1.
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responsibility in the safeguarding and fulfillment of the
popular mission of the army."17
On April 18, six soldiers of the ancien regime were executed
for their actions against anti-Pahlavi demonstrators.'17' The
soldiers were sentenced for owaging war against God, God's
messenger, the people of Iran and the imam's representative;
for sowing corruption on the earth, and effective and direct
participation in killing and massacring the struggling people
of Tehran and Iran. n 27
These executions took place on "Islamic Republic Armed Forces
Day," which was proclaimed by Khomeini as a day for the armed
forces to "demonstrate with their uniforms and their arms for
the Islamic Republic."""8 Khomeini stated that the people of
Iran were "duty bound to show their respect for the Islamic
Army and show brotherly respect toward it" now that the Army
171"Army Chief Discusses Support For Republic, " Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 17 Apr 79 (LD171316), April 19,
1979, p. R6.
"17"'Seven More Executions Announced,"N New York Times, April 18,
1979, p. 12.
"17"'Former Members Of Eternal Guard Executed, * Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 0330 GMT, 18 Apr 79 (LD180900), April 18,
1979, p. R11.
"171Ibrahim, 02 Iranian Leaders Make Sharp Attack On Khomeini
Units," New York Times, April 18, 1979, p. 12.
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was at "the service of the people and Islam." Khomeini also
said that opposition for the Army was "unseemly."09
The demonstration fell short of Khomeini's expectations,
although thousands of people came to see the event.
Helicopters and aircraft flew overhead while a few platoons of
Army and Air Force personnel paraded through Tehran. The
small number of military participants was contrasted
unfavorably to the grand scale of the pomp and circumstance
parades of the Shah and "demonstrated the drastic decline of
Iran's once mighty force of 450,000 members." 1 80
The former Deputy Chief of the Khorramshahr Military
District was sentenced to death and executed on April 20. The
Islamic Revolutionary Court sentenced him with "massacring the
people of this city during the Islamic movement of Iran. ""'
There were three more executions on April 21, including a
general and a colonel who were identified as "corrupt
individuals."182
179
"Army Day Activities," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,
FBIS, 1630 GMT, 16 Apr 79 (LD161829), April 17, 1979, p. R2.
180"2 Ayatollahs Meet in Bid to Settle Their Growing Political
Disputes," New York Times, April 19, 1979, p. 1.
18 1"Former Khorramshahr Military Official Executed," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 20 Apr 79 (LD201748),
April 23, 1979, p. R12.
.
82 nIran Protesters Condemn Khomeini's Committees," New York
Times, April 21, 1979, p. 7.
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The Iranian Army was dealt a further blow when three
unidentified gunmen shot and killed General Vali Ullah
Gharani, who was appointed by Khomeini as the Army Chief of
Staff after the Islamic Revolution. He had later resigned
after controversy regarding his heavy-handed use of force in
suppressing rebellious Kurds. Iranian Government officials
stated that the Army would be demoralized by the General's
death after undergoing internal strife and collapse during the
Revolution.18 3
Acting Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi proclaimed on May 3
that the Iranian Government intended to reduce the size of the
military from 500,000 soldiers to half that number. He stated
the reductions would occur over the coming two months.184
In early May, Ayatollah Khomeini and the clerics announced
the formation of a new, independent military force to serve as
a counterweight 1 85 to the Army that would be "the key to
neutralization of future challenges from the armed personnel
and thus to perpetuation of their rule".1 8 This new element
was called the Pasdarans (Guardians) and eventually came to be
183Ibrahim, "First Iran Army Chief In Khomeini's Regime Is
Slain by 3 Gunmen," New York Times, April 24, 1979, p. 1.
184"Yazdi Says Armed Forces To Be Cut By Half," Manama Gulf
News Acyency in Arabic, FBIS, 1045 GMT, 03 May 79 (JN031117), May 4,
1979, p. R1.
"115Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn, p. 1.
13"Arjomand, The irban for the Crown, p. 165.
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known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (Revolutionary
Guards). The Pasadaran was responsible to the religious
authorities and operated outside of and parallel to the
established military structure.1 87
Brigadier General Fazlollah Nazemi, the former Commander of
the Security Guard, was tried and executed on May 7. He was
charged with "collaboration with the previous regime... sowing
corruption on earth and waging war against God."3.16
On May 8, three military officers (a general and two
colonels) were among 21 persons executed by firing squad after
death sentences were handed down by the Revolutionary Courts.
The charge against them was "corruption on the earth,"
"warring with God and his emissaries," and mcontempt toward
the imam"' 8 9 as a result of their roles in suppressing anti-
Pahlavi demonstrations. The executions took place amidst
rumors that the revolutionary authorities were considering a
general amnesty for lower ranking officials of the Pahlavi
""'Kifner, "Khomeini Organizes A New Armed Force," New York
Times, May 7, 1979, pp. 1 & 3.
168"Former Security Guard Commander Tried, Executed," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 07 May 79 (LD071756),
May 8, 1979, pp. R6-7.
189.21 Former Officials Executed 8 May," Tehran Domestic
Service, in Persian, FBIS, 0430 GMT (LD080928), May 8, 1979, p. R1.
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Regime who were not directly responsible for torture or
death.'90
On May 10, Chief of the General Staff Major General Naser
Farbod spoke to the media concerning the Army, stating that
during the Revolution, the Army was "in no way defeated, but
it decided to submit to the will of the nation." While
stating that the Army was well-armed, he admitted that "army
morale has not returned to its desired state. He also
claimed that the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps would strengthen the Army, while continuing the
"revolutionary spirit" as it combatted "anti-revolutionary
elements. "191
In a later interview, Major General Farbod stressed the
Islamic nature of the Army. In this context, the Army
belonged to the nation and was an integral part of it, which
included enjoying the freedom brought to Iran by the Islamic
Revolution. This freedom "even spread into the army
barracks. m192
"190Kifner, "Tehran Executes 21, Including 3 Officials In Shah's
Government," New York Times, May 8, 1979, p. 14.
"
191"Chief Of General Staff Speaks To Media About Army," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 10 May 79 (LD101848),
May 11, 1979, pp. R2-3.
192 "Army Chief Interviewed On Army's Status, Future," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1710 GMT, 26 May 79 (LD262032),
May 29, 1979, pp. R11-12.
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On May 26, a military officer with ties to the ancien regime
who had commanded a national defense artillery battalion was
sentenced to death and executed for participation in a
"massacre" against anti-Pahlavi demonstrators.'" On May 29,
five more soldiers were executed for their participation in
suppressing anti-Shah demonstrations. 1 94
The executions continued with the deaths of four more
military personnel in Mashhad on May 30. All of the
"criminals" were condemned for "slaying and
wounding... innocent" Muslims during an anti-Pahlavi
demonstration (the highest ranking soldier, a colonel, was
additionally charged with "using maximum firepower and the
utmost severity").' 95  Three soldiers were also executed in
Qazvin on May 30 on similar charges to those brought against
the Mashhad soldiers.1 9'
193"Former Commander Sentenced," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1930 GMT, 26 May 79 (LD262125), May 29, 1979, p.
R13.
"94"More Officers Executed," Tehran Domestic Service in




"Four Mashhad Military Men Executed," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 0430 GMT, 30 May 79 (LD301028), May 31,
1979, p. R12.
"196"Qazvin Court Sentences Three To Death," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 1930 GMT, 30 May 79 (LD302256), May 31,
1979, p. R-'2.
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In an attempt to further define the role of the Army, Major
General Farbod, Chief of the General Staff of the Islamic
Republit.an Army, spoke on June 3 to a group of military
personnel in Tehran. He stated that min order to safeguard
the revolution, the revolutionary people and the Guardians of
the Revolution should be used as much as possible, for we have
done nothing for the revolution." He then commented that the
Army's role was to safeguard Iran's borders. An NCO then
stated that if military personnel were being tried and
executed for killing demonstrators, how could they be assured
that they would not later be tried and executed like the
soldiers of the Pahlavi Regime if they suppressed the ethnic
unrest occurring throughout Iran? General Farbod replied
The situation is now different from the past. You are
now moving in the direction of the wishes of the majority
of the people. You are carrying out the decision of a
government that had been elected by the people. 1 97
On June 5, the Islamic Revolutionary Coirt of Tehran
announced that a colonel had been found guilty of "sowing
corruption on earth" and waging "war against God" as a result
of suppressing an anti-Pahlavi demonstration. He was
executed. A major who worked for the colonel, was also
"19'"Army Chief Interviewed On Role Of Army," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 1610 GMT, 03 Jun 79 (LD032054), June 5,
1979, pp. R4-5.
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convicted by the court but was sentenced to 12 years in
prison.198
The Iranian Defense Ministry issued an order on June 21
banning all military personnel from making statements to the
media. The order stated that many uninformed persons had made
statements that contradicted the Ocountry's supreme
interests." The Defense Ministry announced that an authorized
spokesman would from that moment on offer official
pronouncements. 199
In late June, the lack of discipline within the armed forces
had reached such a state that the newspapers and radio
broadcasts discussed the many examples of insubordination on
a daily basis. In one instance, a squadron of fighter pilots
refused to fly their warplanes to a troubled region and openly
questioned the Government's decision to suppress unrest. In
another case, Navy sailors refused to perform manual labor
until joined by the officers, stating "we're all equal now."
"198 "Tehran Court Sentences Colonel, " Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1930 GMT, 05 Jun 79 (LD052254), June 7, 1979, pp.
R6-7.
"199"INA: Military Banned From Making Statements To Media,"
Baghdad INA in Arabic, FBIS, 1652 GMT, 21 Jun 79 (JN211657), June
22, 1979, P. R27. This move was similar to United States military
practices that designate a Public Affairs officer or spokesperson
to hold press conferences and give official pronouncements. Any
statement or press conference not approved through official
channels (to include Public Affairs) is not sanctioned and
therefore liable to administrative or judicial punishment.
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Other examples included soldiers refusing to quell domestic
unrest for fear of later being charged with repression.2 00
In a departure from past policies, the Revolutionary Council
announced on July 3 that, effective July 10, all members of
Iran's armed and security forces would be granted amnesty
except for instances of murder or torture. After the
implementation of the new policy, any unsubstantiated
complaints of murder or torture would result in a prison term
of up to two years. A Revolutionary Council spokesman stated
that the amnesty was essential to allow the armed and security
forces to fulfill their duties. 20 1
Ayatollah Khomeini announced the implementation of the new
policy on July 9. Khomeini praised Prime Minister Bazargan
for suggesting the amnesty policy and lauded his efforts to
serve the nation.20 2  At the same time, Brigadier General
Saif Amir Rahimi, the Commander of Tehran's military police
and a small number of Revolutionary Guards, was dismissed from
his post for making unauthorized comments not previously
authorized by his superiors.
2
°°Kandell, "Many in Iran Seek the Revival of an Effective
Army," New York Times, June 26, 1979, p. 2.
2 0 1
"Iran Decrees Amnesty For Most Military and Police," New
York Times, July 4, 1979, p. 5.
2 02Ibrahim, "Wide Amnesty in Iran Declared by Khomeini," New
York Times, July 10, 1979, pp. 1 & 10.
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The general alleged that the armed forces were engaged in a
"major conspiracy to discredit the Islamic Republic. General
Rahimi refused to acknowledge the order to dismiss him from
Major General Farbod, stating that he would only step down if
told to do so by Khomeini himself. 2"3 At a news conference,
the general stated that the armed forces were in a sad state
of disarray due to the recent purges and that force reductions
had resulted in a drop in manpower from half a million
soldiers to 300,000. As a result, all the senior generals
were gone and discipline was almost nonexistent. He further
stated that all militia groups in Iran should be disbanded and
disarmed so as not to conflict with the armed forces. 20 4
In the wake of General Rahimi's comments, Ayatollah Khomeini
stated that the general should remain in his position.
General Rahimi's insistence that all elements of the armed
forces must obey their generals had placed him in good stead
with the regime. He had specifically aimed his comments at
the Homofars, the Air Force technicians who staged the strikes
at Farahabad which sounded the death knell for the Shah's
regime. When the Homofars refused to do obey orders after the
Islamic Republic was established, he ordered them jailed.
After Khomeini's statement, Prime Minister Bazargan and
2 0 3 Ibid.
204Ibid.
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General Farbod echoed their agreement with the Ayatollah's
decision. 205  After his vindication, General Rahimi voiced
the need for a disciplined, strong army now that the force was
once again *a sound body" after the anti-monarchist
purges.206
General Farbod was then removed from his post on July 21
allegedly for his "inability to improve morale in the armed
forces." He was replaced by General Hussein Shakeri, who, as
Iran's third military leader in six months, was given the new
title of Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same
time, four soldiers were executed for killing anti-Shah
demonstrators during the preceding year's unrest. 20 7
Soldiers at odds with the government over the execution of
a colonel and a sergeant fought with Revolutionary Guards on
August 8. The confrontation took place in Orumiyeh, in
northwestern Iran. 20 8 This led to Revolutionary Guard calls
20 5Ibrahim, "Iran's Premier Yields to Khomeini, Agreeing Not to
Dismiss a General," New York Times, July 11, 1979, pp. 1 & 11.
206
"Le Monde Interviews Military Police Chief Rahimi," Paris Le
Monde in French, FBIS, 14 Jul 79 (LD171049), July 18, 1979, p. R8.
207
"Religious Broadcaster Murdered in Tehran; Army Chief Is
Ousted," New York Times, July 22, 1979, p. 5.
2 08
"Iranian Troops Clash With Revolutionary Guards," New York
Times, August 9, 1979, p. 7.
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f or a "complete purge" of the Army to remove "mercenary
elements" who engage in "anti-people" plots.20 9
In another significant development in the Islamic Republic's
relations with the military, Khomeini went over the heads of
military leaders on August 18 and directly ordered soldiers to
suppress Kurdish rebels in the town of Paveh. The military
leaders in the area around Paveh had voiced their reluctance
to use the Army as a tool to quell internal unrest. The Army
officers were cognizant of what had befallen other officers
who had commanded soldiers used to quell anti-government
activities during the Shah's last days and wished to avoid
similar fates. Casting aside their doubts, Khomeini stated
As head of the whole army, I give the order to the army
Commander in Chief to move into the area with all the
necessary preparation and I also give orders to the army
garrisons and state police forces that, without awaiting
any further order and wasting any time, that they move
toward Paveh with the necessary ammunition, preparation
and forces. 21`
D. THE IDEOLOGICAL PURGE
Defense Minister Dr. Mustafa Chamran spoke to the press on
October 1 regarding the roles of the Army and the rationale
behind a new wave of "ideological purges." He claimed the
2 09
"Urimiyeh Revolution Guards Call For Army Purge," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 0230 GMT, 09 Aug 79 (LD090858),
August 9, 1979, pp. R5-6.
21 0
"Iran Is Said to Crush Kurd Revolt; Khomeini Bypasses Army
Leaders," New York Times, August 19, 1979, pp. 1 & 13.
64
     
    -  n t . 209 
  i t t   blic's 
   i    f 
 rs  t l     
      .  
s       t ce 
  l t.   
  t     
     ern ent 
          
 .    , i  
   ,    
     
r  tion      
    ,   
        
    ,  
 . no 
.   
 r .     
r i      
    ."   
209nUrimiyeh Revolution Guards Call For Army Purge," Tehran 
   , , , 908S8), 
 , , . S-6. 
210 nIran Is Said to rush urd e lt; ei i   
rs,"  s, t , 9, .  . 
 
purges were necessary to change the existing system in the
Army which was "an order created and tailored by the satanic
regime." To remedy this existing system, he emphasized that
"present revolutionary conditions warrant a change in this
order so that the army may be brought into line with
revolutionary requirements." He also stated that he had
initially thought the Army could be dismantled in favor of the
Revolutionary Guards, but that the internal (ethnic) unrest in
Iran made the armed forces a necessity (he described the
ethnic disturbances as "ominous plots hatched by the
colonialists") to the extent that "we will never be able to
survive without a strong army." 21.
He codified his comments by stating that although "any
request to abolish the army is senseless," that the Army
needed to conform to "our Islamic standards as well as our
revolution's rules." Stating that the purge would be both
Islamic and revolutionary, Chamran claimed
The purge will take place at the very top. At later
stages it will embrace lower levels.2 12
The purge of which Chamran spoke was an "Islamicizing"
ideological one that "resulted in the discharge of some 12,000
military personnel, the majority of whom were officers, by the
211
"New Defense Minister Comments On Army Purge," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1708 GMT, 30 Sep 79 (LD302020),
October 1, 1979, p. R14.
212Ibid, p. R15.
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time of the Iraqi invasion a year later."2 1 3  This Islamic
indoctrination (Islamization) was sanctioned in Article 144 of
the Iranian Constitution.2 4
In the wake of Chamran's comments, the military leaders
became concerned not only with their own future, but with that
of the military, which had
already suffered one comprehensive purge of its senior
ranks immediately after the revolution, when nearly every
general was either dismissed, executed, or forced to flee.
Apart from the general dissatisfaction... many officers
found their orders were being ignored. Islamic committees
set up by the men to ensure that the military was run in
a "revolutionary" fashion, began to quibble over
commands. 21s
Recent exercises and successful actions to quell the
rebellion in Kurdistan had boosted morale and restored
confidence in the military command structure. The Kurdistan
military response not only proved the necessity of the Army,
it also outlined the inability of the Revolutionary Guards to
respond at that time to a "large-scale rebellion."n6
"
21 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, p. 164.
214 Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War, p. 136.
2 1 5Allen-Mills, Tony, "Pledge To Purge Worries Iranian
Officers," Daily TelearaDh (London), October 4, 1979, p. 6.
216At the time of the Kurdistan rebellion, the Revolutionary
Guards were not able to suppress the dissidents. Over the course
of successive rebellions, insurgencies and the Iran-Iraq War, they
developed into a credible military force capable of military
operations in a combat environment.
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During the Kurdistan campaign, the differences in military
proficiency between the Army and the Revolutionary Guards were
further accentuated when the Revolutionary Guards, ignoring
Army advice to remain in their barracks, ventured into Kurdish
territory. They were promptly ambushed by Kurdish rebels, who
annihilated them. At this early stage of their existence, the
Army's experience and military expertise were recognized as
superior to those of the Revolutionary Guards, "whose skills
as a fighting force are by no means as advanced as their
enthusiasm for Ayatollah Khomeini." 2 1"
In October, the Iranian Council of Experts approved a
constitutional clause granting Khomeini control over the
military forces. The Ayatollah was also named Head of the
Armed Forces and was awarded the power to declare war in
consultation with a military council. 218
In November 1979, the United States Defense Department
issued a statement that the Iranian armed services were "no
longer an effective military force." Citing the executions,
purges and desertions, the Defense Department stated that
discipline had "virtually disappeared," quoting examples of
soldiers refusing to obey orders, as well as a dissolution of
217Allen-Mills, "Rebel Kurds Defy Threat Of Destruction," Daily
Telegraph, October 12, 1979, p. 5.
21 8"Constitutional Body Backs Key Powers for Khomeini," New
York Times, October 16, 1979, p. 2.
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the military logistics system, which impeded the flow of spare
parts and supplies. Additionally, the breakdown in
maintenance and repair capabilities caused by the logistics
difficulties had in effect grounded the Air Force and kept the
Navy in port.21'
The purges continued on Jan 12, 1980, when four Army
officers accused of firing on anti-Pahlavi demonstrators were
executed by a firing squad in Tehran.2 20  On February 6,
Lieutenant General Jamshid Fathi Moqaddam was sentenced to
death. The former commanding artillery officer of an infantry
corps was charged with "trying to strengthen the former
regime.. .opposing the Islamic Revolution.. .resisting God, His
Prophet and the vicar of the hidden imam; and carrying out
suppression in the army. "221 On February 7, more monarchists
left active duty as 145 officers were discharged from the
military. They included 91 admirals, 14 colonels, and an
assortment of junior officers, NCO's, and technicians.22 2
21 9Halloran, Richard, "U.S. Analysts See Iran's Armed Forces in
Disarray," New York Times, November 18, 1979, p. 17 and "Desertions
and Disrepair Said to Hit Iran's Army," New York Times, November
28, 1979, p. 11.
22 0
aIran Army officers executed by firing squad," Times,
January 14, 1980, p. 4.
22 1
"Report on Executions," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian,
FBIS, 1724 GMT, 07 Feb 80 (LD071909), February 8, 1980, p. 15.
2 21"Discharge of Military Personnel," Baqhdad INA in Arabic,
FBIS, 1715 GMT, 07 Feb 80 (JN071726), February 8, 1980, p. 16.
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In the wake of these recent purges, President Bani-Sadr met
with the military commanders on February 10 to discuss the
reorganization of Iran's armed forces. After the meeting,
General Shadmehr, Commander of the Combined Army Staff, stated
The mission and duties of the army have been established
by the constitution. Therefore a group of experts have
been asked to reorganize the foundation of the army
according to these duties established by the constitution.
These experts, by organizing work teams and exchanging
ideas, will provide for an organization which will be able
to defend the borders of the country, up to the limit of
a jihad. This organization will, however, require
national assistance for defending the borders of the
country. 223
On February 13, General Shadmehr spoke of a "Cleansing and
Purging Bill" from the Revolutionary Council. He stated that
the Army had been the first of the armed forces to implement
this new bill and that the purge was nearly complete. Issuing
a warning to any would-be dissidents, he cautioned that
persons "who take any action in the future contrary to the
path of the revolution will be handed over to a military
revolutionary tribunal." Invoking repeatedly the cause of
the revolution, he commented regarding those elements of the
military who
are trying, through commotion and clamor, to voice certain
things which are neither in line with the principles of
Islam nor with the laws of the Armed Forces. Most
important of all, they are not in line with the imam's
commands and recommendations.
223*Experts Asked To Reorganize Armed Forces," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 1709 GMT, 10 Feb 80 (LD101856), February
11, 1980, p. 42.
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What distinguishes the present army from that which
existed in the past is that no ideological issue could be
voiced in the past.... in the Islamic Republic Armed
Forces, by contrast, political and ideological
organizations were created after the victory of the
revolution. They are responsible for organizing debates
and discussions on various ideologies, providing freedom
for everyone to voice their views, and generally enabling
people to benefit from an exchange of ideas. All this,
however, must take place during off-duty hours. We have,
for example, Islamic associations whose job it is to hold
off-duty debate and discussions with those who do not know
much about Islam with to view to winning them over.22'
In July of 1980, Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr
announced that the Revolutionary Guards had foiled an
attempted military coup. He stated that the plotters had
attempted to seize an air base in Hamadan Province to then
later bomb Ayatollah Khomeini's home in Tehran, as well as
other facilities.225 Seventeen Army officers were arrested
in Ahvaz and placed immediately on trial for their part in the
plot. The officers were found to possess leaflets proclaiming
the authority of the "National Military Council of Iran." 26
In the wake of the coup attempt, over 300 military personnel
were arrested, including a number of Air Force pilots and two
generals, one from the Air Force, the other from the
2 24
"Chief Of Joint Staff Interviewed On Army Purges, Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 13 Feb 80 (LD141028),
February 14, 1980, pp. 22-24.
22 5Allaway, Tony, "US hostage released by Iranians," Times,
July 11, 1980, p.11.
22 6Allaway, "17 officers on trial over Iranian coup 'plot,'"
Times, July 12, 1980, p. 5.
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Gendarmerie. The generals confessed to having contacts with
former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and described
themselves as "nationalists" seeking the separation of
politics from the clergy. The result of the attempted coup
was a stronger sentiment for further purges of the military,
especially a thorough one of the Air Force. 2 2 7 President
Bani-Sadr announced that in the trials of the coup plotters,
the plotters would be dealt with "in a resolute manner,"
stating that "some will be executed." Bani-Sadr also admitted
that "constant undermining of the morale of the armed forces,
especially through purges," had contributed to the sense of
dissatisfaction within the military and added an element of
pressure to the lives of the professional military.2 28
On July 20, four of the coup planners (including the Air
Force General and two other pilots) were executed for
"plotting." 229 On July 24, 20 soldiers were executed by a
firing squad in Tehran for their role in the attempted coup.
227Allaway, "Two generals accused of plotting Iran coup,"
Times, July 14, 1980, p. 5. The Air Force as an institution had
been very loyal to the Shah because he had ensured that they had
been afforded the most advanced technology available to them.
Under the Khomeini Regime, the spare parts to keep the F-14 and F-4
fighter jets flying were in short supply. For this reason, the Air
Force was less favorably inclined towards the rulers of the Islamic
Republic than towards the Pahlavis.
22 8Allaway, "Iran coup plotters face execution," Times, July
17, 1980, p. 1.
22 9
"Ayatollah says rule is not Islamic enough," Times, July 22,
1980, p. 5.
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Ayatollah Khomeini had personally ordered the death penalty
for all persons connected with the plot, which, if
successfully carried out, would have bombed his home.2 ° In
the wake of these events, Bani-Sadr called for an end to the
purges and a strengthening of the army, emerging as an
advocate of potent military power. 2 ' With an eye towards
potential future conflicts, Bani-Sadr was concerned about the
concentration of Iraqi forces along the southwestern Iranian
border and wanted to assure that an Iraqi invasion would not
push easily into Iran due to a weakened, purged military. 232
On September 8, Ayatollah Khomeini order an end to the
arbitrary arrest and prosecution of military members by
military courts. He further ordered that claims against
military members not be made public until the suspected
soldier's guilt was actually proven. Khomeini's move was an
attempt to improve the sagging morale of the armed forces in
the wake of the recent arrests as a result of the coup plot
(see Table 1 on page 188 for a comparison of military members
executed, retired and imprisoned).23
230i"20 Iranian servicemen shot for plotting coup," Times, July
25, 1980, p. 7.
23 1Bakhash, Shaul, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the
Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984), p. 119.
232Hickman, RavaQed and Reborn, p. 18.
233
"Ayatollah puts curb on armed forces arrests," Times,
September 9, 1980, p. 6.
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E. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
On September 22, 1980, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
ordered an invasion of Iran, which "put the entire issue of
purging the armed forces in a new perspective, a214 because
the recent purges of the Armed Forces initially resulted in a
fragmented opposition to the invaders.2 3  In the early
stages of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Army was relegated to
a secondary role in favor of the Revolutionary Guards. The
military was also beset by command and control problems due to
the rapid rise of junior officers as a result of the purges of
monarchist or ideologically unreliable senior officers. These
junior officers were ideologically acceptable to the regime
but they had little experience, which further undermined the
military's efforts in the early stages of the war.26 The
war did, however, serve as a unifying factor as the military
leadership mobilized to support the government and some
officers detained under the purges were brought back into
service. 2 "
234Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War, p. 127.
23 5Pelletiere, Stephen C. and Johnson, Douglas V., II, Lessons
Learned: The Iran-Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 1991), p. 2.
23 6Stanhope, Henry, "Conflict liable to turn into long war of
attrition," Times, October 20, 1980, p. 6.
2 3 7Wright, In the Name of God, p. 93.
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In an attempt to rectify command and control deficiencies,
Iran's Higher Defense Council established a unified command in
October under which all forces, to include the military as
well as the Revolutionary Guards, would fall. The Iranian
Government hoped to promote discipline and an effective chain
of command in order to coordinate effective military
activities in the face of the Iraqi onslaught." 8
Although friction did exist between the professional
military leadership and the Revolutionary Guards (who were
backed by the mullahs) over how to wage the campaigns of the
war, Saddam Hussein's invasion served to place the military
squarely in the corner of the Islamic Republic as the war
became a fight for national survival. With the passage of
time, the armed forces exhibited their valor in defending
Iran, proving that their loyalty to the state overrode their
animosities with the Pasdaran,2 9 who were forced to rely on
the professional soldiers for their military expertise."'4
Differences of approach regarding the war, and
specifically on how it should be conducted militarily,
have persisted throughout the conflict. There have been
instances when it appeared that the military's skills and
the Pasdar's fervour might be combined and made
23 8Mishlawi, Tewfik, "Iran puts its armed forces under unified
command," Times, November 1, 1980, p. 4.




'Chubin, Shahram and Tripp, Charles, Iran and Iraa at War
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 43.
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complementary, but these moments were fleeting.
Suspicions, resentments, political differences and
uncertainty clouded relations throughout. These reflected
the larger issue - that of the relationship between the
Islamic Republic and its military forces.2 4"
Another innovation was the creation of the Supreme Defense
Council (SDC), which assigned political commissars "to all
military echelons down to the division level.u 242  The SDC
was also assisted by a Political-Ideological Directorate
(PID), which worked with the soldiers directly to provide
indoctrination, counter dissent, spread propaganda, and
oversee security and intelligence activities among the
soldiers. An Ershad (Guidance) Organization guided by clerics
also served to identify potential political or religious
dissidents.243
F. THE POST-WAR MILITARY
In the end, the Iran-Iraq War served as the catalyst that
made the Iranian Armed Forces an effective fighting force
capable of defending Iran from external threat.244  Even
though there was a great deal of mutual suspicion between the
professional military and the Revolutionary Guards during the
241Ibid., p. 45.
242Bill, James A. and Springborg, Robert, Politics in the
Middle East, Third Edition (HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), pp.
264-5.
24 3Ibid.
244Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn, p. 19 and Schahgaldian, The
Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic, p. 37.
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initial stages of the war, the exigencies of combat produced
a grudging, mutual respect borne out of the shared experience
of having defended the country from foreign aggression. 245
In spite of their defense of Iran from external aggression,
the military was still viewed with distrust by the Islamic
Republic. This distrust could still be found during the
"Reign of Terror," when the government used the Pasdaran
instead of the armed forces to suppress the Mujaheddin-e
Khalq. 2 "
Even after the Islamic Republic had consolidated its hold
over the military, dissident elements were to found among the
ranks. In connection with an August 1982 plot to overthrow
the government masterminded by former Foreign Minister Sadeq
Qotbzadeh, 70 military officers were executed.247
After the termination of the Iran-Iraq War, the military,
seen as the saviors of the nation, enjoyed an increase in
popularity. 24" Additionally, the armed forces have been
24 5Schahgaldian, Ibid., p. 26.
24 6Hickman, RavaQed and Reborn, p. 26.
241 70 Iranian officers reported shot after Qotbzadeh 'plot,'"
Times, August 17, 1982, p. 6.
248Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn, p. 31.
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built up both in manpower and equipment since the end of the
war. 249
Although much speculation exists regarding the eventual use
of the military's new weaponry, the leaders of the Islamic
Republic recognize, as they did at the onset of the
revolution, that a strong military under the control of Tehran
is essential for the maintenance and exercise of power.
249Atkeson, Edward B., A Military Assessment of the Middle
East, 1991-96 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
1992, pp. 32-36 & 48.
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III. PERSECUTION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES
Although Iran is considered a Persian nation, there are
various ethnic minorities throughout the country, such as the
Kurds, the Azerbaijanis, the Baluchis, the Arabs and the
Turkomans. Of these minorities, many have members of the same
ethnic group located on the other side of Iran's borders with
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (at that time, the Soviet Union), Iraq and
Turkey.
In the wake of the Iranian Revolution, many of these
minorities requested greater measures of autonomy (at no time
did the minorities ever call for separatism from Iran). These
calls for autonomy were answered with force by the government
as it consolidated its power in a coercive manner. The
government habitually employed rhetoric that evolved from
suave ("our brothers") to very harsh ("enemies of God" or
"enemies of the revolution"). The government also habitually
coupled its demagoguery with armed repression. After varying
exchanges of mutual recriminations, government forces were
brought in and provided with a pretext to suppress the
minorities who had by then been labelled as "subversive."
Reflecting back on the Iranian Revolution, Edward Said was
to comment that *in Iran to this day, the state structure
78
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effectively stifles Azerbaijanis, Baluchis, Kurds, Arabs, and
others, who feel their individual ethnic existence compromised
as a result.' 2 50
A. THE KURDS
Because they live in different countries such as Iran, Iraq,
Turkey, Syria, and the former Soviet Union,2 5' the Kurds have
historically been frustrated in their goal of obtaining their
own independent state. 25 2  For purposes of clarification,
the Kurds will be examined as an ethnic minority as well as a
political and religious (Sunni Muslim) one within Iran. In
Iran, there are an estimated four million Kurds.25 3
During the First World War when Enver Pasha led an Ottoman
attack against Czarist Russia, Persian Kurds formed part of
his force. 25' When Reza Khan ascended the Peacock Throne in
25 0Said, Edward W., Coverina Islam: How the Media and the
Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 59.
2 51Mostyn, Trevor and Hourani, Albert, eds., The Cambridge
Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 463.
"
2 52Mansfield, Peter, A History of the Middle East (New York:
Penguin Books, 1991), p. 17.
"253Delury, George E., World Encyclopedia of Political Systems
& Parties Second Edition (New York: Facts On File, Ltd., 1987),
p. 534.
254Hitti, Philip K., The Near East in History: A 5000 Year
Story (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, INC., 1961), p.
400.
79
ti l  i , , , ,  
    
  • 250 
.  
  t   
, , i n,251  
l    r 
t  252    , 
t     i       
    li    .  
    . 253 
     
   ,   t f 
. 25'         
250Said,  ., g     
rt  t r i     t  t   l   : 
t  s, 1), . . 
251Mostyn, Trevor and ourani, l ert, .,  idge 
l ia   i l      idge: 
ri  i it  , 88), . 3. 
252Mansfield, t ,  v     : 
i  s, 1), . . 
253Delury, George E., orld ncyclopedia  l s 
 i s     , t ., 7), 
. . 
25'Hitti, Philip ., The ear ast i  i t r :   ar 
 t , : .  r d any, ., 1), . 
. 
 
1925, he was forced to engage in guerrilla warfare and
subjugate Soviet-sponsored Kurdish chieftains."25
A Kurdish separatist movement, the Kurdish Democratic Party
of Iran (KDPI) was formed with Soviet backing after the Second
World War. 25 6 This movement attempted to break away from
Iran and called itself the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,
although it "only contained one third of the Kurds in Iran and
was far from being a Kurdish national home." 25 ' The blatant
level of Soviet involvement included supplying Soviet uniforms
and weapons to the Kurds. 25 8 It was subsequently crushed by
the Shah after the Soviets, at American insistence, withdrew
support. 25 9  This Soviet involvement in Iranian Kurdistan
led to skepticism and suspicion regarding Soviet aims towards
25SIbid., p. 416.
256Degenhardt, Henry W., Political Dissent: An International
Guide to Dissident, Extra-Parliamentary, Guerrilla and IlleQal
Political Movements (Burnt Mill, U.K.: Longman Group Limited,
1983), p. 169.
257 Drysdale, Alasdair and Blake, Gerald H., The Middle East and
North Africa: A Political Geography (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985), p. 67.
2 58Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Fourth Edition
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), p. 182.
259Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (New York:
Vintage Books, 1982), p. 310.
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Iran, not only under the Shah, but also in the Islamic
Republic of Iran. 2`
The Kurds have been described as "an ethnolinguistic
minority group who are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim." 261  As
Sunnis,
they belong to the mainstream of Islam. But the same fact
sets them sharply apart in Iran, where Shiism is the state
religion. 262
Lois Beck, in an essay from Tribes and State Formation in the
Middle East, argues that the Sunni-Shiite differences were
exacerbated by Islamic institutions:
Because most Kurdish religious leaders were Sunni, they
did not serve to link Kurdish society with Shi'i
Iranian religious institutions or with the Shi'i dominated
state. In fact, they sometimes served to polarize tribal
society and the state. Urban-based 'ulama' in Iran often
viewed Shi'i and especially Sunni tribal people as poor or
ignorant Muslims, heretics, or infidels.26 3
Additionally, the participation of Sunni Muslims in the
Iranian Revolution was limited by the fact that a great deal
26 0Freedman, Robert 0., "Gorbachev, Iran, and the Iran-Iraq
War," Keddie and Gasiorowski, Mark J., eds., Neither East Nor West:
Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States (New Haven, CN: Yale
University Press, 1990), p. 118.
2 61Bill and Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, p. 33.
262Turner, Arthur Campbell, "Kurdish Nationalism," Chelkowski
and Pranger, eds., Ideologv and Power in the Middle East, p. 382.
263Beck, Lois, "Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and
Twentieth-Century Iran," Khoury, Philip S. and Kostiner, Joseph,
eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1990), pp. 202-3.
81
,   r  , t  n  ic 
lic  . Z60 
  e  i    i istic 
it    l ingly  li . "Z61  
is, 
   trea   l .    ct 
  l  t  , re is  s   
i . Z62 
i  , n    s  t  i    
le t,    ite r ces e 
ted  ic ti : 
      i,  
     t   i'i 
 i s i    i'  
.    i s  ize l 
t   .  la a'    
 i'   i lly i    r 
 s, , . 263 
l ,  i tion      
 i      l 
260Freedman, obert ., " orbachev , ,   
 "  i, ., .,   t: 
 ,    
it   0), . . 
261Bill and Springborg, liti  i    ,  . 
262Turner, rthur a pbell, r is  alism,· l o ski 
, ., y      . . 
2uBeck, Lois, " ribes a  t  t t   t -  
t - entury  ,  . ,  
.,      
t   , 0), . -3. 
 
of revolutionary coordination took place through the Shi'i
mosque network and in urban environments.2 64
Although the Kurds were part of the Iran-wide effort to
depose the Shah,2' 5 the:, were nonetheless excluded from the
central decision-making process after the Shah left Iran. The
Kurds had in fact
joined the revolution against the shah in return for
assurances that they would be granted a considerable
measure of local autonomy. They were quickly disabused of
this notion after Khomeini came to power. 2"
Although Khomeini used the Kurds as allies against the Shah,
once their usefulness was over, he "rapidly made it clear that
he opposed any form of ethnic separatism or autonomy.""26
As the Iranian Revolution progressed, the Kurdish question
took on a new character. On March 2, 1979, the KDPI stated
their desire for an autonomous Kurdistan in Iran. Their goals
were:
1. The boundaries of Kurdistan would be determined by the
Kurdish people and would take into consideration
historical, economic, and geographical conditions.
2. On matters of defense, foreign affairs, and long-term
economic planning, Kurdistan would abide by the
264Ibid., p. 209.
265Hegland, "Two Images of Husain," Keddie, ed., ReliQion and
Politics in Iran, p. 218.
266Sick, All Fall Down, p. 237.
26 7Cordesman, Anthony H. and Wagner, Abraham R., The Lessons of
Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-IraQ War (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press Inc., 1990), p. 26.
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central government's decisions. The Central Bank of
Iran would control the currency.
3. There would be a Kurdish parliament, whose members
would be popularly elected. It would be the highest
legislative power in the province.
4. All government departments in the province would be
run locally instead of from the capital.
5. There would be a people's army, but the police and
gendarmerie would be abolished and replaced by a
national guard.
6. The Kurdish language would be the official language of
the provincial government and would be taught in all
schools. Persian would also continue to be an
official language.
7. All ethnic minorities in Kurdistan would enjoy equal
rights and would be allowed to use their own language
and traditions.
8. Freedom of speech and press, rights of association,
and trade-union activities would be guaranteed. The
Kurdish people would have the right to travel freely
and choose their own occupation. 268
Later that month, Kurdish tribesmen engaged Iranian soldiers
in Mahabad. 269  They presented Minister of Labor Daryoush
Farouhan with the eight point proposal for autonomy, which he
subsequently categorized as "harsh."2"'
On March 18, 1979, Kurdish tribesmen engaged Iranian troops
in Sanandaj, taking over an army barracks, a paramilitary
police barracks, and a radio station. Approximately 120,000
268Times (London), March 4, 1979, cited by MacDonald, Charles
G., "The Kurdish Question in the 1980s," Esman, Milton J. and
Rabinovich, Itamar, eds., Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in
the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988),
pp. 241-2.
26 9Kifner, "Kurdish Tribesmen Battle Iran Troops," New York
Times, March 20, 1979, p. 3.
27"New York Times, March 1, 1979, cited by Pelletiere, The
Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, Inc., 1984), p. 178.
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Kurds held 2,000 soldiers in the barracks while they
negotiated with the Iranian government. 27 1
Ayatollah Khomeini responded with words as well as deeds.
Invoking his own interpretation of theology, he claimed that
the Kurds were nacting against Islam" and stated "we do not
have any differences with our Sunni brothers. n272 Khomeini
then sent helicopter gunships to strafe the gathered
Kurds. 2 " On March 21, tanks were sent in to augment the
helicopter gunships.274
In the face of a standoff, Khomeini sent Ayatollah Taleghani
to Sanandaj to negotiate with the Kurds. 27 5  There, he
arranged the release of the Iranian soldiers in return for the
following concessions:
A Kurd, Ibrahim Yunesi, was appointed governor of
Kurdistan; power to appoint security forces in the
province was invested in a committee of Kurds, which also
had the power to oversee the provincial administration,
and Kurdish was to be taught in the schools.27 6
"'17Pelletiere, The Kurds, p. 179.
"
27Kifner, "Kurdish Tribesmen Battle Iran Troops," New York
Times, March 20, 1979, p. 3.
273Ibid.
274Jaynes, "Kurdish Townsmen, Ignoring Iran's Appeals for
Truce, Continue Fighting," New York Times, March 22, 1979, p. 3.
"25sJaynes, "Long Kurdish Struggle Now Focuses on Khomeini," New
York Times, March 23, 1979, p. 4.
27
'Pelletiere, The Kurds, p. 179.
84
        
t    i  t. 271 
 i     . 
 tation  l ,  t 
  ·ac   -   ·  t 
  s    rs .• eini 
 r     
s. 273  ,     t  
t r ips. 2" 
 ff, i  l  hani 
j te s. 275 re,  
         
 ions: 
 , i  si, t  r f 
i r t t     
 t    t e  ,   
     i l ti , 
    . 276 
271pelletiere, he r s, . . 
272Kifner, " urdish ribes en ttl  Ir  r ps,·   
s,  , 9, . . 
273Ibid. 
274Jaynes, " urdish o ns en, I ri  '   r 
,  ti g,"  s,  , , .  
27SJaynes, H  l   i i,"  
 s,  , , . . 
276pelletiere, he r s, . . 
 
Additionally, the Iranian government released 168 Kurdish
prisoners.27
When Iranians voted in Late March 1979 to determine whether
or not Iran would be an Islamic Republic, voter turnout in
Mahabad, the capital of the Kurdistan Province, was very
almost non-existent. 27 8  Kurdish religious leader Sheik
Ezzedin Hosseini called for the Kurds to abstain from voting
due the lack of details on a clear definition of an Islamic
republic. 279
On April 21, 1979, the inauguration of a branch office of
the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Naghadeh was broken up by
Shilite ethnic Turks, resulting in violence that led to house
to house fighting.2 80  The Iranian government sent in troops
on April 23 to suppress the Sunni Kurds. Over 800 families
were driven into the surrounding mountains by tanks,
helicopter gunships and armored vehicles. 28' After five
277 
"Calm Reported in Sanandaj, Center of Kurdish Revolt," New
York Times, March 24, 1979, p. 4.
278Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 259.
279Jaynes, "Landslide Victory for Khomeini Reported in Voting,"
New York Times, April 1, 1979, p. 6.
2 8 0Ibrahim, "Kurdish-Turkish Fighting Intensifies in Iranian
Town," New York Times, April 23, 1979, p. 3.
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Vigilantes," New York Times, April 26, 1979, p. 10.
85
  t   
ris rs. 277 
   r 
  l   i ,   
a a a , t  it l  t  i t  i ,   
t t. 278    
i  i i ll   t       
 t  l       
i .  
 , , i    f 
t  r i t  r tic t  i       
i'it  t i  r , lti   i l     
 280  t    
   . V  
 i   i g  , 
t r    les. 281   
277"Calm Reported in Sanandaj, Center of Kurdish Revolt," New 
r  i es, r  , , . . 
278Keddie, Roots of e l ti , . 9. 
279Jaynes, "Landslide ictory f r ho eini rt   , " 
 s,  , 9. . . 
280Ibrahim, "Kurdish-Turkish i ti  i s   
,"  s,  , 9,  . 
281 Ibrahim , "Iranians ecide t  r e   ut 
l tes," e  s, l , , . . 
 
days of fighting and hundreds of deaths, 28 2 the Kurds and
Turks were able to agree to a cease-fire, leading to the
withdrawal of government forces. 283
On July 11, Kurds in Mahabad demonstrated to protest an
Iranian Government breach of agreement to grant Kurdish
autonomy and allow the teaching of Kurdish language and
culture. In an appeal for unity, Kurdish leacers stated their
intention to remain part of Iran. 284
Fighting in Kurdistan renewed when Kurds overran the town of
Paveh on August 16, 1979.285 Ayatollah Khomeini sent in
government soldiers directly, bypassing the military leaders,
whom he accused of lacking revolutionary zeal. 28 6  Coupling
his actions with rhetoric, Khomeini called the Kurds
"infidels," ordering revolutionary trials to "crush the
plotters." 287  Khomeini knew that "to show any weakness in
Kurdistan would encourage other national minorities to demand
212Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 169.
21 3Ibrahim, "Iran Reports Cease-Fire in Area Where Kurds and
Turks Clashed," New York Times, April 27, 1979, p. 13.
284Ibrahim, "Iranian Oil Pipeline Is Cut, Reportedly by Arab
Group," New York Times, July 12, 1979, p. 3.
2 8 5
"Kurdish Rebels Said to Seize Town In Western Iran After
Fierce Battle," New York Times, August 17, 1979, p. 2.
2 86
"Iran Is Said to Crush Kurd Revolt; Khomeini Bypasses Army
Leaders," New York Times, August 19, 1979, p. 1.
28 7
"Kurds Said to Trap Officials," New York Times, August 18,
1979, p. 5.
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similar rights, 2s which was something the new regime could
neither afford nor tolerate.
Due to military high command intransigence and disagreements
over using the armed forces to suppress the Kurds, Khomeini
initiated a purge of the armed forces. He also began to
replace them with a new creation, the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps, also known as the Pasdaran. 28 9 After arriving
in Paveh, government soldiers then defeated the Kurds,
executing eleven Kurdish prisoners.29"
In the wake of the Paveh situation, Khomeini stated his
desire to turn Iran into a one-party state: "We will keep just
one party...the rest will be banned." 291 The Kurdish
Democratic Party was subsequently banned and the election of
Abdul Rahaman Qassemloo as the party's secretary general was
declared null and void by the government. 292
Khomeini then sent government forces and tanks to the
Kurdish capital of Sanandaj, claiming they were needed to
28 8Parsa, Misagh, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New
Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1989), p. 259.
289Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 34.
"290 oIran Is Said to Crush Kurd Revolt," New York Times, August
19, 1979, p. 1.
291Ibid.
292, Iran's Troops Move on Kurdish Capital at Khomeini's Order,"
New York Times, August 20, 1979, p. 12.
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crush a rebellion taking place.191 In doing so, he
appointed himself Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian military
forces and declared a general mobilization.294 Khomeini
justified the mobilization and deployment by claiming that the
Kurds were on the verge of seizing weaponry for anti-
government purposes.29" Khomeini also issued a call for the
Iranian population to hunt down members of the Kurdish
Democratic Party29' and, in keeping with his theological
tendency to demonize his opponents, called the KDPI the "party
of Satan." 297
Eighteen Kurds were executed on August 21 for being "agents
of America." 298  In a change of strategy, Khomeini then
offered the Kurds the choice of approximately 75 million
dollars to cease hostilities in the town of Saqqiz or face
harsh punishment. Khomeini stated the Kurds must "join Islam"
29 31Ibid, p. 1.
294Wright, In the Name of God, p. 219.
295 Iran's Troops Move On Kurdish Capital," New York Times,
August 20, 1979, p. 1.
296.22 Newspapers Forced to Close by Iran Regime," New York
Times, August 21, 1979, p. 1.
2 9 7ibid., p. 7.
298"Iran Executes 18 Kurdish Rebels; Expels 5 More Western
Reporters," New York Times, August 22, 1979, p. 1.
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because *there is no difference between the
nationalities."2 9' The Kurds did not accept Khomeini's offer
and the government responded with helicopter gunships that
performed continuous strafing runs. These runs were
illuminated at night by flares3"' and were so intense that
rescue teams could not remove wounded bodies from the street
in order to administer medical care. 30 1  The Iranian
Government executed a physician named Rashvand-Sardari for
"treating a wounded Kurdish rebel." 30 2  The government also
employed F-4 Phantom supersonic jets to fly at low altitudes
over Kurdish positions for psychological intimidation
purposes. 303
Khomeini denounced the Kurds stating "you were not a good
people.. .you were not Islamic," and "We know you are bad
people and we will not give you freedom." 30 4  By August 26,
government forces had retaken Saqqiz with the help of
helicopter gunships, supersonic jets, tanks, rockets, and
"
2 99
"Khomeini Offers Money to Kurds In Apparent Effort to End
Uprising," New York Times, August 23, 1979, p. 1.
3 0 0
"Kurdish Rebels In Fierce Battle With Iran Force," New York
Times, August 24, 1979, p. 1.
3 0 1Ibid.
"32Bakhash, The Reijn of the Ayatollahs, p. 60.
303 Ibid.
31 4"Kurdish Rebels In Fierce Battle With Iran Force," New York
Times, August 24, 1979, p. 7.
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heavy artillery.3 °0  Khomeini sentenced nine Kurds to
execution on August 27 for armed rebellion against the Islamic
Republic. 306
The government then carried the offensive even further.
They first executed twenty persons in connection for aiding
and abetting the Kurds in the fighting at Saqqiz. Government
forces then surrounded Mahabad. 30 ' Rejecting a Kurdish
request for negotiations, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr publicly
stated:
There is no justification whatsoever for the systematic
subversion of minorities who want to impose violence on
our people. As soon as they stop acting in this manner,
brotherly Islamic cooperation can begin. It is not up to
us to declare a cease-fire. 30 8
In contrast to the official government version, Ayatollah
Kazem Shariatmadari indicated he favored a formal cease-fire
and negotiations with the Kurds. He stated "I have no doubt
that this war is imposed on them" and offered to intervene on
behalf of the Kurds.3 °9
3 0 5
"Iran's Troops Crush Kurdish Rebel Siege; New Fight
Expected," New York Times, August 27, 1979, p. 1.
3 0 6
"Kurds Report Agreement on Truce In Talks With Khomeini
Associate," New York Times, August 28, 1979, p. 3.
"301"Iranians Execute 20 In Kurdish Uprising," New York Times,
August 29, 1979, p. 1.
3 08 jIbid, p. 8.
"309"Iran Says Kurds Will Allow Army In Mehabad but a Leader
Denies It,O New York Times, August 30, 1979, p. 4.
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In late August of 1979, Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi
Bazargan unsuccessfully requested that Ayatollah Khomeini
accept his resignation, stating Othe country is not aware
that we have a war cabinet which holds regular sessions on
Kurdistan."31 At the same time, Khomeini accused the Kurds
of attempting to establish a Communist state within Iran and
called for the execution of Kurdish leaders.3 1
Khomeini's anti-Kurdish rhetoric was part of a "major public
campaign to whip up popular support against the Kurds." 3 1 2
Gary Sick, in his account of the Iranian Revolution, All Fall
Down, related the following:
In some respects, the "phony war" against the Kurds
could be regarded as a model for the political techniques
that Khomeini was to use on a much larger scale.. .he
exploited the dramatic circumstances... to whip up public
emotions, to mobilize popular support behind his own
leadership when it showed signs of erosion, to weaken or
crush domestic opposition to his programs,and to press
singlemindedly for the adoption of controversial elements
of his theocratic plans even at the risk of multiplying
turmoil and sacrifice. The Kurdish campaign of August
1979 was more obviously contrived than the major conflicts
that followed, but it provided a foretaste of the
ruthlessness and political adroitness that would confound




"Iran's Prime Minister Again Asks to Resign, Citing Lack of
Power," New York Times, September 1, 1979, p. 5.
"31Ibid.
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31 3Ibid.
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Khomeini then "opened a full-scale assault on the
Kurds," 3 1 1 which was composed of air and ground forces,
including over 100 tanks, directed against opposition forces
in Mahabad. 3 " Government tanks, helicopter gunships and
jets subsequently pushed into Mahabad, driving over 100,000
Kurds into the surrounding hills.3 1  As the Kurds regrouped
in the town of Sardasht, government soldiers closed in,
awaiting the order to advance.
As the government soldiers moved into Sardasht, the Kurds
fled once again into the surrounding areas.38 Over the
next few weeks, the Kurds engaged in limited combat against
government forces, attacking an armored column,n 9 frontier
posts, 320 and the Mahabad police station. 32 1
3 4Pelletiere, The Kurds, p. 181.
315
"Iran Reports Broad New offensive To Put Down Kurdish
Insurrection," New York Times, September 2, 1979, p. 1.
3 16
"Kurdish Rebels Flee Stronghold As Iranians Drive Through
Lines," New York Times, September 4, 1979, p. 4.
3171150,000 Iranian Kurds Said to Flee To Asylum Near the Iraq
Border," New York Times, September 6, 1979, p. 3.
3 18
"Tehran Says Its Forces Capture Kurdish Rebels' Last
Stronghold," New York Times, September 7, 1979, p. 10.
3 19
"Kurds Almost Wipe Out Column of Iranian Troops," New York
Times, October 11, 1979, p. 7.
3 20
"Kurdish Guerrillas Destroy Frontier Post in Iran," New York
Times, October 12, 1979, p. 4.
3 21
"Kurdish Rebels Said to Kill Police Chief and 3 Others," New
York Times, October 14, 1979, p. 11.
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In late October, fighting resumed in Mahabad, where
government helicopter gunships and tanks assaulted Kurdish
positions.3 2  The Kurds were able to assume control of the
city and called for peace negotiations with the
government. 3  In response, the government agreed to limited
self-rule in the Kurdish provinces.3 4
In December of 1979, a country-wide vote was held to decide
on the referendum for an Islamic constitution. Throughout
Kurdistan, voter turnout was almost nonexistent due to
Qassemloo's banishment from the Assembly of Experts.3 5  As
tensions mounted in Kurdistan over the referendum, the
government moved soldiers back into the area, in violation of
the cease-fire agreement that had been reached with the
Kurds. 32  The Kurds were also angered by government
references to two Kurdish leaders as "agents of Zionism and
corruption.a32
3 22
"Kurds Said to Control City in Northwest Iran After Heavy
Fighting," New York Times, October 21, 1979, p. 8.
32 3
"Fighting Said to Continue in Northwest Iran City," New York
Times, October 23, 1979, p. 11.
"
324
"Iranian Officials Tell Kurds Of Limited Self-Rule Plan,"
New York Times, November 3, 1979, p. 7.
325
"Kurds in Iran Shun Referendum, Stressing Self-Rule Aim,"
New York Times, December 4, 1979, p. 11.
326Kifner, "Iran Moving Troops Against Kurds To Curb Unrest
Over New Charter," New York Times, December 7, 1979, p. 1.
3 2 7Ibid., p. 16.
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On December 17, 1979, Khomeini stated his position vis-a-vis
the Kurds (and all other ethnic minorities) in Iran during a
radio address:
Sometimes the word minorities is used to refer to such
people as Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians, Baluchis and such.
These people should not be called minorities, because this
term assumes that there is a difference between these
brothers. In Islam, such a difference has no place at
all. There is no difference between Muslims who speak
different languages, for instance, the Arabs or the
Persians. It is very probable that such problems have
been created by those who do not wish Muslim countries to
be united.
They created the issues of nationalism, of pan-Iranism,
of pan-Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to
Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and the
Islamic philosophy."28
By claiming that any divergence from the Imam's line was un-
Islamic, Khomeini, in a de facto sense, removed the
theological legitimacy from any activities of which he did not
approve. He was to often use anti-minority rhetoric
interspersed with theological explanations to justify
government suppression of minorities."'
"12Radio Tehran, December 17, 1979-British Broadcasting
Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, December 19, cited by
MacDonald, "The Kurdish Question," Esman and Rabinovich, eds.,
Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State, p. 245.
"'
2 Halliday, Fred, "Iranian Foreign Policy Since 1979:
Internationalism and Nationalism in the Islamic Revolution," Cole,
Juan R.I. and Keddie, eds., Shi'ism and Social Protest (New Haven,
CN: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 102.
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In April of 1980, fighting broke out again in Saqqiz,33
and also in Sanandaj, the latter of which was put down with
helicopter gunships and jets.3 3 1  In July of 1980, the
Iranian government called for a *cleansing" of Kurdistan by
the armed forces. 3 2  A few days later, the commander of the
Sanandaj Revolutionary Guards warned residents to surrender
all arms and "return to Islam ... before we purge the
area. 333
In August of 1980, the government prohibited the flow of
medicine and diesel fuel into Kurdistan, negatively impacting
the sick and wounded as well as local agriculture. The Kurds
engaged in a series of clashes with government forces in order
to open the roads and remove the blockades.3 3
In February of 1981, fighting between government forces and
Kurds resulted in the Kurdish recapture of Mahabad. Fighting
also took place in Sanandaj and Saqqiz. The Iranian
government offered the Kurds more autonomy in return for
330Allaway, "Student violence leads to Tehran purges," Times,
April 19, 1980, p. 5.
33 1Allaway, "Gunships and jets attack Kurdish rebel city,"
Times, April 25, 1980, p. 1.
332Fisk, Robert, "Iran demand for ban on left-wing opposition,"
Times, July 5, 1980, p. I.
33 3Allaway, "Armenian women in a quandary," Times, July 11
1980, p. 8.
314 "Kurds claim victory over government forces," Times, August
12, 1980, p. 5.
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support in the war against Iraq. 335  The Kurds rejected the
government's offers of pardon and fighting continued around
Mahabad. Many residents fled as government artillery and
mortars destroyed buildings in the city.'6
In July of 1981, the Kurds were assessed as a "serious armed
threat to Ayatollah Khomeini's regime 331 due in part to their
alignment with Bani-Sadr, who had fallen out of official
favor. The Times of London described their forces as "the
most heavily armed and the best trained" as they engaged in
continued skirmishes with government forces. 33 8  In November
of 1981, the KDPI formally joined the National Council of
Resistance, an organization of Iranian expatriates who were
out of favor with the regime.
Throughout 1982, the Kurds fought the government forces, who
were primarily concerned with Iraqi troops. During an Iranian
offensive in August of 1982, government forces led by the
331"Kurds claim their foes have taken former capital," Times,
February 3, 1981, p. 6.
336
"Kurds spurn Tehran's pardon offer," Times, February 10,
1981, p. 5.
331"Guerrillas killed in Iran clash," Times, July 6, 1981, p.
5.
338 Ibid.
33 9Teimourian, Hazhir, "Expulsions ordered by Baghdad, Times,
November 7, 1981, p. 4.
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Pasdaran 340 also attacked Kurdish strongholds with tanks,
helicopter gunships and artillery.34" At the same time,
Kurdish groups in Paris, France alleged that the Iranian
government was resorting to the mass imprisonment and
deportation of Kurdish families from the Kurdish
provinces. 342
Revolutionary Guards clashed with Kurdish forces near
Mahabad in May of 1983, causing the deaths of "large numbers
of counterrevolutionaries, a according to Tehran radio. Tehran
Radio also reported that several officials of the Kurdish
Democratic Party had been arrested.343
On July 23, 1983, Iranian forces launched an attack into
Kurdistan. With a four-to-one advantage in manpower, they
were able to dislodge Kurdish forces from Mahabad, Bukhan and
Baqqez. 344 From that point, Iran had the "manpower and ethnic
unity to mercilessly put down any Kurdish resistance." 341
34 0Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 122.
34 1Teimourian, "Kurdish strongholds under attack," Times,
August 27, 1982, p. 6.
342Ibid.
343
"Kurdish Operations," from a Tehran radio broadcast, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), May 3, 1983.
344Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 166.
34SIbid., p. 207.
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On February 9, 1984, The Times reported that Amnesty
International was in receipt of information concerning extra-
judicial executions of munarmed villagers of all ages, in
Kurdish areas. 3 '
Even though the Kurdish uprisings "never posed any serious
threat to the central government, "m4 they did seek to
"establish themselves in a strong bargaining position vis-a-
vis the government" 348 in order to further voice their
grievances with some measure of credibility and leverage.
In the final analysis, Iran has never wanted to allow
Kurdish autonomy and would not be likely to alter their
position towards the Kurds. Additionally, the methods used
with the Kurds were to be the standard responses applied to
other groups that the government viewed as subversive. The
escalation of rhetoric used in conjunction with armed force
became the trademarks of governmental repression.
History has shown that, in Iran, "Kurdish nationalism and
separatism have invariably been met with repression." 349 As
346McGregor, Alan, "Fear for torture victims," Times, February
9, 1984, p. 6.
34 7Turner, "Kurdish Nationalism," Chelkowski and Pranger, eds.,
Ideolocqv and Power in the Middle East, p. 409.
34 8Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraa at War, pp. 107-8.
34
'Drysdale and Blake, The Middle East and North Africa, p.
155.
98
 , ,   t   t  
i l   t  ti n  -
l   "una     ,"  
 . 3" 
        
 l rn ent,  347    
   i  i  
 t A 348     ir 
s     t   e. 
 ,      
        ir 
   . ll ,   
          
    t   ive.  
ti  i    i    
e s t l . 
       lis   
tis   l    i . ,,349 s 
3"McGregor, lan, "Fear for t rt r  i ti ," , r  
, , . . 
3"Turner, "Kurdish ationalis ," el s i  , s., 
ology  r    ,  . 
. 
348Chubin and ripp, Ira   q , . -8. 
3490rysdale and Blake, The iddle ast  rt  , . 
 
long as they fall under non-Kurdish rule, "the Kurds are, and
will remain, pawns in the hands of greater forces.n"
B. THE AZERBAIJANIS
Azerbaijanis who live in Iran are also known as Azeri Turks
and ,izerbaijani Turks. Located in the North-Western section
of the country, they control the grain-producing areas of
Qazvin, Kermanshah, Reza'iyeh and Tabriz.3"' Approximately
15,000,000 Azerbaijani Turks live in Iran, constituting its
largest ethnic minority group. 352
In December of 1945, Soviet forces helped establish the
Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in Tabriz and prevented
Iranian forces from entering the area to suppress the
separatist movement. 313  The Soviet aim was that the
Azerbaijanis secede from Iran to join the Soviet Union.35 '
Under pressure from the United Nations, Soviet soldiers
35 0Turner, "Kurdish Nationalism," Chelkowski and Pranger, eds.,
Ideology and Power in the Middle East, p. 410.
3 51Mostyn and Hourani, eds., Cambridge Encyclopedia, p. 32.
352Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 160.
3 5 3Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, pp. 9-
10.
"34Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, p. 249.
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withdrew in 1946.3ss After the Soviet withdrawal, the
Iranian Government regained control of Azerbaijan.3 5'
Azerbaijani Turks were part of the anti-Shah coalition that
led to his fall. Shi'ite leader Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari
called for demonstrations in Tabriz in 1977 that began the
unrest that eventually culminated in the Shah's ouster. 35 7
After the Shah's departure, Shariatmadari did not accept the
supreme authority of Ayatollah Khomeini or the concept of the
predominance of a ruling clergy in the form of a
theocracy.3 5 8  Shariatmadari was also criticized by Khomeini
for raising questions over the wisdom of public whippings and
executions of pregnant women, young children and old men.
Azerbaijani resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran was
sparked by the December 2, 1979 vote on the referendum for an
Islamic Constitution. Shariatmadari told Azerbaijanis he was
not going to vote on the referendum. The Azerbaijani Muslim
People's Party then called for a boycott, resulting in low
3 55Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 182-3.
3 56Herrmann, Richard, "The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions
and Policy, 1946-1988," Keddie and Gasiorowski, eds., Neither East
Nor West, p. 64.
35 7Gupte, Pranay, "Left in Iran Split by Stand Over Khomeini,"
New York Times, December 6, 1979, p. 18.
35 8Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 168.
359Bakhash, The ReiQn of the Ayatollahs, p. 89.
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voter turnout in Tabriz and the surrounding areas.36"
Shariatmadari's concern with the referendum was the ultimate
authority of religious leaders over other types of authority
and the lack of personal autonomy for Iranians. 36 '
Shariatmadari, while calling for the revision of various
articles due to what he described as "inherent
contradictions," stated the constitution was acceptable. 36 2
Azerbaijani objections to Khomeini's stance were grounded in
Shariatmadari's fear of a theocracy that would establish
religious domination over secular aspects of society.3 63
Apprehension regarding Khomeini's attitude towards Azeri
autonomy as articulated by Shariatmadari compounded the
ambivalent attitude towards the referendum as well. 364
In reaction to the Azerbaijani religious leader's call for
a boycott, Khomeini supporters on December 5 marched against
and attacked Shariatmadari's home in the holy city of Qom,
resulting in an Azerbaijani guard's death.365
36 0Gupte, "Member of Iranian Minority Says Khomeini Charter Is
'Not for Us,'" New York Times, December 5, 1979, p. 18.
361 Ibid.
362Gupte, "Left in Iran Split by Stand Over Khomeini," New York
Times, December 6, 1979, p. 18.
363Kifner, "An Ayatollah's Boycott of Vote Assailed," New York
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In retaliation for the attack on Shariatmadari's house, on
December 6, Azeris occupied government buildings, to include
the Governor's mansion, in effect taking control of Tabriz and
Azerbaijan Province. 3 66 Shariatmadari's supporters, led by
the Muslim People's Party, also took control of the government
operated radio and television stations."36 They were
endorsed by local police as well as local Iranian Army and Air
Force personnel in the region.368  Shariatmadari supporters
and Khomeini supporters then clashed in Tabriz.
Shariatmadari's supporters also staged a peaceful reciprocal
march on the Qom home of Ayatollah Khomeini. 36'
Shariatmadari soon met with Khomeini and stated that
although Azerbaijani Turks should be granted autonomy, "we do
not want freedom separate from Iran." 3 70  Azeris maintained
their occupation of government facilities with the support of
local police and military personnel.3 7
366Kifner, "Iran Moving Troops Against Kurds To Curb Unrest





'Kifner, "Dissident Ayatollah Appears To Support Provincial
Uprising," New York Times, December 8, 1979, p. 1.
"371Ibid,., p. 4.
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Shariatmadari later proclaimed that agreements he had made
with the government were being broken, in spite of "very
fruitful and effective" talks with Khomeini. 32 At the same
time, Pasdaran raided the offices of a prominent Azeri in
Tehran and arrested six members of his staff. 3
In Tabriz, Shariatmadari's supporters prevented Murredin
Gharavi, the provincial governor from returning to his
offices. Gharavi publicly stated "we will act forcefully" to
regain control of the government offices. At the same time,
Shariatmadari's supporters prevented two planes containing
troops loyal to the central government from landing."'
Government loyalists recaptured the radio and television
stations in Tabriz on December 9 but were driven out the same
day by Shariatmadari supporters. In the wake of the conflict,
Gharavi called the Moslem People's Party "Communists and
leftists" that had received the support of terrorist
groups. 375 Escalating the rhetoric with an injection of
interpretative theology, Khomeini stated that "revolting
"372Kifner, "A Key Ayatollah Warns Tehran On Breaking




"375Gupte, "Fighting Breaks out For Tabriz Station; 3 Reported
Killed," New York Times, December 10, 1979, p. 1.
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against the Islamic Republic is a great sin - just like
blasphemy. .376
On December 28, fighting broke out between supporters of
Shariatmadari and Khomeini in Tabriz. The violence occurred
in response to government raids on the homes of members of the
Muslim People's Party as well as party offices. 377 Further
violence erupted between supporters of Khomeini and
Shariatmadari on January 7, 1980 in Tabriz.
Revolutionary Guards seized Muslim People's Party offices in
Tabriz on January 11, 1980 and took a number of party members
as prisoners. On the following day, eleven party members were
summarily executed for "waging war on God and his
messenger. "u3 On January 26, four more party members were
executed for plotting a coup. On May 23, two more party
members were executed for participating in the uprisings of
December, 1979.380
After the executions of many of his supporters,
Shariatmadari was forced to retreat in order to keep his
"376Ibid., p. 16.
"377Kifner, "New Clash Erupts in Tabriz and Hostages Are
Seized," New York Times, December 29, 1979, p. 5.
"378 Brogan, Patrick, "US pursues call for sanctions against
Iran," Times, January 8, 1980, p. 4.
"379Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 168.
38 0
"Shah's health improving but seclusion continues," Times,
May 24, 1980, p. 5.
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I 
followers out of a confrontation with the central
government. 3 81  Shariatmadari was then made the target of a
propaganda campaign waged to decrease his credibility.
"*Doctored documents were produced to suggest that in
negotiations with the Shah's government in 1978, Shariatmadari
had approved of martial law and had described himself as an
opponent of Khomeini.2 38 2
These allegations contradicted the fact that Shariatmadari's
call for demonstrations in Tabriz in February of 1977 was the
catalyst that began a string of anti-Shah activities leading
to the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty.3 83  The allegations also
ignored the fact that Shariatmadari had helped to elevate
Khomeini to "his high religious position." 384  Khomeini's
overall behavior and position vis-a-vis Shariatmadari were
political rather than religious, although the former's
rhetoric implied a certain theological legitimacy.
Following his implication in the plot to kill Khomeini,
Shariatmadari was stripped of his title and placed under house
381Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, p. 310.
382Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 223.
383Kifner, "An Ayatollah's Boycott of Vote Assailed," New York
Times, December 6, 1979, p. 18.
38"Vecsey, George, "Growing Dissident Voice in Iran," New York
Times, December 8, 1979, p. 4.
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arrest on September 30, 1981.385 He remained there until
his death on April 3, 1986.384 With the removal of
Shariatmadari, the Azeris were "broken by repression,"3 87
leaving the government in undisputed control of the situation
in Azerbaijan.
C. THE BALUCHIS
The Baluchis occupy parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Ethnically related to the Kurds, they may have originally come
from the shores of the Caspian Sea 388 and have historically
been denied an independent state of their own. 38 9  There are
an estimated 750,000 Baluchis in Iran,39 ° who are isolated
from the central government in Tehran by 800 miles of desert
and inhospitable terrain.3 9' The Baluchis were held in check
38 5
"Two more shot for 'Qotbzadeh plot,'" Times, October 1,
1981, p. 8.
386Banks, Arthur S., ed., Political Handbook of the World:
1992 (Binghamton, N.Y.: CSA Publications, 1992), p. 359.
387Rubin, "The State of U.S.-Iran Relations," Rosen, Barry M.,
ed., Iran Since the Revolution: Internal Dynamics, Regional
Conflict, and the Superpowers (New York: Social Science
Monographs, 1985), p. 104.
388Kifner, "Iran Troubled by Traditional Resistance of Its
Minorities," New York Times, April 11, 1979, p. 8.
389Pace, "Iran's Minorities: A History of Conflict," New York
Times, December 23, 1979, p. 14.
"390Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 534.
"3'Drysdale and Blake, The Middle East and North Africa, p.
155.
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by the Pahlavis and, like other ethnic minorities in the
country, saw the Iranian Revolution as a possible means to
forward their hopes for a Baluchi state.392
As Iranians prepared to vote on whether or not to establish
an Islamic Republic, Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan appealed to
"our Baluchi brothers" for calm in the face of unrest.3 93
In order to prevent anti-government coordination, telephones
did not function in the Baluchi capital of Zahidan.394  The
appeal for unity was followed by a visit from Iranian Defense
Minister Rear Admiral Ahmad Madani. Khomeini also accused the
Baluchis of "spreading poison and disunion" with American aid
in order to alienate them from other Iranians. 395 Given the
tone of anti-American propaganda prevalent in Iran during that
time, being accused of complicity with the Americans was a
psychological warfare measure calculated to provoke hostility
towards the anti-government forces.
In the wake of the voting that produced an Islamic Republic,
sporadic disturbances took place in Baluchistan. Iranian
Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir Entezam called the Baluchis
"392Pace, "Iran's Minorities," New York Times, December 23,
1979, p. 14.
"
393Kifner, "Iran Winds Up Campaign to Get Out Vote Today for an
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"counterrevolutionaries and agents of the former regime" and
demanded that they end the disturbances.
3 96
The Baluchis were part of the ethnic unrest that took place
in many areas of Iran in December of 1979 due to controversy
over the new Islamic Constitution. Iran's proposal to make
Shi'ism the official national religion caused a great deal of
consternation in Sunni Baluchistan. 3" Sunni Islam's strong
hold on Baluchistan had offered Shi'i Islam few opportunities
for encroachment. 39 8  The religious issue was exacerbated by
a shortage of food and other staples399 and a general
condition of poverty.""0  Baluchi tribesmen in Zahidan then
took the Governor General and other government officials as
surety and demanded autonomy within the month.' 0 1
On December 20, 1979, fighting broke out between Baluchi
tribesmen and Iranians in Zahidan. The ethnic violence was
sparked by the presence of former Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim
396Jaynes, "Khomeini Declares Victory in Vote For a 'Government
of God' in Iran," New York Times, April 2, 1979, p. 6.
397 Kifner, "Iran Moving Troops Against Kurds To Curb Unrest
Over New Charter," New York Times, December 7, 1979, p. 1.
3 98Keddie and Cole, "Introduction," Cole and Keddie, eds.,
Shi'ism and Social Protest, p. 16.
"399Gupte, "For Now, the Baluchis Hold Their Fire," New York
Times, December 25, 1979, p. 4.
4'0 Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 265.
40'Kifner, "A Key Ayatollah Warns Tehran On Breaking
Azerbaijani Accords," New York Times, December 9, 1979, p. 1.
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Yazdi. Dr Yazdi was in Zahidan to assess the situation for
the central government and to make a public speech appealing
for calm. 40 2
The Iranian Government responded by declaring a state of
emergency in Zahidan on December 22 and sent armed forces
equipped with tanks and armored personnel carriers to restore
calm to the area.' 0 3  The Governor of Baluchistan, Habib
Ghariri, stated that "foreigners" had caused the violence,
which was later "confirmed" by government sources.4°4 The
Baluchi religious and political leader, Mowlavi Abdul-Aziz,
also broadcast an appeal for calm.40 s As Revolutionary
Guards patrolled the city, the government announced that "in
view of the critical situation in Zahidan, the Army will take
over until further notice to maintain security and peace."406
Criticizing the presence of Pasdaran forces in Baluchistan,
Abdul-Aziz commented
There seems to be an epidemic in the central government
that whoever is standing for his own regional rights is an
agitator or troublemaker or a foreigner.
402Wren, Christopher S., "In New Ethnic Violence in Iran,
Baluchis Battle Persians," New York Times, December 21, 1979, p.
12.
403Gupte, "Iran Declares State of Emergency In Baluchistan as
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Our feeling is that we want autonomy within Iran... We
want outside officials to get out, and by that we mean
first and foremost this terrible governor Jaririe. We
want all the Pasdarans to get out, because they have been
harassing us and molesting our women.407
A cessation of hostilities took place due as much to the
presence of soldiers, tanks, and armored personnel carriers as
to the presence of Yazdi. Governor Ghariri publicly stated he
had the best interests of all at heart, but that the Baluchis
needed to let him fix the situation.'0 8  At the same time,
he referred to the Baluchis as "smugglers and illiterate"
people.40 9  Yazdi and Abdul-Aziz negotiated a cease-fire,
which included the joint supervision of Pasdaran and Baluchis
to enforce the truce.' 10
D. THE ARABS
There are over 2,000,000 Arabs in Khuzistan Province, which
was called Arabistan before oil was discovered there.' 11
Upon the discovery of oil, ethnic Persians began to move into
the area, obtaining a monopoly on jobs with better pay and
40 7Gupte, "For Now, the Baluchis Hold Their Fire," New York
Times, December 25, 1979, p. 4.
408 Ibid.
409Ibid.
"410 Gupte, "Iran Declares State of Emergency In Baluchistan as
Fight Continues," Times, December 22, 1979, p. 4.
"4'Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 167.
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more power, which caused resentment among the native Arab
population.412
After Reza Shah took power, he changed the name of the
province to Khuzistan and "then proceeded to methodically
crush any signs of Arab nationalism, suppress Arabic as a
language, resettle the population to reduce what was then a
strong Arab majority, and to exploit the province for his own
ends. .413
When it appeared that there would be no change of status for
them after the fall of the Shah, ethnic Arabs in the oil-
producing province of Khuzistan took control of municipal
buildings in the oil field city of Ahvaz and the port of
Khorramshahr in April of 1979. A government spokesman stated
that the Arabs, who were demanding that Arabic be taught in
the schools, were "in the process of conspiring, m414 and
claimed
counterrevolutionary elements have once again been
infiltrating among the decent and honorable people, and
are involved in certain plots. We expect to uncover
further plots as well. The efforts of the
counterrevolutionaries will be fruitless."415
412 Ibid.
"413Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 12.
414Kifner, "Iran Troubled by Traditional Resistance of Its
Minorities," New York Times, April 11, 1979, p. 8.
"45S*Spokesman Entezam Comments on Unrest, 'Superpower'
Presence," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 01
Apr 79, (LD011330), April 2, 1979, p. R14.
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The Government claimed soon after that a separatist movement
had been discovered and foiled. "Observers noted that this
was the first mention of 'separatism' rather than 'autonomy'
referred to by authorities in relation to incidents involving
ethnic minorities.'1 6 The government's mention of separatism
was a purposeful misnomer perpetrated to exacerbate the
inherent tension of the situation. The government was to
utilize the Arab request for greater autonomy to manufacture
a justification to suppress the autonomists.
The importance of the region was emphasized by the presence
of a refinery in the vicinity of much of the nation's oil
producing fields. At the time of unrest in the region,
Khuzistan was producing over four million barrels of oil a
day, more than two-thirds of the entire country's production
under the Shah." 7  These factors, coupled with simultaneous
ethnic problems in other parts of Iran, were compounded by
fears of U.S. or Soviet intervention in Iranian internal
affairs.
Arab discontent was fueled by a desire for autonomy in the
face of Persian domination. Ethnic Arabs were not only
excluded from government and military postings, they also were
"416"Spokesman Says Khuzestan Separatist Movement Foiled," Paris
AFP in English, FBIS, 0926 GMT 03 Apr 79 (NC030932), April 3, 1979,
p. R6.
"47 Kifner, "Ethnic Arabs of Iran's Oil Region in South Worry
Regime," New York Times, April 22, 1979, p. 16.
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forced to learn Farsi, the only language taught in the local
schools. In hopes of some measure of autonomy, the local Arab
population began referring to the region by its old name,
Arabistan.416
On April 26, representatives of a new group, the Arab
Political and Cultural Organization (APCO),4 19 held a news
conference in Tehran and requested autonomy, including "the
right to elect officials, revive Arab culture and heritage and
have children receive their education in Arabic at Government
schools."420  They emphatically stated that they did not
want
control of foreign policy or economic planning, but only a say
in regional planning."4
In response to the demands of the Arab autonomists,
Ayatollah Mohammad Tahir Khaqhani emphasized the necessity for
the preservation of unity and cohesion to uphold the example
of a great political struggle:
If the demands of the Arabs' representatives in Khuzistan
are legal and do not harm the government's programs, the
government will naturally have to care for their rights.
418Ibid.
419Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 167.
42 01brahim, "Iran Reports Cease-Fire in Area Where Kurds and
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If these demands are detrimental to the revolution, we
will not support them.42 2
On May 29, Arab dock workers and government forces in
Khorramshahr clashed. This was followed on May 30, as
violence erupted between Arabs and government forces when
Arabs set fire to government buildings, including the main
police station, the post office, and a government tobacco
factory. These conflicts resulted in a government declaration
of a state of emergency.42 3
The fighting soon spread from Khorramshahr to the refinery
at Abadan. As government reinforcements were flown to the
area, multiple charges of "counterrevolutionary" were leveled
at various masked, armed groups in the streets, whose
political affiliations could not be determined.' 2'
Khaqhani, who was also the Arab Sheik of Khuzistan, went to
Qom to discuss the matter with Khomeini. Before he left for
Qom, Khaqhani stated he sought a peaceful solution to the
crisis but that the presence of Rear Admiral Mahdani, the
Governor General, was "explosive."425  The outcome of
42 2"Ayatollah Khaqani Interviewed on Rights of Iranian Arabs,"
Abadan International Service in Arabic, FBIS, 1630 GMT, 10 May 79
(JN101901), May 11, 1979, P. R2.
421.2 Die as Iranian Arabs Clash With Troops in Port," New York
Times, May 30, 1979, p. 7.
424Kifner, "Iran Arabs Battle Government Troops In Two Oil
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Khaqhani's talks with Khomeini was an agreement for limited
autonomy.426
By May 31, government forces were in control of Khorramshahr
after the arrival of reinforcements. They also forced the
Arabs to relinquish control of the government buildings in
which they had been operating. Mahdani then imposed a
curfew"27 in addition to the state of emergency.428
The Iranian Government's response to events in Khuzistan
provoked sharp criticism from Cairo's Voice of the Arabs on
May 31:
To our astonishment we found that the revolution was red
and that blood was being shed, rivers and seas of it;
suffering was the same and perhaps more; injustice was
also the same, if not worse; prisons and detention centers
were also the same if not more oppressive. We also found
that the imaginary trials--the wonder of the revolutionary
committees--were trying and sentencing at the same time
without.. .defense. Then bodies would swing from
scaffolds or eyes be blindfolded in front of rifles. One
martyr after another would fall in the name of the Islamic
Revolution.
Thus Iran is being ruled by the imaginary revolutionary
courts and by mob-committees, which in some aspects remind
us of the Al-Qadhdhafi committees in Libya and the
dreadful Inquisition in the Middle Ages.. .We cannot shut
our eyes to what is taking place against some Muslim
minorities there, and in particular the Arab minority
which at this moment is being exposed to a clear and
deliberate annihilation process planned by the Khomeyni
revolutionary committees and implemented by the Iranian
'
2
'Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 167.
427 Kifner, "Arab Unrest in Iranian Port Appears to be
Suppressed," New York Times, June 1, 1979, p. 3.
42 8Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 292.
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Army, on the clearly defined instructions of the imam.
The Iranian Army has killed at least 83 Arabs and has
wounded a large number of Arab inhabitants in bloody
battles between Arab citizens and Iranian forces in
Khuzistan and Abadan, where the oil refineries are. The
Iranian authorities have also arrested a large number of
Arabs in various Iranian towns.' 2'
Khaqhani, in response to events in Khuzistan, stated that
the Iranian Government was determined to deprive minorities of
their rights while undermining the cause of Islam:
I have told the Government that unless it begins to follow
Islamic principles I will leave the country.
We staged a revolution to recreate Islam, but they are
now acting against Islam. I do not want to show another
distorted face of Islam to the world. I want foreigners,
women, Jews, and other minorities to have their rights and
guarantees. If the rights of these minorities are
endangered, I will leave.' 30
The Iranian Government and APCO reached an agreement on June
6, allowing APCO to continue its activities.43 1  The Iranian
Government's treatment of Arabs in Khuzistan, who were
suffering "the tribulations of death, dispersal, torture and
fear," also drew appeals for "sympathy and compassion for the
429 "Voice of Arabs Attacking Iran Policy Toward Ethnic Arabs,"
Cairo Voice of the Arabs in Arabic, FBIS, 1130 GMT, 31 May 79
(LD311505), June 4, 1979, p. DI1.
430"Arab Ayatollah Says Iran Mistreats All Minorities," New
York Times, June 2, 1979, p. 3.
43'Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 167.
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Arabs of Arabistan" from clergymen in Karbala and Najaf, two
important Shi'ite cities located in Iraq.432
More Arabs were arrested on June 13, as the government
declared that only citizens mfaithful to the revolution" would
be allowed to carry arms. In response, Khaqhani stated the
accord of June 6 was no longer valid and claimed the
government had not released Arab prisoners in keeping with the
agreement.
In early July of 1979, a new Arab Guerrilla group calling
itself "Black Wednesday" caused two oil field explosions in
Khuzistan that halted the delivery of oil to the Abadan
refinery. The group vowed to continue the attack until it
achieved the "legitimate rights of the Arab Iranian
population."'434 The Arabs emphasized once again they were
not they were not separatists, they were only requesting
greater autonomy to teach Arabic language and culture in the
schools.
'3"Religious Scholar Appeals to Iran on Khuzestan Arabs,"
BaQhdad INA in Arabic, FBIS, 1345 GMT, 29 Jun 79 (JN291455), June
2, 1979, E3.
43 3Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 167.
434Ibrahim, "Iranian Oil Pipeline Is Cut, Reportedly by Arab
Group," New York Times, July 12, 1979, p. 3.
431Ibid.
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On July 11, five Arab guerrillas engaged Revolutionary
Guards on an island in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. 43 6 They
were subsequently captured and brought to Tehran, where they
were executed. Simultaneously, Revolutionary Guard personnel
occupied Khorramshahr and began arresting suspected Arab
subversives, including Ayatollah Khaqhani."' Khaqhani was
then taken to Qom and placed under house arrest there.4'38
Three Arabs were executed on July 15 and two more on the
next day.'43 More Arabs were arrested and two Arabs were
executed for attempting to blow up a oil pipeline, and another
one for "acting against the Islamic Republic."440
In March of 1980, four oil pipelines were blown up in
Khuzistan Province, leading to the execution of four alleged
saboteurs on April 17 and another four on July 23.441
Saddam Hussein of Iraq attempted to capitalize on Arab
discontent while he was planning his invasion of Iran. Saddam
envisioned that the Arabs in Khuzistan would greet the Iraqi
436 Ibid.
437Ibid.
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soldiers as liberators.' 42  Saddam went so far as to have
the Iraqi press portray Khuzistan as a province of Iraq, in an
attempt to create an excuse for the Arabs in the province to
claim allegiance to him."' In the end,
Baghdad failed to get significant support from Khuzistan's
Arab population. Iraq captured nearly a third of
Khuzistan province during the fist two months of fighting,
but it never gathered any meaningful popular support.
Iraq's efforts to encourage Arab separatism.. .had no
meaningful impact on the war during any part of the Iraqi
invasion of Khuzistan.'"
In retrospect, concerns about the loyalty of Arabs in
Khuzestan to the central government in Tehran "proved largely
unfounded, "44 although the sizeable presence of Iranian
troops in the region probably had as much to do with that as
loyalty to Iran over Iraq.
E. THE TURKOMANS
The Turkomans are spread over an area east of the Caspian
Sea in Iran, Afghanistan, and the former Soviet Union's
Turkmen Republic. The Turkomans migrated into Iran during the
"442Hiro, Dilip, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military
Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 38.
"443Ibid., p. 254.
"'44Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 95.
"445Drysdale and Blake, The Middle East and North Africa, p.
155.
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tenth through the fourteenth centuries from Inner Asia.446
There are approximately 315,000 Turkomans in Iran.44' Under
the Shah, Turkoman land was taken away from them and awarded
to court favorites, whom the Turkomans have historically
tended to view as outsiders unjustly given their land.44"8
On March 26, 1979, the Sunni Turkomans gathered in Gonbad-e-
Qavus to call for a boycott on the approaching national
referendum for an Islamic Republic. During this
demonstration, Revolutionary Committee officers tried to
arrest someone for selling cigarettes at inflated prices. As
they struggled, a Turkoman youth was killed."49  Consistent
with actions taken towards other ethnic groups, government
revolutionary forces then opened fire upon the Turkomans,
setting off eight days's° of intense fighting that forced
local residents to stay inside their homes for safety.4'5
"446Lapidus, Ira, A History of Islamic Societies (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 414.
"44'Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 534.
"448Kifner, "Turkomans Battle Iranian Forces in New Outbreak of
Tribal Separatism," New York Times, March 28, 1979, p. 3.
"44'Ibid.
4'5 Kifner, "Iran Troubled by Traditional Resistance of Its
Minorities," New York Times, April 11, 1979, p. 8.
451Ibid.
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On March 27, the Turkoman Political and Cultural Society
issued a statement requesting
concessions involving (i) the redistribution of land owned
by supporters of the former Shah; (ii) the right to set up
their own police force; (iii) the official recognition of
their language; and (iv) representation in the local
revolutionary committees dominated by Shia Muslims.4 5 2
The Turkomans felt so strongly about the land ownership
issue that they began to take land back, plow under winter
wheat and set farm buildings on fire. In these activities,
the Turkomans were encouraged and aided by the Fedayeen-e-
Khalq, a Marxist guerrilla group.4A3 The landowners appealed
to the revolutionary government for aid."''
The government, in response, "offered assurances... that the
new constitution would pay special attention to the
Turkomans."4 55  Although the government (in keeping with
their established modus operandi) appealed to the "noble and
decent people of Gunbad-i-Qawus and their Turkoman brothers,"
452Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements: An
International Guide, Second Edition, (Burnt Mill, U.K.: Longman
Group UK Limited, 1988), p. 169.
4'3Bakhash, The Reiqn of the Ayatollahs, p. 69.
454 Kifner, "Turkomans Battle Iranian Forces in New Outbreak of
Tribal Separatism," New York Times, March 28, 1979, p. 3.
45sKifner, *Iran Promising Special Attention to Ethnic Demands,
New York Times, March 29, 1979, p. 3.
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the government's offers to the Turkomans gave no specific
measures towards federalism or regional autonomy.4'5
Tehran sent reinforcing troops to the area as fighting
continued in spite of government proclamations of a cease-
fire. Ayatollah Khomeini offered the Turkomans a warning on
March 29
With all sorrow we hear of disturbing news from Gunbad...
that certain sections are spreading poison and disunion
among our people.. .with all sorrow I should say that these
disruptionists, who are receiving their inspiration from
America and are in the guise of leftists, are trying to
convert our country into another form, hand-in-hand with
the plunderers of the previous regime.4'5
While Khomeini voiced ominous statements on one hand, on the
other, government spokesman Amir Entezam's tone was quite
different towards the Turkomans when he stated that for "such
an obvious matter as the use of local languages, there is no
need for marching or demonstrations." 45 8 He also added that
the rights off all persons had been taken into account and
that the rights of each individual would be guaranteed, "even
more than what the people expect," and that the government was
456Ibid.
45 7Kifner, "Iran Winds Up Campaign to Get Out Vote Today for an
Islamic Republic," New York Times, March 30, 1979, p. 6.
4SS"Spokesman Entezam Comments on Unrest," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 01 Apr 79 (LD011330), April 1,
1979, p. R14.
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looking into the Turkoman demands "with utmost sympathy and
interest. "'1
In the face of air"' and ground forces (to include tanks
and armored personnel carriers),461 the Turkomans withdrew
on April 3, handing in their weapons at a local mosque.462
Revolutionary Guards also expelled Turkomans from land they
had recently appropriated from non-Turkoman landholders.463
Once government forces had consolidated power in the region,
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, keeping with the government's
approach towards power consolidation, stated "that there would
be no settlement between the government and those who demanded
self-rule or advocated separatism.""'
Fighting broke out between Turkoman Fedayeen-e-Khalq
followers and Revolutionary Guards at Gonbad-e-Qavus and
Gorgan from February 9 - 12, 1980.465 The fighting was so
intense that women, children, and elderly people were
4I9ibid.
"460Kifner, "Turkomans Battle Iranian Forces in New Outbreak of
Tribal Separatism," New York Times, March 28, 1979, p. 3.
"461"Gonbad-E-Kavus Fighting Continues Despite Cease-Fire,"
London Reuter in English, FBIS, 2036 GMT, 02 Apr 79 (WA022056),
April 3, 1979, p. R8.
"I2Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 171.
"43Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 199.
"464Ibid.
"I5Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 171.
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evacuated from Gonbad-e-Qavus to the countryside.'" On
February 10, Iranian Army tanks were used to storm Gonbad-e-
Qavus in an attempt to dislodge combatants.467
Abdolali Mozheb, the Governor General of Mazandaran, issued
a statement on February 11 in which he blamed athe anti-
Islamic and counterrevolutionary movement which has the
necessary leadership and which has been able to bring about a
tragedy anytime it wanted."4 68  The Revolutionary Guards
suppressed the Turkomans and several of them crossed the
border into the Soviet Union.4 69
"466"'Critical' Situation in Gonbad-E-Kavus Reported," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 09 Feb 80 (LD091156),
February 11, 1980, p. 27.
"467"Tank Attack on Gonbad," BaQhdad INA in Arabic, FBIS, 1455
GMT, 10 Feb 80 (JN101501), February 11, 1980, p. 31.
"468"Disturbances in Gonbad-E-Kavus Reported," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 2030 GMT, 11 Feb 80 (LD112220), February
12, 1980, p. 18.
"469Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p. 170.
124
t d - avus t i  •  
r  ,      -e-
  t  tants. t" 
l li , t  r l ran,  
 t t t  r       •  
i   lutionary t    
 i     t  
  t  .• 468  ti ary s 
    l     
r  . 4  
t66. 'Critical' Situation in onbad- - avus rt , n  
estic r i  i  r i , I ,  ,    091156), 
 , , . . 
t67nTank Attack on onbad," aghdad I  i  ic, ,  
,    01501), r  , ,  . 
UhDisturbances in Gonbad-E-Kavus eported," r  tic 
  , ,  , l 20),  
, 0, . . 
t69Degenhardt, evolutionary a  i i t ents, . . 
 
IV. POLITICAL SUPPRESSION
During the course of events following the Iranian
Revolution, the "regime consolidated its power by ruthlessly
eliminating rival political parties and political
dissent."04 0  Faced with the Tudeh Party, the Mujaheddin-e-
Khalq and the Fedayeen-e-Khalq, the government chose to
suppress rather than accommodate. Under these circumstances,
the "ultimate elimination of the Mojahedin, Fadayan, and Tudeh
was a foregone conclusion in the ideological framework of an
Islamic Iran."471
In political cases, warrants for arrests were seldom used.
Consequently, there was no judicial determination of
whether these detentions were in conformity with Iranian
law. Detainees were frequently held for long periods
without charge and in some cases were tortured. For
political crimes, no access to a lawyer was permitted;
such cases were heard, if at all, by the revolutionary
judiciary, and bail was not permitted.""2
470Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 247.
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A. THE TUDEH PAPTY
The Tudeh Party (Party of the Masses) was founded in 1941
after the Allied invasion of Iran.413 The Tudeh Party is
the oldest existing Communist Party in the Middle East and was
closely tied to the Soviet Union before it broke up into the
Commonwealth of Independent States.47 ' Its base in Northern
Iran placed it among the Azerbaijanis and Kurds.'"
The Tudeh supported the autonomous republics of Kurdistan
and Azerbaijan" 6 and was banned after one of its members was
implicated in an unsuccessful assassination attempt on the
Shah in 1949, who repressed it until he fell from power in
1979.'" The Tudeh Party supported Mossadegh and actually
warned him beforehand of the coup d'etat that removed him from
power. 478
The Tudeh Party went into exile in East Germany in 1949. It
remained there until 1979, where it welcomed the Iranian
"473Janke, Peter, Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations: A
World Directory and BiblioQraphy (New York: MacMillan Publishing
Company, 1983), p. 233.
474 Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 525.
475Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 115.
47 6Mansfield, A History of the Middle East, p. 149.
477Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 525.
470Richard, Yann, "Ayatollah Kashani: Precursor of the Islamic
Republic?" translated by Keddie from Keddie, ed., Religion and
Politics in Iran, p. 116.
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Revolution, praising the "religious side of the anti-shah
movement" 7" and promising complete backing for the anti-
imperialist goals of the new regime. Once the Tudehs were
granted permission to operate once more in Iran, they called
for the alliance of socialist forces, '° and supported
Khomeini fully in their rhetoric.48' This support included
voting to replace the monarchy with an Islamic Republic.4 2
In spite of Western fears of Communist encroachment in Iran,
the Tudeh had relatively little influence and their office in
Tehran was even sacked on June 4, 1979 by an Islamic crowd
when Khomeini issued an anti-leftist statement.' 83
Tudeh Secretary General Nureddin Kianuri's attempts to
engage in a dialogue with Ayatollah Khomeini were also
unsuccessful: "They never reply to our letters or
suggestions." Kianuri stated his intention to support the
Islamic Revolution as long as it remained "progressive" in
spite of being put aside by Khomeini. 4 "'
4'"Sick, All Fall Down, p. 108.
480Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 173.
48 1Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 68.
"482Ibid., p. 73.
"113Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, p. 292.
484Ibrahim, "Unrest Said to Show Rising Opposition to
Khomeini," New York Times, August 17, 1979, p. 2.
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Tudeh support for Khomeini during the ethnic disturbances of
December, 1979 was expressed by Hossein Joudat, the Tudeh
leader in Azerbaijan.
We approve of the Imam's line.. .we are firmly for
Ayatollah Khomeini and for sharing through our party his
various programs. We believe in unity for Iran on the
political front."""5
In the wake the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
resultant anti-Soviet rhetoric in Iran, the Tudeh Party
"consistently and slavishly proclaimed its support for
Khomeini at every twist and turn."'"6 In spite of this
support for Khomeini, the Tudeh Party was undermined by Soviet
activities in Afghanistan.487
As Iran was preparing to vote on the Mailis (parliament),
the Tudeh Party had more than one hundred candidates vying for
office. Even though the eventual parliament had a great deal
of diversity, the Tudehs won no seats and as a result were not
represented politically at all.' 88  In the end, Tudeh
members were banned from running for the presidency and they
485Gupte, "Left in Iran Split by Stand Over Khomeini," New York
Times, December 6, 1979, p. 18.
486Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 375.
487 Atkin, Muriel, "The Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union,"
Keddie and Hooglund, Eric, eds., The Iranian Revolution and the
Islamic Republic, Second Edition (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse
University Press, 1986), p. 200.
488Wright, In the Name of God, pp. 90-1.
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never obtained a seat in parliament in subsequent
elections.48 '
Despite their services to the Revolution and their mass
following, especially in Tehran and the northern
provinces, at no time were the.. .Tudeh allowed to play a
role in the government."' 0
The Soviet Union gave the Tudeh Party advance warning of the
Iraqi invasion of Iran. The Tudeh Party in turn provided this
information to the Iranian government, who responded by
sending armored units to the Soviet-Iranian border, 491
perhaps because the Tudehs had at one time "called for the
complete disbanding" of the regular Iranian armed forces." 2
In June of 1981, The Tudeh Party newspaper was banned." 3
The Tudeh was allowed to function as long as it showed itself
supportive of the Islamic Republic."' The Tudeh publicly
supported the Iranian Government in the war against Iraq as
"long as hostilities were being conducted on Iranian
soil."495  This stance in part reflected the interests of
489Ibid., p. 124.
"490Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 259.
"491Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 369.
"492Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraa at War, p. 35.
"493Atkin, "The Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union," Keddie
and Hooglund, eds., The Iranian Republic and the Islamic
Revolution, p. 197.
"494Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraa at War, p. 221.
"495Hiro, The Loncest War, p. 101.
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Moscow, who odid not want an Iranian invasion of Iraq to
provide the US with an excuse to intervene militarily in the
Gulf, or to gain access to bases in the name of defending its
regional allies."' In fact, the Tudeh Party publicly
"supported the government until it was crushed by massive
arrests."49"
On May 4, 1982, the government banned and then dissolved the
Tudeh Party in retaliation for Soviet arms support to Saddam
Hussein. These arms included surface-to-surface missiles that
were used to attack the Iranian city of Dezful.498
Another event that was a key factor in the downfall of Tudeh
fortunes was the defection to Britain of a KGB agent, Vladimir
Kuzichkin,'99 operating under the guise of a Soviet diplomat
while stationed in Tehran.so' Kuzichkin was officially a
vice-consul at the Soviet Embassy with a background in
Oriental Studies from Moscow University. 501  He gave the
British Intelligence debriefers the names of Soviet spies and
"'9Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraa at War, p. 222.
"497Rubin, "The State of U.S.-Iran Relations," Rosen, ed., Iran
Since the Revolution, p. 104.
"498Hiro, The Longest War, p. 101.
"499Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, p. 210.
50
•Wright, In the Name of God, p. 124.
50IStanhope, "Secret service 'wanted spy to stay in Tehran,'"
Times, October 25, 1982, p. 24.
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the Iranian agents under their control. This list was in turn
passed on to the Americans, who eventually provided it to
Tehran in an attempt to curry favor with the Iranians."0 2
Government authorities arrested Tudeh leader Nureddin
Kianuri,10 3 and party theoretician Eshan Tabari,s5 4 as well
as 1500 party members, including those serving in the
military.5 0 5
The government also ordered all Tudeh Party members at large
to turn themselves in to the authorities. 50 6 The commander
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Mohsen Reza'i, then
made a public appeal: "We invite all members of this defunct
and filthy Tudeh Party to identify themselves immediately to
the Corps' centers, to give their names."5 0 " Reza'i's
rhetoric was indicative of the treatment Tudeh members were to
receive at the government's hands.
502 Ibid.
5 03Herrmann, "The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and
Policy, 1946-1988,0 Keddie and Gasiorowski, eds., Neither East Nor
West, p. 82.
s°4Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p. 166.
505Hiro, The Longest War, p. 101.
S06Hooglund, "Iran 1980-85: Political and Economic Trends,"
Keddie and Hooglund, eds., The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic
Republic, p. 22.
5 07 *Guards Commander Comments on Tudeh Arrests," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 02 May 83 (LD021211),
May 3, 1983, p. 15.
131
 . ist   
 ,  t  
   . 50l 
t     i  
i uri,503    , 50' ll 
  t  rs, i l i  t  i    
  505 
 t      
s  i s. 50   nder 
f t  I l i  l ti ry r  ,  a' i   
a e a li  l: " e i it   rs   nct 
 ilt   t  t   t l s l   
 s' , s." 507 'i's 
r t ri  s i i ti e  t  t t t  rs   
r i  t t  t's s. 
502Ibid. 
503Herrmann, "The ole of Ir  i  i t i s  
p li , - 8," i   i r ski, .,   r 
t, . . 
50'Degenhardt, ry  t ents, . . 
505Hiro,  ges t r, . 1. 
506Hooglund, "Iran 1980-85: liti l   s, n 
i   l , s.,  ian tion   i  
lic, . . 
507 "Guards Commander Comments on Tudeh Arrests,· Tehran 
tic   i , ,  ,  0212 1), 
, 3, . . 
1 
Many Tudeh Party members, to include Kianuri and Tabari, 50 8
were then shown on television confessing that they were spies
for the Soviet Union.s5 0  Kianuri, in what was to become the
typical model of torture-induced public profession of guilt
for Tudeh Party members, stated he had been in contact with
Soviet agents since 1945 and "Our violations mainly consisted
of the delivery of top-secret military and political documents
to our bosses at the Russian embassy.O51l Kianuri also
stated that he had engaged in damaging practices "which
deserve the most severe punitive actions that the Islamic
Republic may decide to mete out,1151' attesting to the
effectiveness of the torture he had endured. In his interview
Kianuri said his party was guilty of six important errors:
remaining dependent on the Soviet Union and engaging in
espionage on its behalf; illegally retaining secret arms
caches; maintaining a secret political organization in
contravention of official rulings that such groups should
be dissolved; establishing a secret group of officers
which became an agency for collecting information for
dispatch to the USSR; infiltrating the administration; and
arranging illegal departures from the country. Kianuri
expressed "chagrin and shame" over his deeds against
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni and urged young Tudeh members
to avoid participating in any leftist infiltration of Iran
508Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 527.
s5 9Hooglund, "Iran 1980-85," Keddie and Hooglund, eds., The
Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, p. 22.
5 1 0
aIran-Iraq prisoner exchange completed," Times, May 2, 1983,
p. 5.
51 1 Communist Leader's Confession," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1150 GMT, 01 May 83 (LD011522), May 2, 1983, p. ii.
132
   rs,  i ari,508 
   i  i    
t . 50' i,      
l l -induced  i  ilt 
  rs,    t  
     ·     
r  t r  l ents 
    .• 510 i  
     i  i es ·  
        
i    ,,,511 i   
ti eness  t     .   i  
    t   t : 
 t       
  ts f;    s 
; i   l tion  
tion l     
 ; i     rs 
 e  ti    
   ti  ti ;  
i g   . ri 
  "   i st 
l        ers 
 i ating   f ist tion  
508Delury, orld c cl e ia, . . 
50'Hooglun , , n   , .,  
 i   i  lic, . . 
510. Iran-Iraq prisoner exchange l t , n , , , 
. . 
511·Co ist 's i ,n   i e  
, I ,  ,   Ol1522), ,198 , . i. 
 
as this means "affiliation with foreigners and
aliens. as2
The confessions tended to be very explicit in the nature of
espionage activities carried out and were generally prompted
by specific, leading questions designed to point out the guilt
of the person confessing.5 13
The admissions of guilt were *obtained under horrifying
conditions and may have reflected the suspicions and
propaganda needs of the clerical leaders in Iran far more than
the actual intentions of the Tudeh."51 4  The Tudeh bore the
brunt of the perception among Khomeini supporters that "any
form of Marxism came to be seen as a potential threat against
the revolution."sls
Ten military members of the Tudeh Party were charged with
pro-Soviet espionage and executed in February of 1984.516
The former Iranian navy commander, Captain Bahram Afzali was
one of the ten military members executed.51' Revolutionary
512ibid.
"'I3Ibid., questions were worded precisely and were self-
incriminatory in nature, "explain the espionage cases," "tell us of
your treason,N and other questions in this vein.
s 54Herrmann, "The Role of Iran in Soviet Perceptions and
Policy, 1946-1988," Keddie and Gasiorowski, eds., Neither East Nor
west, p. 78.
11sCordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 142.
s 5Hiro, The Longest War, p. 101.
117Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p. 166.
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Guards Commander Mohsen Reza'i explained that the Tudehs were
not executed immediately because the Iranian government was in
no hurry to execute them. He also stated that they still had
a great deal to confess and added that all those who had
confessed had signed their own death warrants by so doing."'i
The Iranian Government's suppression of the Tudeh Party led
to a deterioration of relations between Tehran and Moscow. 5 19
The Soviet Union disapproved of the Iranian Government's
repression of the Tudeh and also the radio broadcasts of
Islamic propaganda beamed into the Central Asian Soviet
republics, viewing them as subversive appeals directed at
Soviet Muslims to encourage them to revolt. 52 °
In August of 1982 the Iranian media publicly announced that
the Tudehs were anti-revolutionary.5 " This official
demonization, on the heels of with the government purges
caused the party to go into a period of hibernation that still
522persists.
5 18




9Atkin, "The Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union," Keddie
and Hooglund, eds., The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic
Republic, p. 192.
52
°Hiro, The Lonqest War, p. 263.
52 1Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 156.
5 2 2Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 527.
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The Mujaheddin-e-Khalq was ma militant splinter group of the
Iran Liberation Movement, .523 who began a campaign of armed
struggle against the Shah in 1971.5' They were primarily
urban based and came from well-educated backgrounds. 5 25  As
a result of their agitations against the Pahlavi government,
many Mujaheddin members were incarcerated and executed.5 2'
This crippled the organization for the duration of the Shah's
regime. After the Shah departed Iran, the Mujaheddin
cooperated with the Fedayeen-e-Khalq in February of 1979 to
oversee the collection of arms confiscated from the Shah's
supporters.527
The Mujaheddin initially supported Khomeini during the early
stages of the Iranian Revolution, battling the Shah's forces
more effectively than the Ayatollah's supporters.5 28  The
Mujaheddin formed an important part of the anti-Pahlavi
coalition and advocated a socialist program as well as "the
rights of all who fought the Shah, including Marxists, to
52 3Janke, Guerilla and Terrorist Organisations, p. 232.
524 Ibid.
525 Ibid.
52 6Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 343.
527Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p. 165.
12 Ibrahim, "Unrest Said to Show Rising Opposition to
Khomeini," New York Times, August 17, 1979, p. 2.
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express their views. Additionally, they supported the
right of national minorities to have autonomy but not
secession.530
In April of 1979, the Mujaheddin sided with Ayatollah
Taleghani in his theological dispute with Khomeini over
differing interpretations of Koranic exegesis and stated a
willingness to put its armed forces, estimated at between
5,000 to 10,000 men, under his command. 3' By advocating a
position not approved by Khomeini, they were to become the
"main target group" of a wave of persecution that was to
include mass arrests and executions. 53
On August 13, Mujaheddin offices in Tehran were looted by
militant supporters of Khomeini, in retaliation for leftist
criticism of the Ayatollah's religious policies.
Following the attacks, the Mujaheddin staged a sit-in protest
and vigil outside their headquarters to prevent any further
violence. During the vigil, they were surrounded by heavily
529Ibid.
53 0mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 344.
531Ibrahim, "An Ayatollah Who Must Be Reckoned With," New York
Times, April 19, 1979, p. 9.
53
'Keddie and Cole, "Introduction," Cole and Keddie, Shi'ism
and Social Protest, p. 25.
533"Khomeini's Backers Raid Headquarters of Iranian Leftists,N
New York Times, August 14, 1979, p. 1.
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armed Revolutionary Guards who sought to intimidate them."3'
In the wake of the anti-leftist violence, Khomeini denounced
the Mujaheddin as "counterrevolutionary," leading to their
alignment with other underground organizations.5 35 This was
a prelude to "mass government executions" that targeted the
Mujaheddin as subversive.5 3 6
In response to the Mujaheddin boycott of the constitutional
referendum, Khomeini declared that Mujaheddin candidate Masoud
Rajavi could not run as a candidate in the upcoming
presidential election.5 3Y As a result, Mujaheddin candidates
won no seats in the parliamentary elections of the Spring of
1980.538 By emphasizing the "counterrevolutionary" nature of
the Mujaheddin and denying them political representation, the
government further ostracized them in the eyes of Iranian
society.
In June of 1981, Mujaheddin backers of Iranian President
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr repeatedly clashed with pro-government
5 34"Guerrillas Hold Quiet Vigil at Tehran Headquarters," New
York Times, August 16, 1979, p. 5.
53 5Gupte, "Left in Iran Split by Stand Over Khomeini," New York
Times, December 6, 1979, p. 18.
536Keddie, "Introduction," Keddie, ed., Reliqion and Politics
in Iran, p. 13.
5 3 7Wright, In the Name of God, p. 89.
538Bakhash, "Historical Setting," Metz, ed., Iran, p. 56.
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Hezbollah factions backed by Revolutionary Guards.5 3' When
Khomeini dismissed Bani-Sadr, the Mujaheddin took to the
streets to protest the action, marking their official break
with the government. 540  Later that month, six Mujaheddin
members were executed by a firing squad at Tehran's Evin
Prison and many more were arrested for questioning by
authorities.5 41 In another demonstration, twenty young girls
attempting to shield their fellow Mujaheddin members were
arrested and promptly executed by the Revolutionary
Guards.542
Fifty Mujaheddin members were arrested by Iranian
authorities on June 30 and blamed for bombing the Islamic
Republican Party (IRP) headquarters on June 28.s'• The bomb
killed 72 people,544 including 27 Majlis Deputies.5 4 5  The
539Allaway, "Bani-Sadr loses the battle for Tehran's streets,"
Times, June 10, 1981, p. 8.
54
°Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 521.
54 1Allaway, "Iranians keep up search for missing President,"
Times, June 24, 1981, p. 4.
542Zabih, "The Non-Communist Left in Iran: The Case of the
Mujahidin," Chelkowski and Pranger, eds., Ideoloan and Power in the
Middle East, p. 250.
143050 held for Tehran parliament plot," Times, July 2, 1981,
p. 6.
144Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p. 165.
41'050 held for Tehran parliament plot," Times, July 2, 1981,
p. 6.
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Iranian Government swiftly executed 17 "radicals" and arrested
50 more.5 46 In the wake of the IRP bombing, the Oexecutions
became far more widespread and indiscriminate thereafter,
although no responsibility for the bombing was proven."5 47
In spite of the lack of proof, the mullahs continued to
publicly blame the Mujaheddin. 5 4'
Mujaheddin members and government forces fought in a central
Tehran apartment on July 5, resulting in the death of three
guerrillas. On the same day, seven Mujaheddin members were
executed for anti-government activities.5 49
The next day, 27 people, many of them Mujaheddin supporters,
were executed for being "enemies of Islam." 50  Having
evolved from counterrevolutionaries to "enemies of Islam," the
Mujaheddin were then accused of planning to destroy the
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) . 5 The
executions continued on July 7 when nine people were put to
54"Ashford, Nicholas, "Court allows transfer of Iranian
assets," Times, July 3, 1981, p. 6.
547 Keddie, "Introduction," Keddie, Religion and Politics in
Iran, p. 13.
548wright, In the Name of God, p. 98.
541"Guerrillas killed in Iran clash," Times, July 6, 1981, p.
5.
s55 "Iran firing squads busy as gunmen murder governor," Times,
July 7, 1981, p. 7.
55 1Ibid.
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death for *assault, street fighting and conspiring against the
Islamic Revolution. .552
On July 10, three more Mujaheddin supporters were executed
for "creating clashes, insulting the authorities, theft and
subversive relations with the hypocrites" (hypocrites became
the government's official term for referring to the Mujaheddin
and was a play on words from the term for hypocrite,
"Monafeqin*). 55 3  As the government escalated the rhetoric,
it also continued to "ruthlessly hunt down and execute any
Mujahideen supporters they could find."5 5'
On July 12, a Tehran businessman, Ahmad Javaheriyan, was
executed for providing financial suipport to the Mujaheddin.
The same day, 27 other "counterrevolutionaries," most of them
Mujaheddin or Fedayeen, were also executed as part of a clean-
up campaign following the June 28 bombing of the Parliament in
Tehran.ss
552*Reuters Shut in Iran," Times, July 8, 1981, p. 32.
553
"Three Executed in Iran," Times, July 11, 1981, p. 4. The
Islamic Republic's utilization of the term "Monafeqin" as a
description of those who were theologically impure and therefore a
threat to the regime is examined in an essay by Haggay Ram entitled
"OCrushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of
Iran," from The Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer 1992),
pp. 428-439. This essay looks at the evolution of rhetoric as a
demonization tool of the regime to legitimize theologically its
repression of its enemies.
S5 4Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 117.
515 OTehran business leaders executed by firing squads,N Times,
July 14, 1981, p. 5.
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The 18 month repression became known as the "reign of
terror" and led to a decrease in overall freedom for
Iranians. 5 6 As a special target of the government, the
Mujaheddin was made the object of a well publicized,
systematic campaign to the point that
the regime publicized the death sentences, leaving the
bodies on public gallows - something not seen in Iran
since the 1910s, - and proudly announcing the execution of
whole families, including teenage daughters and 60 year
old grandmothers."5 7
The anti-leftist campaign continued as firing squads
executed four Mujaheddin members and supporters on July 15.
They were charged with "armed rebellion against the Islamic
Republic and waging war on God," 5 5 8  a theological
justification for political activity. Utilizing political
rhetoric, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Mousavi stated the
Mujaheddin were attempting to create "confusion and unrest" in
Iran prior to the country's upcoming presidential
elections.'"
Government forces then staged raids on Mujaheddin hideouts
and "safe houses" throughout Iran. As a result, 120 leftists
55 6Wright, In the Name of God, p. 99.
5 5 7Abrahamian, Ervand, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven, CN:
Yale University Press, 1989), p. 220.
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were arrested and 11 executed on July 16.560 Another man
accused of being a Mujaheddin member was executed on July
19.561
As the Iranian presidential and parliamentary by-elections
approached, the executions continued. On July 22, nine
Mujaheddin members were put to death in Evin Prison for
"waging war against God." 5 62 A government official described
the Mujaheddin as "the corrupt of the earth" due to their
status as enemies of the Islamic Revolution. 563
On July 27, Muhammad Reza Saadati, a Mujaheddin leader, and
15 other Mujaheddin members were executed by a firing
squad.5 64 Saadati had been imprisoned in the wake of the
Iranian Revolution on charges of spying for the Soviet Union
and was accused of murdering the governor of the by now
infamous Evin Prison in Tehran. 5"
The Iranian Government executed 12 Mujaheddin members on
August 3 along with 15 other opponents of the regime. The
560
"Iran rounds up 120 in left-wing strongholds," Times, July
17, 1981, p. 4.
"561"Ten executed by Iranians," Times, July 20, 1981, p. 4.
562 Murder and executions precede poll in Iran," Times, July
24, 1981, p. 6.
563 Ibid.
"564"Shah's family pay respects," Times, July 28, 1981, p. 10.
565Ibid.
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Mujaheddin were charged with being
"counterrevolutionaries."5 66 At the same time, a government
spokesman warned France that Iran would "react appropriately"
if France became a center for "counterrevolutionaries." This
remark was made in reference to the presence in Paris of
Mujaheddin leader Masoud Rajavi with former President Bani-
Sadr. 5 67
Ayatollah Khomeini offered on August 10 to allow Rajavi to
return to Iran under certain conditions
Even now, all those who have gone abroad and want to
overthrow the regime in Iran can come back to the country
if they repent. If they want to serve their country, they
can come back and serve. No one will do anything to
them.5 66
Khomeini, while extending an offer of clemency on one hand,
then referred to Rajavi as a "heretic."s69
On August 13, the Iranian Government announced a new anti-
terror campaign which included a wider range of offenses
punishable by death. Revolutionary Prosecutor General Ali
Ghoddusi proclaimed that all persons assisting members of
underground "seditionist groups," as well as those taking part
5666027 opponents of the regime executed in Iran," Times, August
5, 1981, p. 5.
567 Ibid.




ujaheddin  harged ith eing 
·co t ries .• 5 , rn ent 
      tely· 
f e  r ·c tionaries.· is 
   r ce      
j in l r  j i it   t i-
r. 567 
    t   i  
   i  i s 
 ,        
r          
f t. f   ,  
    .   i 11   
. 568 
ini,       , 
 r  t  j i as a "heretic.,,569 
 t ,   t ed   -
i     es 
 . ti nary t r l li 
 i   s   f 
  n    rt 
566"27 opponents of the regime executed in Iran,· Times, August 
, 1, . . 
5E7Ibid. 
568· h i i'    t les,· s, , 
1, . . 
569Ibid. 
 
in direct attacks upon the regime would face a firing
squad.s7 0
Simultaneously, the government executed 15 persons, among
them a number of Mujaheddin members. Islamic Revolutionary
Guards also arrested approximately 250 leftists throughout
Iran, including a large number of Mujaheddin members and
supporters, to include 11 teenage girls."" The teenage
girls were executed because they were defined by an Islamic
judge as "mature."s5
The Iranian news agency Pars announced that 38 Mujaheddin
sympathizers were executed on August 24. Government officials
then announced on August 25 that over 700 guerrillas had been
recently rooted out from their safehouses and arrested as part
of an anti-counterrevolutionary campaign.173
Government forces continued the anti-leftist campaign by
executing 21 people in Northern Iran on August 25, many of
them Mujaheddin. Revolutionary Guards also carried out
"S70Allaway, "Tehran extends death penalty in anti-terror
drive,n Times, August 14, 1981, p. 5.
"S7Ibid.
"S72Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 352.
"573"Iran Raids On Rebel Hideouts," Times, August 26, 1981, p.
5.
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simultaneous raids and arrests on Mujaheddin hideouts in
Qom. 74
Mujaheddin members were among 37 people executed at Tehran's
Evin Prison On September 1 and the Iranian Government
announced that nine others had been executed at unspecified
locations in Iran at the same time. 517 The executions were
part of a campaign of reprisals for a bombing on August 30,
for which the Iranian Government blamed the Mujaheddin. Over
60 government officials were later arrested in 1986 for
causing the explosion." 6  In the midst of the battles
between the Mujaheddin and government forces, Hashemi
Rafsanjani stated in September of 1982 that the authorities
had seized "enough safe houses to make up a city" and "enough
arms to equip several divisions."5 7 7
The Mujaheddin then attempted to wage a series of small
demonstrations similar to those which preceded the downfall of
the Shah. Small groups of armed protesters composed of girls
and young men gathered and chanted anti-Khomeini slogans.
5 4Allaway, "Unwarlike face of conflict in the Gulf," Times,
August 27, 1981, p. 6.
5 7 5Allaway, "Khomeini's man wins backing of Majlis," Times,
September 3, 1981, p. 6.
"'Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic
Republic, p. 33.
577Iran Times, September 3, 1982, cited in Bakhash, The ReiQn
of the Ayatollahs, p. 222.
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When the Revolutionary Guards or police arrived, the
demonstrators rapidly broke up and disappeared down side
streets.5'a
As the authorities began to respond and pursue
demonstrators, fighting began to break out during successive
protests. On September 9, fighting occurred in five different
areas of Tehran as the Mujaheddin carried out their "lightning
street protests" all over the city. 5 " The violence that was
typical of the reign of terror continued throughout the month
of September and at "the height of the confrontation, an
average of 50 persons a day were executed; on several
days... the total number executed throughout the country
exceeded 100.""'°
In one instance, a heavy gunfire exchange took place between
Mujaheddin supporters and Revolutionary Guards along the main
thoroughfare of Tehran. In response, Khomeini threatened
political reprisals against the Mujaheddin and their
supporters with theological reasoning by stating that when the
Prophet Muhammad "failed to improve the people with
"5"Allaway, "Terrorists move on to streets of Tehran," Times,
September 9, 1981, p. 6.
"579Allaway, "Two killed in Tehran street gunfights," Times,
September 10, 1981, p. 6.
5 8
°Hooglund, "Government and Politics," Metz, ed., Iran, p.
208.
146
r    ,  
t rs   red   
ts. 578 
  i s     
t rs,      i  
.  r ,  r   nt 
    in    
t ov  ity.579 e  s 
l       
r     ti ,  
   s    ;  ral 
 ..    t  t  
  n 580 
  ,   e   
in  i ary   i  
fare  .  , ome ni  te  
i l ls t i   ir 
rs  i al i g    
t     l   
578 ll y,  t  , n s, 
r , ,  . 
579Al 1 away , "Two killed in ehran tr t i ts," s, 
 , , . . 
580Hooglund, "Government and Politics," Metz, ed., Iran, p. 
. 
 
advice, he hit them on the head with a sword until he made
them human beings." 5,.
Tehran radio reported on September 25 that the government
had executed 29 government opponents for "possession of
weapons, participation in armed demonstrations and terrorism."
The government referred to the executed persons as belonging
to "pro-American groups."a5
2
From exile in Paris, Rajavi stated on September 25 that
although he spent seven years in solitary confinement under
the Shah, the reign of Ayatollah Khomeini was more repressive
and reactionary than *anything Iran had experienced
before." 5 83  Rajavi claimed that the regime was also
executing "10 and 12 year old girls... for demonstrating in the
street," and that the numbers of Mujaheddin executed by the
government were much higher than what the regime was
publicizing.5 "4  He pointed out that the government's recent
claim of executing 200 persons in one day, to include 179
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The Times reported on September 29 that government firing
squads executed 110 persons on September 28. Of that 110, at
least 53 were Mujaheddin members and supporters. The Times
wrote that the most recent spate of executions brought the
"officially acknowledged" total to at least 1,597 since the
beginning of the crackdown on June 20.586
The next day, the Iranian Government announced that it had
executed 43 more "opponents of the regime. n587 Throughout
the October 2 - 4 weekend, Iranian authorities announced 66
Mujaheddin members, including five women, were executed by
firing squads in seven Iranian towns. All of those put to
death were charged with supporting armed struggle against the
Khomeini Regime.5 88
The government executed 61 more people, eight of them women,
at Tehran's Evin Prison on October 5. The Iranian
Revolutionary Prosecutor's Office announced the executed
people were Mujaheddin sympathizers or "hypocrites" who had
engaged in "rebellion against the Islamic Republic." 5 89
.
86Joseph, Ralph, "Another 110 Shot In Iran," Times, September
29, 1981, p. 1.
5 8 7




"Mullah power triumphs in Iran poll," Times, October 5,
1981, p. 9.
5 8 9
"Eight women among 61 executed in Tehran," Times, October 6,
1981, p. 9.
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Sporadic fighting took place in various Iranian cities on
October 6 as the violence continued. In Tehran, Revolutionary
Guards and Hezbollah partisans battled with the Mujaheddin for
half an hour, resulting in the arrest of six guerrillas.5 90
Twenty Mujaheddin members and supporters were arrested during
a safehouse raid by Revolutionary Guards in two unspecified
cities.5 91 Government authorities arrested an unknown number
of guerrillas in a raid in Khoramabad, which netted an arms
and ammunition cache.5 92
Tehran radio proclaimed on October 12 that 82 rebels were
executed on October 10, bringing the number of officially
acknowledged executions since June 22 to over 1,700.'9' The
Mujaheddin office in Paris alleged that the government had
recently removed 100 children wounded in demonstrations from
their hospital beds and executed them in Tehran's Evin
Prison.5 94
The Iranian Government announced on October 13 that it had
executed 22 more Mujaheddin rebels, bringing the total since
"190 "Tehran gunfight between guards and Mujahedin," Times,
October 7, 1981, p. 4.
591Ibid.
S92Ibid.
93a"100 children executed in Iran, claim Mujaheddin," Times,
October 12, 1981, p. 4.
194Ibid.
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June 22 to more than 1,800 persons. This also brought the
total of persons known to have been executed to almost 3,400
according to Amnesty International. 59"
The Iranian Government executed 18 Mujaheddin insurgents
during late December 1981 and early January 1982."' In
early January, Mujaheddin leader Masoud Rajavi stated from
Paris that the Iranian Government had executed over 8,000
people in the previous six months, but had announced less than
half that number for fear of *the condemnation of national
and world opinion."5 '" The eventual number of Mujaheddin
members and supporters executed was estimated to exceed
7,500.598 The government announced the execution of eight
more Mujaheddin guerrillas on January 6, 1982, for "armed
rebellion. .599
In February, the Iranian Government claimed that it had
killed Mujaheddin commander Musa Khiabani at a guerrilla
hideout in North Tehran. Khiabani was alleged to have been
... "Guerrilla deaths take Iran execution toll to 3,350," Times,
October 14, 1981, p. 10.
s96NIran executes 18 insurgents," Times, January 4, 1982, p. 4.
597
"Executed Iranians 'had tongues pulled out,'" Times, January
7, 1982, p. 4.
598Hooglund, "Government and Politics," Metz, ed., Iran, p.
216.
599
"Executed Iranians 'had tongues pulled out,'" Times, January
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one of 12 Mujaheddin members killed, including his wife, and
the wife of Rajavi, and other important guerrilla leaders.'00
Mujaheddin activities, having been dealt a *near-fatal
blow, .60 abated for the next few weeks in the wake of
Khiabani's death. In April, Minister of Islamic Guidance
Hojatoleslam Abdel Majid Moadikhah refused to comment on a
Times report that claimed that over 8,000 people, including
many Mujaheddin, had been executed in the past few months. He
did say that the Mujaheddin were responsible for Ohideous
crimes worse than terrorism anywhere else."6"2
The Iranian Government then began another onslaught to
"stamp out" the Mujaheddin "by using unrestrained force and
propaganda.'0 3  The Mujaheddin suffered a serious blow in
early May when Iranian security forces and Revolutionary
Guards killed and arrested more than 50 Mujaheddin members and
supporters. The government security forces also destroyed
over ten guerrilla bases, damaging Mujaheddin operational,
administrative, and logistics capabilities."0' Among the
600nIranian guerrilla commander 'shot and killed,'" Times,
February 9, 1982, p. 1.
60'Hiro, The LonQest War, p. 99.
602Owen, Richard, *Media in West attacked for 'lies,'" Times,
April 16, 1982, p. 5.
603Hiro, The Longest War, p. 10n.
'°
4
"Mujahedin suffer 'heavy blows' in Tehran raids,'" Times,
May 4, 1982, p. 5.
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captured materials were documents identifying other Mujaheddin
members and supporters. The arrests occurred at the end of an
eight hour battle between Revolutionary Guards and
guerrillas.605
The anti-guerrilla campaign was part of a "massive hunt for
the Mujahideen"0 ° that was to result in nsome 5,000-6,000
people...killed or executed."6 0 7  The violence continued in
June when eleven Mujaheddin members were executed in Bandar
Abbas. In a unique conglomeration of psychological and
theological intimidation, one of them was hung in the public
square "to enable others to learn a lesson from such unholy
people." 60 8 Five more Mujaheddin were executed in early July
for "armed rebellion and opposition to the Iranian
regime. .609
The Iranian Government launched an official propaganda
campaign on August 16 against the "interior terrorism of
hypocrites," again utilizing the regime's sanctioned parlance
605Ibid.
606Cordesman and Wagner, Modern War, p. 155.
60 7Ibid.
""Public hanging," Times, June 3, 1982, p. 7.
609Teimourian, "Iran's hawks pressing for full invasion,"
Times, July 12, 1982, p. 4.
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to describe the Mujaheddin.' 10 On August 18, the Mujaheddin
office in Paris issued a communique stating that the Islamic
Republic of Iran had executed "hundreds of political
prisonerso from August 15 through August 17.611
In December, Amnesty International issued a statement
claiming that over 3,000 executions had been carried out by
the Iranian Government since Bani-Sadr's departure. The
Mujaheddin claimed that the figure was actually closer to
7,000.612
Mujaheddin military commander Mehran Asdaghi was hung at
Tehran's Evin Prison on January 12, 1985. The authorities
claimed Asdaghi had confessed to torturing people with cables,
boiling water and hot irons before killing them.613 Four
more Mujaheddin guerrillas were hung in public in Tabriz in
February after confessing and being tried for killing local
shopkeepers. 614
In October of 1985, the Mujaheddin called a news conference
in Paris to offer to the public the testimonies of two
610.70 Iranian officers reported shot after Qotbzadeh plot,"
Times, August 17, 1982, p. 6.
611Teimourian, "Iran Executions," Times, August 19, 1982, p. 4.
"'Wright, In the Name of God, p. 106.
613HKhomeini approves suicide hit squad,0 Times, January 16,
1985, p. 6.
614"Four guerrillas hanged in public," Times, February 25,
1985, p. 5.
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Mujaheddin members mistreated by the Iranian Government. One
of the former prisoners, Mojgan Homayounfar, stated the
Revolutionary Guards had cut off one of her feet with swords
and dumped her into the street to die. After she had been
admitted to a hospital, they had arrested her again, given her
a summary trial, and incarcerated her.615  She alleged to
have witnessed mass torture and executions and the detention
of people in cages "where you could only crouch."" Another
former prisoner, Behzad Naziri, stated he had been whipped for
"days at a time" on the soles of his feet.""
After the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the death of
Khomeini, the Mujaheddin were once again the target of
government repression. In retaliation for fighting alongside
"'Iraq during the war, more Mujaheddin were executed." 9




6'"The Iran-Iraq War was detrimental to the interests of the
Mujaheddin due to the organization's support of and alignment with
Iraq. By siding with the enemy (Iraq), the Mujaheddin became a
frequent target of Iranian governmental diatribe. As a result, the
central government in Tehran had a convenient excuse to demonize
the Mujaheddin by painting the organization as un-Iranian (in
addition to being un-Islamic hypocrites). In this instance, the
Mujaheddin damaged thsir chances of attaining political and
cultural credibility. By raiding Iran from Iraqi soil, they came
to be identified as allies of Saddam Hussein, thereby bestowing a
certain legitimacy upon the Iranian government's credibility in the
hearts and minds of Iranians engaged in the struggle against the
invader.
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Those who were not executed were sent to reeducation camps
"very similar to thcse set up by the Vietnamese after the fall
of South Vietnam, or in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge." 620
By this time, "the group's activities were considerably
reduced and... they presented no real challenge" to the
regime.6n Iranian President Rafsanjani oversaw the arrest
of many Mujaheddin members in December of 1991 to ensure
domestic tranquility in the months before the balloting of
1992.622
The Mujaheddin, although still nominally active, have been
effectively excluded from the political process in Iran
through adroit maneuvering by the government. The political
exclusion was n"-de even more effective by military suppress )n
coupled with theolcgical ostracism. In the repression
following the Iranian Revolution, the Mujaheddin bore a heavy
burden in the regime's process of coercive power consolidation
(see Table 2 on page 189 for a comparison of the claims of
Mujaheddin death tolls by the various sources utilized in this
study.)
"619Wright, In the Name of God, p. 196.
62 0Zabih, "The Non-Communist Left in Iran," Chelkowski and
Pranger, eds., Ideolocy and Power in the Middle East, p. 253.
62 1Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 521.
622Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World, p. 359.
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C. THE FEDAYEEN-E-KHALQ
The Marxist Fedayeen-e-Khalq was formed in 1963 in
opposition to the monarchy of the Pahlavis.'" Fedayeen
members opposed the Shah throughout the sixties and
seventies.62 4 They received training from Palestinian
organizations and waged an unsuccessful campaign in 1971
against the Shah's security apparatus in Siahkal, located in
the Caspian forests of Northern Iran.' 25
In the wake of the Siahkal operation, many Fedayeen members
were jailed, and some of them died at the hands of their
jailers.' 26 Based in the cities of Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan
and Tabriz, the Fedayeen drew its support primarily from the
middle class, to include professionals, teachers, civil
servants627  and student organizations.628 They were
revitalized by the Shah's downfall and departure.6 29
623 Ibid.
624Munson, Henry, Jr., Islam and Revolution in the Middle East
(New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 57.
625 Janke, Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations, p. 231.
626Bakhash, "Historical Setting," Metz, ed., Iran, p. 41.
627Afshar, Haleh, Iran: A Revolution in Turmoil (Albany, N.Y.:
State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 8.
62S Ibid.
62 9Hooglund, "Government and Politics," Metz, ed., Iran, p.
211.
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The Fedayeen took part in the February 9, 1979 attack on an
air force base, siding with the air force technicians who had
expressed support for Khomeini in the face of reprisals from
the Shah's Imperial Guards.630  The Fedayeen also played a
crucial role in distributing guns and opening up "prisons,
police stations, armories and Tehran's major military
bases."63 1 Due to memories of repression at the hands of the
Shah's armed forces, the Fedayeen called for the complete
dismantlement of the regular armed forces.' 3
The Fedayeen attacked the United States Embassy compound on
February 14, killing an Iranian employee, wounding a Marine
guard, and taking American prisoners. They were convinced to
release the prisoners, but the incident served as an example
of the lack of stability within Iran.'3  During that time,
Khomeini accused the Fedayeen of receiving supplies, to
include weapons and money, from the United States.634
Fedayeen members were part of the anti-government activities
that took place in Gonbad-e-Qavus in March of 1979. With the
Turkomans, they demanded a boycott on the referendum for an
"6Munson, Islam and Revolution in the Middle East, p. 64.
63*Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 257.
63'Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraa at War, p. 35.
133Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, p. 281.
'
3 4 Ibid., p. 280.
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Islamic Republic,63 5 stating there were not enough choices on
the ballot.636 The Fedayeen indicated that Iran should have
democratic institutions before the constitutional
referendum.'63 During the demonstrations, fighting broke out
between Fedayeen backed Turkomans and government forces that
lasted eight days.5* 3  Due to their aid and support for the
Turkomans, the Fedayeen were referred to by Khomeini as
"disruptionists" who were spreading "poison and disunion among
our people..639
The Fedayeen were called "counterrevolutionaries"040 and
"armed trouble-making individuals" who came to Gonbad-e-Qavus
from "outside. "641 As the short conflict wound on, the
Interior Ministry theologically denounced the "satanic
6 3 5Kifner, "Turkomans Battle Iranian Forces in New Outbreak of
tribal Separatism," New York Times, March 28, 1979, p. 3.
'
36 Jaynes, "Landslide Victory for Khomeini Reported in Voting,"
New York Times, April 1, 1979, p. 6.
637Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 173.
"
638Kifner, "Iran Troubled by Traditional Resistance of Its
Minorities," New York Times, April 11, 1979, p. 8.
"639Kifner, "Iran Winds Up Campaign to Get Out Vote Today for an
Islamic Republic," New York Times, March 30, 1979, p. 6.
"640 "Spokesman Entezam Comments on Unrest, 'Superpower'
Presence," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 01
Apr 79 (LD011330), April 2, 1979, p. R14.
"641'Prime Minister: Army Will Restore Peace in Gonbad-E-
Kavus," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1300 GMT, 01 Apr
79 (LD011450), April 2, 1979, p. R15.
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designs" of the Fedayeen in an attempt to alienate them from
their Turkoman allies." 2  The Fedayeen yielded to superior
air"3 and ground forces in early April."'
In early May of 1979, the announcement of the formation of
the Pasdaran fueled suspicion that the government would
attempt to take the Fedayeen's weapons away in an attempt to
establish legitimacy on the part of the government." 5 The
announcement came as the government was trying to consolidate
its control among Islamic and leftist factions.64"
In August of 1979, pro-Khomeini demonstrators attacked and
ransacked the Fedayeen's Tehran headquarters. Four Fedayeen
members were beaten and had to be hospitalized as a
result.64" The attacks were in retaliation for a leftist
protest that erupted into a riot between Islamic and leftist
"642"Interior Ministry Issues Message on Gonbad-E-Kavus," Tehran
Domestic Service in Persian, FBIS, 1030 GMT, 03 Apr 79 (LD031442),
April 4, 1979, p. R8.
"
3Kifner, "Turkomans Battle Iranian Forces in New Outbreak of
tribal Separatism," New York Times, March 28, 1979, p. 3.
"64'"Gonbad-E Kavus Fighting Continues Despite Cease-Fire,"
London Reuter, in English, FBIS, 2036 GMT, 01 Apr 79 (WA022056),
April 3, 1979, p. R8.
"'Kifner, "Khomeini Organizes a New Armed Force," New York




"Khomeini's Backers Raid Headquarters of Iranian Leftists,"
New York Times, August 14, 1979, p. 1.
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factions, injuring hundreds of people."4" The Fedayeen
denounced the government's moves to control the press and the
religious nature of the Iranian Revolution, contending it was
"not progressive enough." 649 A government soldier who took
part in the raid on the Fedayeen's headquarters later
scattered leftist literature on the street, referring to it as
"Communist garbage." 650
In response to the events of the previous days, a Fedayeen
spokesman stated
We are moving from anarchy to fascism... People are being
jailed.. .Newspapers are being shut down. Political views
are being suppressed by blinded fanatics who claim the
right to rule in the name of Islam.6 5 '
The Fedayeen then went underground, fueling speculation that
its opposition to the regime was at an end.
65 2
The Fedayeen also assisted the Turkomans who battled
government forces in Gonbad-e-Qavus from February 9 - 12,
1980.653 Government propaganda accused the Fedayeen of being
648
"A Tehran Protest on Papers' Closure Erupts into Rioting,"
New York Times, August 13, 1979, p. 1.
"6'9"Khomeini's Backers Raid Headquarters of Iranian Leftists,"
New York Times, August 14, 1979, p. 9.
6 5 0 Ibid, p. 1.
6 5 1Ibrahim, "Unrest Said to Show Rising Opposition to
Khomeini," New York Times, August 17, 1979, p. 2.
65 2
"Khomeini Offers Money to Kurds In Apparent Effort to End
Uprising," New York Times, August 23, 1979, p. 4.
613Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 171.
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the "bloodthirsty hand of foreign mercenaries" who represented
a counterrevolution that was "terrified by the flourishing of
the Islamic Revolution. "654 The Revolutionary Guards
eventually blamed the Fedayeen for the disturbances. 5. and
arrested four members of the organization.'"' The Fedayeen
were labeled as an "anti-Islamico group as well as a
"counterrevolutionary" one, signifying their status as
official theological and political enemies of the
government. 657
On April 19, 1980, an official campaign was initiated to
"purge the country's universities and colleges of radical
student groups."65 8 This was brought about by a proclamation
from the Khomeini faction that an "Islamic purge" was
necessary in order to deny the Fedayeen "their most fruitful
"654"Revolution Guards Statement," Tehran Domestic Service, in
Persian, FBIS, 1700 GMT, 09 Feb 80 (LD091850), February 11, 1980,
p. 28.
"
5ss"More on Clashes," London BBC World Service in English,
FBIS, 0600 GMT, 11 Feb 80 (TA110634), February 11, 1980, p. 32.
"656"Casualties from Fighting," Tehran Domestic Service in
Persian, FBIS, 1051 GMT, 10 Feb 80 (LD101144), February 11, 1980,
p. 31.
657wDisturbances in Gonbad-E-Qavus Reported," Tehran Domestic
Service in Persian, FBIS, 2030 GMT, 11 Feb 80 (LD112220), February
12, 1980, p. 18.
658Allaway, "Student violence leads to Tehran purges," Times,
April 19, 1980, p. 5.
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bases for recruiting and organization."65 9 Another ayatollah
stated the need to "kick out the leftistso with the "use of
the great force of the masses against them." 660
On July 4, 1980, Ayatollah Montazeri called for the
dissolution of the Fedayeen. Montazeri stated there was no
room in Iran for left 4.sts and that the government would
tolerate no opposition to the religious regime of Ayatollah
Khomeini.661
After the Iraqi invasion of Iran, the Fedayeen supported the
war effort in Iran and called for "the defence of the
revolution and independence of the country in the face of
attacks from the Iraqi fascist regime."662
Fedayeen members and supporters were attacked by government
supporters in Tehran in early February 1981 when the Fedayeen
gathered to commemorate the second anniversary of the Iranian
Revolution.66 3  Government forces and religious supporters
used a variety of weapons against the Fedayeen, injuring at
least 45, some of whom were later treated for bullet and stab
659 Ibid.
660 Ibid.
"66'Fisk, "Iran demand for ban on left-wing opposition," Times,
July 5, 1980, p. 1.
"662Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 173.
"663Allaway, "Many demonstrators arrested in violent Tehran
street clashes," Times, February 7, 1981, p. 5.
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wounds. Many Fedayeen members were also taken away for
questioning. In the wake of the violence, the government
demonized the Fedayeen by accusing them of Hworking for their
American masters* to foment dissent in Tehran."64
With the dismissal of Bani-Sadr from the Presidency in June
of 1981, the Fedayeen "joined the Mojahedin uprising.. .and
consequently lost most of its cadres in the ensuing
confrontation with the regime."66s The mass arrests and
executions of the 18 month "reign of terror,"666 while
focused primarily on the Mujaheddin, took its toll on the
Fedayeen as well. 66  "Nearly all those arrested and tried
since Mr. Bani-Sadr's downfall have been supporters of the
Mujahidin or of the Marxist Fedayeen group..668
The government dealt a further blow to the Fedayeen in early
1982 when it discovered and destroyed the organization's
underground publishing facility and political cells, killing
664Ibid.
"665Hooglund, "Government and Politics," Metz, ed., Iran, p.
217.
"6'Wright, In the Name of God, p. 99.
"667The mass executions and arrests are detailed in the section
of this paper dealing with the Mujaheddin. The government's anti-
leftist campaign and the way in which it was chronicled in various
periodicals, publications and books would indicate that the
Fedayeen were, in many cases, lumped together in the same category
as the Mujaheddin when describing the "reign of terror."
"66"Tehran business leaders executed by firing squads," Times,
July 14, 1981, p. 5.
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----------------------------------------_ .. _._ .... __ .. --
many partisans."'1 The Fedayeen was declared illegal in
1983'" in the wake of mass arrests.'7
The Fedayeen was sufficiently *decimateda672 by the
Revolutionary Guards in the Iranian Revolutions's political
purges' 73 that it "had effectively ceased to pose a serious
threat to the Iranian regime by the mid-1980s..67 4
"661Milani, The MakinQ of Iran's Islamic Revolution, p. 301.
67'Although Ayatollah Montazeri called for the dissolution of
the Fedayeen in 1980, they were not declared illegal until 1983.
The reasons for this delay may be attributed to the Iran-War (which
began in September of 1980), and preoccupations with the Kurds and
other ethnic minorities.
67 1Ibid., p. 304.
"672Janke, Guerrilla and Terrorist OrQanisations, p. 231.
'73According to Delury's World Encyclopedia, sixty Fedayeen
were arrested in one operation in January of 1986, p. 525.
674Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p. 164.
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V. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
Before the Iranian Revolution, non-Shi'i religious
minorities lived in Iran, co-existing with the Shii majority.
After the revolution, Khomeini suppressed the Baha'is and the
Jews, often drawing the attention of international
organizations.675
In evaluating the hundreds of executions ordered each
year, separating cases of executions for actual crimes
from executions based purely on the defendant's beliefs,
statements, or associations, was difficult, given the
regime's practice of cloaking the latter category with
trumped-up charges from the former category. 6 "'
A. THE BAHA'IS
The Baha'i religion was founded in 1863 by Mirza Husain Ali
(Baha'ollah), a self-proclaimed prophet. 6 7  Since its
inception, Baha'is in Iran were despised as apostates because
they had adhered to another religion after the establishment
of Islam6"' and, as a result, were consistently oppressed.6"9
In Iran, the Baha'is were commonly regarded as Zionists who
675Kechichian and Sadri, "National Security," Metz, ed., Iran,
p. 296.
676ibid.
"677Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, p. 576.
670Degenhardt, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, p. 170.
"'1Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 533.
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threatened to take over and control the economy.' 0
Additionally, due to their illegitimate status in Islamic
eyes, the Baha'is have never been formally recognized by any
Iranian government."61
In 1955, the Baha'i faith was proclaimed illegal and the
main Baha'i Center in Tehran was publicly destroyed by leading
government officials." 2  Concerning religious oppression in
the Middle East, Alan Richards and John Waterbury wrote in A
Political Economy of the Middle East that "Some minorities
have not fared well; but none worse than the Baha'is in
Iran."683  Concerning the state of Baha'ism in Iran, Philip
K. Hitti wrote "the most interesting religion modern Persia
gave the world has been denied a place in the land of its
origin. .684
When the Iranian Revolution occurred, there were
approximately 450,000 Baha'is in Iran.6"' Their loyalty to
"68°Tabari, Azar, "The Role of the Clergy in Modern Iranian
Politics," Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran, p. 68.
"
1Keddie and Cole, "Introduction," Cole and Keddie, eds.,
Shi'ism and Social Protest, p. 25.
"682Esposito, John L., Islam and Politics, Revised, Second
Edition (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. 123.
"683Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle
East, p. 346.
"684Hitti, The Near East in History, p. 405.
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the Shah and their status as religious non-entities6" had
resulted in the appointment of Baha'is to key medical,
management and administrative posts in spite of anti-Baha'i
"sustained and systematic persecution" which relegated them to
status as "second-class citizens."687  The Shah's opponents
criticized him for permitting the Baha'is to occupy important
government and military positions at the expense of Shi'i
Muslims .6s
The importance of the Baha'is in these posts may have been
exaggerated due to the fact that they were regarded as
infidels..6 9 Their loyalty to the Shah also drew the
attention of Ayatollah Khomeini, who stated they were an
unlawful political faction that would not be accepted.' 9 °
This accusation selectively ignored the Baha'i prohibition
against any participation in political movements or taking any
sort of political office.691
"686Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 533.
"68'Coleman, Michael, "Eleven vanish into unknown jail," Times,
August 30, 1980, p. 4.
"6'OEsposito, Islam and Politics, p. 231.
"689Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 242.
"69'Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 175.
"691Coleman, "Bahais pay price for taking no sides," Times, July
15, 1980, p. 6.
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Early in the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Sadoughi called
for Irariians to *chase the Baha'is you know from all
administrative positions and deliver them to the
revolutionary court."" 2  Sadoughi was later to proclaim
that the Baha'is were "mahdour-e damn" which translates as
"those whose blood may be shed."'93 In retrospect, history
would reveal that the Iranian Government's "persecution of the
Baha'is was particularly ferocious.""'9 Throughoi': Iran,
Baha'is were arrested and held without charge in Tehran,
Tabriz, Shiraz and Yazd.695 The persecution of the Baha'is
was lacer revealed to have no legal basis"9' and was present
in all phases of the Iranian Revolution."'
Shortly after February 11, 1979, unidentified persons broke
into Baha'i offices in Tehran and rifled them, taking
membership lists of Baha'is in Iran, which may have been
692 Ibid.
6'3Fischer, Michael M.J., "Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of
Understanding," Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurqent Islam (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 153.
"6"Johnson, Paul, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to
the Nineties, Revised Edition (New York: HarperPerennial, 1991),
p. 713.
"695Coleman, "Bahais pay price for taking no sides," Times, July
15, 1980, p. 6.
"'9Keddie, "Islamic Revivalism Past and Present, with Emphasis
on Iran," Rosen, ed., Iran Since the Revolution, p. 14.
"697 Ibid., p. 15.
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handed over to anti-Baha'i groups.69 8  Baha'i meetings and
classes were interrupted and broken up as well." 9  Baha'i
properties and holdings, to include the Baha'is' main
investment company,70 0  were also seized under the
justification that the Baha'is were supporters of Zionism,70'
because the world center for the Baha'is was located in Haifa,
Israel.' 0 2  Four charges were commonly leveled at the
Baha'is: "encouragement of prostitution, pro-Zionism, anti-
Islam and sending funds to Israel.""°3
un July 13, 1980, Dr. Faramarz Samandari and Mr. Yadullah
Astani, two Baha'is held in detention, were removed from their
jail cells and executed.70 4 Dr. Samandari was charged with
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On August 21, 1980, in response to Ayatollah Sadoughils
appeal, nine members of the National Spiritual Assembly of the
Baha'is of Iran were arrested and taken to an unknown location
under suspicion of espionage.7 06  At the same time, ten
Baha'is were executed for alleged "involvement in a planned
coup." 7 0 7  On September 7, 1980, seven Baha'is arrested
in June of that year were executed in Yazd. In a secret
trial, they were charged with spying. Three of the executed
persons were alleged leaders of the local Baha'i
community.7 0 8
On December 17, 1980, two Baha'is were assassinated in
Khorassan for unspecified reasons.7 0 9
On January 10, 1981, Revolutionary Guards interrogated
Professor Manuchihr Hakim about his activities as a Baha'i.
He was a physician and member of the Tehran University




0 7Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 176.
708 "Iranian Cabinet dispute flares up in Majlis," Times,
September 10, 1980, p. 6.
709Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 176.
"70 "Hostages legislation delayed in Tehran, Times, January 14,
1981, p. 5.
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On 14 Jun 1981, seven Baha'is were executed by a firing
squad.7 1 1  As the toll of Baha'is executed since the Iranian
Revolution mounted to 40, 50 British Ministers of Parliament
sent an appeal to Ayatollah Khomeini to cease the killing of
Baha'is and other minorities in Iran: NWe strongly urge you
to use your personal and moral authority to inquire into the
deaths of members of ethnic and religious minorities,
including the Baha'i community." 7 12
The government became so intent on persecuting the Baha'is
that on August 12, 1981, 150 Baha'is, an undetermined number
of them deceased, were ordered to report to the local
revolutionary court in Yazd by August 15. The Baha'is who did
report were told that they could be charged for their
religious beliefs, not any specific crimes. Additionally,
furniture, livestock and crops were at the time being
systematically seized from Baha'is in the area.13
In response to government persecution of Iranian Baha'is, in
late 1981, the United Nations Human Rights Sub-Commission
"71 Allaway, "Bani-Sadr defies ultimatum by Ayatollah," Times,
June 16, 1981, p. 1.
712
mIran sends four more to firing squads," Times, July 16,
1981, p. 7.
"
73Allaway, "Danish ship seized by Iranians," Times, August 13,
1981, p. 4.
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requested that increased pressure be pplied to Iran in order
to cease auxti-Baha'i activities."'
In late December of 1981, the Iranian government executed
eight members of the Baha'i National Spiritual Assembly.
Baha'i sources claimed the Baha'is were killed for their
religious beliefs. Ayatollah Moussavi-Ardabili, Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, stated the Baha'is were guilty of spying
for unnamed foreign countries.7 15  The Iranian Government
had earlier denied the December execution of the eight
Baha, is. 7 16
The Baha'i National Assembly issued a statement that Iranian
firing squads executed six Baha'i leaders on January 1,
1982."I The Assembly alleged that the Iranian Government was
trying to eradicate the Baha'i faith from its birthplace. The
six executed Baha'is were arrested in December of 1981 along
with a woman who was providing them refuge. They were then
sentenced without charges or a trial. 1 8  According to
"'Allaway, "Two killed in Tehran street gunfights," Times,
September 10, 1981, p. 6.
"715"Bahais executed in Iran," Times, January 9, 1982, p. 5.
"716"Iran executes 18 insurgents," Times, January 4, 1982, p. 4.
"71"Bahais executed in Iran," Times, January 9, 1982, p. 5.
"78 Ibid.
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Baha ' i sources, the Iranian government had acknowledged the
execution of 97 Bahalis since the Iranian Revolution.719
The Times reported in early 1981 that the Iranian government
requested that its employees state their religion."' A
number of Bahali civil servants viewed this as a calculated
maneuver to remove Bahalis from their positions through legal
maneuvering. 121 The penalty for refusing to comply with the
government census was dismissal and possible incarceration.
One civil servant commented that if "somebody gave false
information concerning his religious background, he would risk
the danger of being identified and executed. 022
The Times reported that Iranian Baha'is in Hong Kong were
'121ordered back to Iran to face unspecified charges. A Hong
Kong spokesman for the Bahalis stated that the Bahalis did not
want to return, fearing they would be the victims of a
"religious purge with political significance" upon their
return to Iran. 724 The Iranian consulate in Hong Kong told
719.Ibid.
720 "Executed Iranians 'had tongues pulled out, "' Times, January
7, 1981, P. 4.
721 Ibid.
721 Ibid.
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the Baha'is that their passports would not be renewed upon
expiration." 5
On July 12, 1982, The Times reported that four Baha'is were
executed on July 11.76 The Baha'is were cryptically charged
with "being members of an organization trying to overthrow the
government." 7 2 7  Three more Baha'is were hung in secret by
the government in March of 1983.78 The secret hangings
continued in June of that year when 22 Baha'is were executed
in Shiraz.7" They had been condemned to death the previous
February and kept in detention in order to extract self-
incriminating confessions. The Baha'is had been beaten in
order to persuade them to renounce their faith and become
Muslims. When they refused, they were eventually
executed.7 3 °
725 Ibid.
"7 6Teimourian, "Iran's hawks pressing for a full invasion,"
Times, July 12, 1982, p. 4.
"
72Ibid.
"78 "Bahais hanged," Times, March 17, 1983, p. 6.
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During the month of July, 1983, 22 more Baha'is were
arrested in the cities of Tehran, Shiraz and Mashhad. All of
them were accused of espionage. 7 3 1
The Times reported on November 12, 1984 that the Iranian
Government had executed three Baha'is, including Ahmed
Bashari, a member of the disbanded Baha'i National
Assembly.'"
Iranian Baha'is were consistently executed as a result of
espionage charges. They were usually charged with Zionist
spying for Israel."" Other ch.-, --s brought against the
Baha'is involved the establishment of a dissident Bahali
movement.
Whereas Christian, Jews and Zoroastrians were recognized in
Iran's Constitution, the Baha'is were not"35 and were
"pointedly excluded from any constitutional rights or
representation in parliament..1 36 In fact, the Baha'is were
"731"Iran spying denied by Red Cross," Times, July 29, 1983, p.
6.
"732"Bahais executed," Times, November 12, 1984, p. 5.
"733Bahais executed in Iran," Times, January 9, 1982, p. 5.
"734Degenhardt, Political Dissent, p. 176.
735Ibid., p. 175.
"
6Wright, In the Name of God, p. 106.
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the "only major religious community denied representation by
the constitution. "73
According to Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, Iran
declared all Baha'i institutions, "including educational and
charitable ones" illegal.7 3 8  Additionally, "the Islamic
Revolution Prosecutor-General insisted no individual had been
executed on religious grounds, and that all those killed had
been found guilty of espionage or treason. m739
The Iranian Government did not recognize Baha'ism as a
religion740 nor allow them any seats in the Parliament.T4
Going one step further, the Islamic Republican Party
"*attempted the total destruction of the country's Baha'i
community,"7 42 executing Baha'is "primarily because they were
Baha'i. w43
As events during the Iranian Revolution began to enter the
realm of public knowledge, it became clear that Iran's
737 Ibid., p. 181.
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largest religious minority, the Baha'is, have actually
been subjected to officially sanctioned persecution. At
least two hundred Baha'is have been executed, and an
estimated 767 were in prison by the end of 1985. Baha'is
are forbidden to hold government jobs or attend public
schools. The ruling clerics justify such harsh measures
against the Baha'i on grounds that the adherents are
apostates, a reference to the fact that the religion
originated among Shi'i Muslims in Iran in the mid-
nineteenth century. "44
In June of 1988, the Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations of the United States House of
Representatives held hearings on the religious persecution of
Baha'is in Iran. In the hearings, Illinois Representative
John Porter described the behavior of the Khomeini regime
towards the Iranian Baha'i community as "institutionalized
hostility. "74 The eventual outcome of the hearings was a
resolution calling on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease
anti-Baha'i activities and "restore fully the rights
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
including freedom of thought, conscience and religion
education, and equal protection of the law."i7 46
744Hooglund, "Iran 1980-1985," Keddie and Hooglund, eds., The
Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, pp. 24-5.
74 5Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and
International Organizations, Religious Persecution of Baha'is in
Iran, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Remarks of Representative Porter
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 29,
1988), p. 5.
746Ibid., 100th Congress Resolution 310, June 2, 1988, p. 9.
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John L. Esposito summarized the state of Baha'is in Iran in
his book Islam and Politics:
Although government officials insist that Baha'is have
been punished for political crimes and not religious
reasons, the rights of non-Muslim minorities in an Islamic
state remain an unresolved issue.7 47
B. THE JEWS
Throughout the Muslim world, the Jews enjoy special
considerations as Ahl al-dhimmah, or dhimmi ("people of the
book"). 7 48 Their status stems from the Prophet's reverence
for Hebrew scriptures and his regard for their revealed
religion.7 49
The Jewish presence in Iran dates back for over 2,500
years.7 5 0  Iranian Jews descended from those who stayed in
the region after the Babylonian captivity, after the Jews were
allowed to return to Jerusalem by the Achaemenid rulers of the
first Iranian empire."' A number of Iraqi Jews chose to
immigrate to Iran rather than to Israel in 1948, which
augmented the Iranian Jewish population. The Jews in Iran
74 7Esposito, Islam and Politics, p. 230.
748Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the
Present (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1951), p. 233.
741Ibid.
"750Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 534.
7s5 Hooglund, "The Society and Its Environment," Metz, ed.,
Iran, p. 128.
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eventually became culturally and linguistically
indistinguishable from ethnic Persians.7 5 2 Although regarded
as inferior by Persian Shi'i, they integrated into Persian
society and appreciated its culture.7 53
The Shah's toleration of Jews made him appear to some as the
"hireling of the Americans,I as his detractors liked to point
out. 7 5 4 In the parliamentary crisis of 1961, Ayatollah
Khomeini intimated that the Koran and Islam were in danger
from Jews and Zionists, indicating what would also be his
sentiments in a few years." 5  Throughout his period of
exile, Khomeini referred to the Jews only in the most
vitriolic of terms, scarcely disguising his contempt.75 6
When the Shah left Iran, there were approximately 100,000
Jews living in the country, mostly in Tehran, Shiraz, Hamadan,
Isfahan, and Kashan. 7  In the early days of the Iranian
Revolution, the Jewish community of Tehran stated their desire
to be part of the new regime and attempted to distance
"712Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, PA: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p. 83.
"753Ibid.
"7"Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions, p. 266.
"755Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 26.
"756Ibid., p. 37.
757Delury, World Encyclopedia, p. 534.
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themselves from Israel.'" Although Jewish leaders said they
expected some anti-Jewish violence, they issued statements
emphasizing that their primary allegiance was to Iran and not
to Israel. In support of this statement, they cited a local
Jewish hospital's treatment of many Muslims wounded in an
anti-Shah demonstration in 1978.'5'
Stating a further desire for integration within the new
regime, the Jewish leaders proclaimed
We want cooperation between the two peoples, Moslems and
Jews, regardless of religion... Khomeini has declared that
the minorities would have a better chance to prosper now
than under the old regime.. .we want to work with him.7"0
Jews also took part in anti-Shah demonstrations in Shiraz.
Their cry was for unity; "Muslim, Jew, Christian: Shout down
with the shah!"7"
Khomeini met with Iranian Jews in April of 1979 and offered
his assurances that they had a part to play in the new Iran as
long as they did not associate with "Zionists and oppressors
of Islam."n62
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On May 9, 1979, a prominent Jewish businessman was executed
by a revolutionary firing squad. Habib Elghanian was charged
with spying and raising money for Israel. As the first non-
Muslim killed by the new Islamically oriented regime, his
death alarmed the Iranian Jewish community so much that no one
wanted to attend his funeral.7 63  The Iranian Government
stated Elghanian was guilty of "friendship with the enemies of
God and being an enemy of the friends of God, .7•4 once again
undertaking repressive action using a theological
justification. The Jewish population also became alarmed as
the Shi'i clerics ceased to distinguish between Judaism and
Zionism, often employing anti-Semitic rhetoric.7 65
As the Iranian Revolution progressed, anti-Jewish rhetoric
became common. Coupled with violent statements concerning
Israel and Zionism, many of Iran's Jews became frightened and
left the country."6  Many Jews were dismissed from civil
service and teaching jobs for no other reason than the fact
763Kifner, "Firing Squads Kill 2 Iran Businessmen," New York
Times, May 10, 1979, p. 1.
"764Ibid, p. 3.
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that they were Jewish."" Additionally, many synagogues were
desecrated." 8
As restrictions upon the Jews became harsher, many were
prohibited from emigrating to Israel because that was viewed
as a *Zionist act* by the Iranian Government.769  The
government impounded the passports of many Jews who had
visited Israel to ensure their inability to commit any such
acts.770
Khomeini also severed diplomatic ties to Israel and later
permitted the Palestine Liberation Organization to house their
mission in Tehran in the former Israeli Embassy.7 7
In May of 1979, a Jewish woman was tortured and beheaded in
her Shiraz home by unknown assailants. Her funeral was
disrupted by demonstrators who shouted
This is only the beginning. This is nothing compared to
what will happen to the Jews. 7"
In May of 1981, several leading members of Tehran's Jewish
community were arrested, to include a rabbi and his wife.
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They were charged with receiving payment to help Iranian Jews
leave the country in order to avoid military service.""3
In 1981, an Islamic code of retribution (Layeha-ye Qesas)
was presented to the Parliament. Under this new "Bill of
Vengeance," Jews could be held accountable for crimes that
they had not committed. If a Muslim alleged that a Jew had
committed a crime, that Jew could be required to pay a blood
money compensation, or, be executed under certain
circumstances."'4
The law was passed in 1982.""' In the wake of this type of
discrimination, many Jews left Iran for Europe, Israel, and
the United States.7 7
During the course of the Iranian Revolution, some "were
condemned primarily because they were.. .Jews." 7 7 By the
mid-1980's, the number of Jews in Iran had dropped to
approximately 40,000 due to government policies and
repression.7 7 8
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p. 6.
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ed., Iran Since the Revolution, p. 91.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989 marked the
passing of an era for Iran. The defeat of Saddam Hussein and
the breakup of the Soviet Union also altered the context of
Iran's views toward itself and the rest of the world."9'
There has been no small amount of speculation concerning
what changes might occur in Iran's internal policies towards
the military, ethnic minorities, political opposition parties,
and religious minorities. Recent studies seem to indicate
that although Rafsanjani's government has made some progress
towards addressing Iran's many internal problems, the
political process in Iran has been relegated to a lower
priority due to the economic problems and a shortage of food
and consumer goods." 8"
In retrospect, the very existence of the Islamic Republic
belies Skocpol's contention that the military would have had
to disintegrate due to outside pressures for the revolution to
succeed. In spite of the fact that the Pahlavis had the most
"'*7Hooglund, "Iran's Security Policies: 'New Thinking' or New
Means to Pursue Old Objectives?" Dorr, Steven R. and Slater, Neysa
M., eds., Balance of Power in Central And Southwest Asia (NP:
Defense Academic and Research Support Program, 1992), p. 51.
7 8 0Schahgaldian, "The Current Political and Economic
Environment in Iran," Dorr and Slater, eds., Balance of Power in
Central and Southwest Asia, p. 107.
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powerful, well-equipped and well trained military machine in
the region, this was unable to save them from losing power.
On one hand, the Khomeini Regime neutralized the military
politically and socially from within, thereby partially
negating its effectiveness. On the other hand, the military's
hierarchy was structured in such a manner that it was
emasculated without the Shah to direct it. The Shah's
insistence that the military chiefs deal directly with him,
coupled with his prohibition that they have any contact among
themselves, prevented effective coordination to counter the
revolution and undermined the military's command and control
structure at the time when it needed cross -communication most.
In contradiction to Skocpolls theory, the Khomeini Regime
came to power not only in spite of the armed f orces, but
because of them as well. The Khomeini Regime identified the
incorporation of the armed forces into its power structure as
the crucial element to successful power consolidation and took
active measures before and during the revolution to accomplish
this. Its appeals to the armed forces to desert the monarchy
(who were the backbone of the monarch's power) during the last
days of the Pahlavi Regime and join with the Imam's forces
were successful.
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Having incorporated the armed forces unto itself, the
Khomeini Regime left the infrastructure of the military
intact. It then embarked upon a purge of the monarchists from
the upper ranks, replacing them with "ideologically pure"
officers. With the military under its control, the Khomeini
Regime then used the armed forces to consolidate its own power
by suppressi-g ethnic minorities, political opposition groups
and religious minorities that had been officially labeled "un-
Islamic" and "corrupt." By means of a later "ideological
purge," the Islamic Republic further ensured military loyalty
to the government.
The Islamic Republic demonized its enemies throughout the
power consolidation process, labelling those with whom it was
displeased as "enemies of God" and "corruption on earth."
Through this demonization process, the Islamic Republic
provided a jurisprudential and theological justification for
its coercive power consolidation by purging those it deemed
"impure."
At present, the military is firmly on the side of the
government and will be its tool to withstand any external or
internal threats that may arise, although the military's
primary emphasis remains to defend the country from external
attack. Under the Islamic Republic, the military command and
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control structure has been realigned and has proven itself in
the war with Iraq and the suppression of dissident societal
elements.
While the regime has counted on the military to attain and
maintain its power (in a variation of Skocpol's theory), the
question of whether Iran's armed forces, ethnic minorities,
political opposition groups and religious minorities will ever
have freedom of expression and political rights under the
Iranian Constitution will have to be answered at some
indeterminate moment in the future by the Iranian Government.
Even if granted freedom of expression and political rights,
the repression suffered by the "enemies of God" will stand as
a clear legacy of the regime's method of coercive power
consolidation.
This process transformed "brothers in Islam" into "enemies
of God" and "corruption on the earth," providing the Islamic
Republic with an aegis under which to neutralize or eliminate
these elements of society that it deemed threatening or
unnecessary. By doing so, the Islamic Republic remade Iranian
society into a more "Islamic" mold in accordance with
Khomeini's vision of Shi'ism.
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